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Zero Trust Case Study: Taylor Wessing, Dr. Zurheide & Dr. Schelinski

Live case studyReal documents · real signatures · hashes published below · counts reproducible offline

A case study in why zero trust is necessary. One request for a person's own data under Article 15 GDPR, answered by partners of a leading international law firm under qualified signatures. Every assurance in the answer had to be taken on trust: the signature, the titles, “a month of manual review”, the protection of third parties, “every court will agree”. Checked against the delivered file, none of them holds. This page shows what trust produced, and how a checkable model would have left no room to deceive or to doubt.

15 August 2025 · letterDr. Tobias SchelinskiPartner, Taylor Wessing · specialist lawyer for information technology law
1 October 2025 · letter and Anlage 1Dr. Patrick Zurheide, LL.M.Salary Partner, Taylor Wessing, since 2025 · IT, data protection & tech litigation

Professional roles are taken from the firm's linked profiles. This page does not say whether blocking the Steam account was justified. It shows what the delivered file contains and what the signed letters say about it. Every figure can be checked against the files.

830 pagesin the attachment to the second letter
36 secondsfrom creation to last change of that attachment
905,672characters readable under its black rectangles
2 signaturesdeclared in the two letters, one in each

In short. A signature tells you who sent a file. It cannot tell you whether the file is complete, correct or true. Only checks on the bytes can, and anyone can repeat them.

Zero trust: check the file, not the sender

Zero trust means that nobody has to be believed: not a firm, not a title, not a signature, and not us. An answer to an access request should prove itself. It has to answer three questions, and a signature answers none of them.

Is the copy complete?Does the requester have everything that is theirs, and is every omission counted and explained?
Is the copy unchanged?Is each record what was originally held, and would any later change show?
Who decided what is hidden?Was the withholding decided by someone entitled to decide, and can anyone check it afterwards?

Most legal disputes in the EU stay closed: settlements under NDA, sealed files, decisions that are never published. We have nothing against that. This case is different, and probably not because what happened in it is rare. It has no NDA and no court decision, so it can be read from end to end: a very simple law, the GDPR; one request for a person's own data; what was actually delivered; and black rectangles that anyone can remove.

What makes it unique is who answered, and how. Dr. Tobias Schelinski and Dr. Patrick Zurheide are partners of Taylor Wessing, in its own words “a European legal services powerhouse”. Both hold doctorates; one is a certified specialist lawyer for IT law, the other holds a Master of Laws from Aberdeen. They took 106 days not to process a lawful access request. Along the way they handed the reported account holder the complaint texts and logins of more than 1,800 other people, some of whom may be minors, under black rectangles that anyone can remove.

PhishDestroy's view. A login, the user name, is highly personal data. It is reused across services, and an account that has lived for years is, in most cases, tied to a real person who can be identified through it. Looking only at the fifty visible fragments, we think any court could indeed be misled. With the full picture, the timeline and the arithmetic on this page make it plain that the GDPR request was not processed. No signature and no misspelled name changes that fact.

What trust produced, and what the model would have done

Each assurance in the answer is set below against the delivered file, and against the checkable model this page proposes. The evidence for every line follows further down.

The signature

„Dieses Schreiben ist qualifiziert elektronisch signiert“

It says who sent the letters. Under it, 905,672 characters stay readable beneath black rectangles.

Evidence

The firm signs a salted hash of every withheld field. The content is checked, not the sender.

The selection

Counsel decide what the requester gets to read.

50 complaints left readable, all filed after the block and the request; 43 of them are “Suspected Hijacker”. 1,944 covered over.

Evidence

A rule declared and signed when the copy is made, every withheld record counted, and the choice reviewed by the authority.

“A month of manual review”

„… die volle Monatsfrist ausgeschöpft … manuell die Daten bereinigt …“

An 830-page file made in 36 seconds. Its first readable row is a homophobic slur, and complaints left readable are contradicted by the same file.

Evidence

Nobody's word about effort counts. The file proves itself, and anyone can find a contradiction in it.

Third-party rights

„soweit keine Rechte Dritter entgegenstehen“

The logins and complaint texts of more than 1,800 other people, delivered under black rectangles that anyone can remove.

Evidence

Other people's data never enters the requester's copy. It travels sealed for the authority's key.

The copy of the data

„Auskunft gemäß Art. 15 Abs. 1, Abs. 3 DSGVO“

Payments, support tickets and the records behind the block are absent. Only the complaints appear complete.

Evidence

The signed manifest lists what is included and counts what is not. No gap can go unnoticed.

“Every court”

„Aus unserer Erfahrung wird jedes Gericht …“

Fifty fragments can mislead. The whole file shows a request that was not processed.

Evidence

The court or regulator opens the full original and checks every field against what the firm signed.

Every row has the same shape. An assurance that had to be believed, a file that contradicts it, and a check that would have made the assurance unnecessary. With the model there is nothing to deceive with and nothing to doubt: the requester sees what is theirs, the authority sees the rest, and every field is bound to what the firm signed. See the model

The evidence, point by point

Every line of the comparison above rests on the files below: two signed letters and Anlage 1. Page references use PDF page order, and every figure can be repeated offline.

The text remained under the black rectangles.

This is how an answer to a simple access request looks when it comes from the top of the profession. The black rectangles left the underlying text in the file. That made it possible to read and compare both groups: the 50 descriptions left visible and the 1,944 covered over.

THE LETTERTHE DELIVERED FILE

“Regardless of the details of the complaints”

The number alone is said to show repeated breaches of the Steam agreement.

Dr. Schelinski · 15 Aug 2025 · p. 2
„Unabhängig von den Einzelheiten der Beschwerden …“
50descriptions left visible
August–September 2025
1,944descriptions covered over
February 2021–July 2025

43 of the 50 visible descriptions are labelled “Suspected Hijacker”. Among the 1,944 covered descriptions, 269 have that label.

Anlage 1, pp. 444–620. One further record has an empty description: 50 + 1,944 + 1 = 1,995 rows in the supplied table.

Fifty complaints convenient for counsel

The October letter names the ground for the block: the account was blocked as „Used for Hijacking“ (Dr. Zurheide, p. 8). Of the fifty complaints the requester was allowed to read, 43 say the same thing: “Suspected Hijacker”. All fifty were filed months after the account was permanently blocked, after the access request, and after the last logon that the same file records.

Anlage 1, page 1, gives Last Client/Web Logon Time: 2025-05-23 20:48:31 (UTC). The account was blocked on 7 May 2025. On 9 May 2025 Steam Support answered the first ticket: the block was not an error, it was permanent, and the ticket was closed. The access request followed on 17 June. By the letters' own account, a third party had the account by then: Dr. Schelinski writes that it was acquired from a third party after 3 May 2025 (p. 2), and Dr. Zurheide that a third party made payments through it after 3 May, the last on 30 July 2025 (pp. 1–2). The supplied complaint table then records:

53Aug 2024
54Sep
70Oct
79Nov
82Dec
92Jan 2025
32Feb
35Mar
20Apr
12Mayblocked 7 May
last logon 23 May
1Jun
7Jul
47Aug
3Sep

Complaint text under a black rectangleComplaint text left readable

Complaints per month in Anlage 1, August 2024 to September 2025, counted from the file's text layer; the full history is under Verify it yourself. After the block on 7 May and the last logon on 23 May: one complaint in June, seven in July, then 47 in August.
  1. From this date, per the letters: a third partyThe account was “acquired from a third party”: Dr. Schelinski, p. 2 · “payments by a third party”: Dr. Zurheide, p. 1
  2. Account blockedSteam
  3. Not an error, permanent; ticket closedSteam Support, first ticket
  4. Last logonAnlage 1, p. 1
  5. Access requestDr. Zurheide, p. 1
  6. The deadline begins, “if at all”Dr. Schelinski, p. 1
  7. Last “payment by a third party”; data attributed to the requester only from hereDr. Zurheide, p. 2
  8. 47 complaints, all readableAnlage 1, pp. 444–448
  9. Termination: 1,938 complaints, “regardless of their details”Dr. Schelinski, p. 2
  10. 3 complaints, readableAnlage 1, p. 444
  11. “Date of Report”Anlage 1, p. 1
  12. The answer: “the full month”, data cleaned “by hand”Dr. Zurheide, p. 1

Dr. Zurheide writes that the full one-month period had to be used and the data cleaned by hand: „musste leider die volle Monatsfrist ausgeschöpft werden … manuell die Daten bereinigt werden mussten“ (p. 1). Three of the readable complaints are dated September 2025, and the report itself is dated 29 September. They were filed in the last weeks before the answer, while, by his account, the data was being cleaned.

“This account just started acting shady overnight”

Suspected Hijacker · August 2025 · p. 446

“Suddenly messaging people weird links probably stolen”

Suspected Hijacker · August 2025 · p. 448

“Friend warned me to report this one”

Suspected Hijacker · August 2025 · p. 446

“Everyone in voice chat agrees it's a stolen account”

Suspected Hijacker · August 2025 · p. 446

The same file contradicts them

Some of the fifty make claims that Anlage 1 can check against itself. The file records the account's logins and its security history. Both are in it; the security history is under a black rectangle.

Left readable · Suspected Hijacker · Aug 2025 · p. 446
“My friend can't log in, says someone changed the password”
Security History · p. 830 · under a black rectangleLast password change: July 2024

Not made by the owner, as the same file shows. There is no password change in 2025.

Left readable · Aug 2025 · pp. 446, 448
“This account just started acting shady overnight”
“Suddenly messaging people weird links probably stolen”
Login History · pp. 1–119Last logon: 23 May 2025

The login history ends in May 2025. Not one login is recorded in June, July, August or September. The account had been blocked since 7 May 2025; on 9 May Steam Support called the block permanent.

Left readable · Aug 2025 · pp. 445, 448
“Real person probably got locked out”
“My friend said they can't get into this account anymore”
Security History · p. 830No security change in 2025

The last change the security history records is the password reset of July 2024.

PhishDestroy's reading. The slur on page 444 needed a translation. These complaints are in English, and the answer to them is in the same file. A month of manual review left them readable and put the line that contradicts them under a rectangle.

How the fifty read

Formatting does not prove who wrote a complaint. It is exactly what a court would look at before counting one.

Visible and covered descriptions in Anlage 1
CheckLeft readable · 50Covered over · 1,944
PeriodAug–Sep 2025Feb 2021–Jul 2025
“Suspected Hijacker” category86%43 of 5013.8%269 of 1,944
Description contains Cyrillic4%2 of 5055.4%1,077 of 1,944
Reporter login: Latin letters + 3–5 digits62%31 of 5021.6%420 of 1,944

Cyrillic: at least one character from that script. Login pattern: Latin letters followed by 3–5 digits, nothing else. All 1,995 reporter logins, including those beside the 50 visible texts, are covered and remain extractable. No reporter login is reproduced here. Four readable texts repeat word for word across nine records; “Acting way off pretty sure someone else is using it” appears three times (pp. 446, 447).

Dr. Schelinski · 15 Aug 2025 · p. 2
„Unabhängig von den Einzelheiten der Beschwerden zeigt schon die bloße Anzahl …“

“Regardless of the details of the complaints, the mere number shows …”

Is the content really irrelevant to a court?
Dr. Zurheide · 1 Oct 2025 · p. 9
„Aus unserer Erfahrung wird jedes Gericht die Sperrung … als rechtmäßig qualifizieren.“

“In our experience, every court will qualify the block … as lawful.”

Has his experience included every court? And would every court agree, with data processed like this?

The two questions are PhishDestroy's. We do not say how a court should rule on the block. We say that a court should be able to read what it is asked to count.

What the black rectangles remove from view

The two letters treat the same complaints in two ways. Dr. Schelinski counted all of them against the requester, „1.938 Mal“, regardless of their details (15 Aug 2025, p. 2). Dr. Zurheide then drew a line at 30 July 2025: only from that date „können wir … davon ausgehen, dass etwaige Daten … sich auf Ihren Mandanten beziehen“ (1 Oct 2025, p. 2). The black rectangles follow that line: every complaint text up to 23 July 2025, the last one before it, is covered; every one from August on is readable.

PhishDestroy's reading. Before 30 July 2025 the complaints count against the requester as a number, and are withheld from him as data that is not his. The October letter itself argues from „zwischen 2019 und 2023“ (p. 7).

Anlage 1 · page 444 · the first readable row
Offensive AvatarSeptember 2025p***r

A homophobic slur, masked here. It is the first entry the requester could read, after a month of manual review.

What lies under the rectangles

1,148 complaints, more than half of the table, are filed as “Offensive Profile”. Not one was left readable: 1,147 have their text covered and one has no text. Read from under the rectangles, without logins, the covered descriptions keep returning to the same themes:

Themes in the covered descriptions, counted by word stem in Russian and English; one description can mention several
ThemeCoveredReadable
Nazi, Nazism1100
Hatred, hate speech1080
Racism990
Ukraine, Ukrainians900
Russophobia840
Insulting the nation or Russians650
Propaganda640
An ethnic slur for Ukrainians500
Politics460

615 of the 1,944 covered descriptions touch at least one of these themes; none of the fifty readable ones does. Long texts repeat too: 18 texts of eight words or more appear word for word in 48 rows. Two of them, four times each:

“I made this account to report this user because he has stolen my account”

Covered · 4 rows

“I created this account in order to expose this user because he robbed my account.”

Covered · 4 rows

One of the fifty readable texts (p. 448) is a pasted Steam profile page that names other users. It is not reproduced here. The rectangles covered every reporter's login and left that page readable.

The statements and the supplied records

Each statement below is quoted from the signed letters. Each record is in the files they delivered.

Dr. Schelinski · p. 2

“Hundreds” in every year

„In jedem Jahr, bis ins Jahr 2025 hinein, gab es demnach hunderte Beschwerden.“

2021: 25 · 2022: 122

The annual counts in the supplied complaint table. The full monthly count is under Verify it yourself.

Dr. Zurheide · p. 1

The full month, cleaned by hand

„… die volle Monatsfrist ausgeschöpft … manuell die Daten bereinigt …“

36 seconds

Anlage 1 was created at 19:58:05 and last modified at 19:58:41 for 830 pages. Its first readable complaint is a homophobic slur.

Dr. Schelinski · p. 3

Protection of third-party rights

„soweit keine Rechte Dritter entgegenstehen“

905,672 characters remain

Text is still extractable beneath 1,044 black rectangles that overlap it. The rectangles also cover the account's own security history (p. 830).

Dr. Zurheide · p. 7

“Between 2019 and 2023”

„Über einen Zeitraum von mehreren Jahren, zwischen 2019 und 2023 …“

Created in August 2020

Anlage 1, page 1, gives the account's creation time: August 2020.

Dr. Zurheide · p. 9

Every court will agree

„jedes Gericht … als rechtmäßig qualifizieren“

A forecast

The sentence says every court will find blocking the Steam account lawful. It names no court and cites no ruling.

What the signature can and cannot tell you

A qualified electronic signature is strong evidence about the sender. It is not evidence about the content. The two questions have to be checked separately.

A signature can show

  • who signed the document
  • that the signed bytes have not changed since signing

A signature cannot show

  • that the export is complete
  • that the redaction removed anything
  • that the statements in it are true
  • that anyone read it before signing
THREE CHECKS · DOK.-NR. 42603633 · ANLAGE 1Offline
01 · SENDERQualified e-signature„qualifiziert elektronisch signiert“Declared by the firm on page 9.
02 · INTEGRITYSHA-256 of Anlage 12bb927e2…4ff7d6afMatches the recorded hash.
03 · CONTENTText layer of Anlage 1pdftotext Anlage1.pdf -905,672 characters readable under 1,044 rectangles.

Sender: declared. Integrity: matches. Content: broken. The signature answered the first question and none of the others.

Checks 02 and 03 need nothing but the file and standard tools. Check 01 tells you who sent it. Only 02 and 03 tell you what was sent.
Dok.-Nr. 42603633 · page 1One page, two spellings
Dr. Patrick Zurheide, LL.M. (Aberdeen)Signatory
p.zurheode@*****wessing.comLetterhead
p.zurheide@*****wessing.comPublic record
The title is spelled correctly. The signer's own name in the letterhead is not. Page 6 contains „Die Antwortet lautet ja, in den dort genannten Grenzen.“ twice, word for word, at the end of sections 1.5 and 1.6. Page 3 sends the data with „Anbei übersenden wie Ihnen …“.

The request the export was meant to answer

Behind the signatures is one request for one's own data. The law that governs it is short.

REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 · OFFICIAL TEXT
Art. 15(1)
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data …”
Art. 15(3)
“The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing.”
Art. 12(3)
“… without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary …”

Source: EUR-Lex

The letters know this law. Dr. Zurheide's opens with it: „nachfolgend erteilen wir Namens und in Vollmacht unserer Mandantin Auskunft gemäß Art. 15 Abs. 1, Abs. 3 DSGVO“ (p. 1). Apart from one reference to third-party rights (Dr. Schelinski, p. 3), neither letter cites a provision that allows a controller to restrict access: not Art. 12(5), not Art. 23, not the German BDSG. What the request received instead:

  1. 15 Aug 2025 · Dr. Schelinski · p. 1The deadline, “if at all”

    „Die Frist nach Art. 15 DSGVO hat, wenn überhaupt, erst … am 29. Juli 2025 begonnen“

  2. 15 Aug 2025 · Dr. Schelinski · p. 2The account terminated

    „Hiermit kündigen wir daher Namens und in Vollmacht der Valve Corporation … mit sofortiger Wirkung.“

  3. 15 Aug 2025 · Dr. Schelinski · p. 2Proof by count: 1,938 complaints, regardless of their details

    „Unabhängig von den Einzelheiten der Beschwerden zeigt schon die bloße Anzahl …“

  4. 1 Oct 2025 · Dr. Zurheide · p. 2Data narrowed to 30 July 2025

    „… können wir erst ab diesem Zeitpunkt davon ausgehen, dass etwaige Daten … sich auf Ihren Mandanten beziehen.“

  5. 1 Oct 2025 · Dr. Zurheide · p. 8The rest, on a condition

    „Gerne beauskunften wir die restlichen (bzw. noch weitere) personenbezogene Daten, sobald Ihr Mandant uns nachvollziehbar darstellen kann …“

  6. 1 Oct 2025 · Dr. Zurheide · p. 8“Accomplices”

    „… dass Ihr Mandant bzw. dessen Komplizen seine Phishing-Angriffe … in verschleierter Form fortsetzen will“

  7. 1 Oct 2025 · Dr. Zurheide · p. 9Four criminal statutes

    „… §§ 263, 263a, 202a, 303a StGB) einer strafrechtlichen Verfolgung zuzuführen.“

None of this is a condition in Art. 15. A right of access is not cancelled by a termination, a forecast about courts or a criminal statute. 106 days after the request, it stood exactly as written.

PhishDestroy's reading. The doctors cite the law on page 1 and then write as if there were no such law.

The letter lists what Valve processes. The file leaves most of it out.

On pages 2–6 the October letter quotes the Steam Privacy Policy to describe the personal data Valve processes. Each category it names is compared below with Anlage 1. Anlage 1 has twelve sections: account, profile, name history, logins, product keys, playtime, phone, complaints, chat, Steam Guard devices, friends and security changes.

Categories named in Dok.-Nr. 42603633 and their place in Anlage 1
DataNamed in the letterIn Anlage 1
Transactions and payments„Transaktions- und Zahlungsdaten“ · p. 2
„… Transaktionsdaten … für einen Zeitraum von bis zu zehn (10) Jahren aufbewahren muss“ · p. 6
Absent
Trades and Community Market„… Konsistenz des Gameplays oder Steam-Community-Marktes …“ · p. 6Absent
Achievements, game progress, in-game items„Ihre erspielten Errungenschaften … Ihren Spielfortschritt … Ihre im Spiel erhaltenen Gegenstände“ · p. 4Absent
Game ownership„… mindestens Ihr Eigentum am fraglichen Spiel“ · p. 4Absent · playtime and 100 key activations from a single day only
Levels, badges, trading cards„Daten über die Nutzung des Steam-Clients und der Steam-Websites“ · p. 3 · items and market · pp. 4, 6Absent
Posts, comments, follows„… veröffentlichen, kommentieren oder denen Benutzer folgen“ · p. 3
„Message Boards, Foren und/oder Chatbereiche“ · p. 5
Absent
Chat„Informationen, die Benutzer im Chat gesendet haben“ · p. 32 entries, covered
Support tickets„… wenn Benutzer Informationen oder Support von Valve anfordern“ · p. 3Absent · including the May 2025 ticket that confirmed the block
Linked third-party accounts„… mit dem Konto eines Drittanbieters zu verknüpfen“ · p. 5Absent
Records behind the block„Zum Entdecken von Verstößen erforderliche Informationen“ · p. 3
„… nach einer manuellen Prüfung durch einen Mitarbeiter der Valve Corporation“ · p. 7
Absent · no review record, no device link, no phishing report

The letter describes the data. The attachment does not contain it. Payments are the basis of both lawyers' conclusions about ownership, yet the payment category is the one the file leaves out.

What the file does contain, and for which period

Periods are taken from dates in the file, including dates under the black rectangles.

Sections of Anlage 1 and the periods their dates cover
SectionIn Anlage 1Period in the file
Basic account data · email, country, username, Steam IDReadableCurrent state
LoginsDate and type readable; time, IP, hardware ID coveredOct 2023 – May 2025 · account exists since Aug 2020
PlaytimeGames readable; last-use date and time coveredDec 2020 – May 2025
Chat2 entries, coveredSep 2025 only
Complaints against the account1,995 rows · 50 descriptions readableFeb 2021 – Sep 2025
Friends and blocks5,789 rows · coveredFeb 2021 – Sep 2025
Steam Guard devices · registered phone · security changesCoveredSecurity log: Aug 2020 – Jul 2024 · 4 rows
Product key activationsKeys covered100 rows, one date: 13 Mar 2025

Only the complaints appear to be there in full. Almost nothing else is: logins start in October 2023, friends in February 2021, product keys on a single day, and whole categories that Valve stores are absent. The categories the letter's own decisions depend on, payments and the records behind the block, are not in the file at all.

The friends list has 5,789 rows: 4,410 “Blocked User”, 1,182 “Friend” and 200 “Inviter”, dated 24 February 2021 to 28 September 2025; 74 are dated after the last logon. Whether it is the current list of connections or a full history including removed ones cannot be determined from the file.

The answer to Art. 15(1) raises three further questions. The recipients (point c) and the source of the data (point g) are given only as general policy text, not for this account. The storage period (point d) is a quotation from the policy, without specifics. And the letter sends the data „als Anlage 1 und 2“ (p. 3); only Anlage 1 is examined here.

Valve had already verified who owns the account

The account was registered as a Steamworks partner in order to publish a game. That process involves a Steam Direct fee of USD 100, a tax interview, payout bank details and identity verification carried out by Valve itself. All of it is personal data Valve processes. Art. 15 GDPR covers every category of personal data processed, not only those listed in a privacy policy. None of it appears in Anlage 1.

Dr. Schelinski · p. 1

“Not a single proof of ownership”

„… kein einziger Beleg für die Inhaberschaft (Verfügungsbefugnis) Ihres Mandanten für den Account …“

Identity verified by Valve

The partner verification, its documents and the USD 100 payment are held by the client the letter speaks for.

Dr. Schelinski · p. 3

Proof demanded from the requester

„… gefälschten ‚Utility Bill‘ …“ · „… tatsächlich alleiniger Inhaber des Accounts …“

Proof withheld from the requester

The requester is asked to prove ownership while the ownership records Valve itself verified are left out of his access copy.

The model: nobody decides alone, nothing can be swapped

This is not about one piece of software. It is about who decides. In this case two lawyers decided which fifty complaints mattered and that the rest did not. No court, no regulator.

Some things must stay hidden: the reporters' logins are other people's data. The question is who decides, and whether anyone can check the decision afterwards. A black rectangle answers neither, and anyone can remove it. Two standard tools answer both: a salted hash in the requester's copy, and the original sealed for the public key of a supervisory authority or a court.

SALTED COMMITMENT · ONE PER WITHHELD FIELD

c = SHA-256(salt ‖ value)

The salt is 16 random bytes, new for every field. The requester's copy carries c in place of the value, under the firm's signature. The value and its salt travel in an envelope encrypted for the authority's public key, with OpenPGP or with X25519 and AES-GCM. Without the authority's private key nobody can open it, and the firm cannot swap a value without breaking the commitment it signed.

  1. Step 1 · the requesterHands over the copy and the envelope

    The signed copy with its commitments and the sealed envelope go to the supervisory authority or the court.

  2. Step 2 · the authorityOpens the envelope and recomputes

    The inspector decrypts with the authority's private key and recomputes SHA-256(salt ‖ value) for every field. Each result must equal the commitment the firm signed.

  3. Step 3 · an independent bodyDecides what was really protected

    The authority, not the firm, reads everything that was withheld, here 1,944 complaint texts and a security history, and decides whether third-party rights required withholding it.

ANLAGE 1 · PAGE 514 · ONE ROW, TWO WAYS TO HIDE ITLive · in your browser
As delivered · black rectanglesVisual overlay only
Aspose.PDF for .NET 20.8 · page 514Text layer + rectangles
Reporter: [login · not republished here]
Date: 2024-03-28
Type: Offensive Profile
Text: русофоб

Black rectangles drawn on top. The text underneath stays in the file.

Requester's copy · salted commitmentsSigned by the firm
c = SHA-256(salt ‖ value)Sealed for the authority
Reporter: [withheld · commitment]
Date: 2024-03-28
Type: Offensive Profile
Text: [withheld · commitment]
Envelope · RSA-OAEP-256 + AES-256-GCMfor the authority's public key

The copy holds commitments. Values and salts are in the envelope.

  1. 1The requester hands over the copy and the envelope
  2. 2The authority opens it and recomputes every commitment
  3. 3The authority decides what stays withheld

Both panels hide the same two fields. Read the raw bytes, then run the authority's check.

Left: one row of Anlage 1 as delivered; the complaint text sits under a black rectangle on page 514 and is quoted without the reporter's login, whose field holds a placeholder. Right: the same row with salted commitments, its values sealed for an authority's key. The key pair is generated in your browser for this demonstration, and the envelope is the one TgWitness uses for sealed delivery. The decision in step 3 is an example.
Nobody decides aloneThe firm still proposes what to withhold. Someone with the full picture and no stake in the dispute checks it.
Nothing leaksThe requester sees no other person's data. The salt makes a commitment useless for guessing: without it, a one-word complaint could be found by hashing a word list.
Nothing can be swappedEvery value is bound to the commitment the firm signed. A different text, or a missing one, fails the check.
The signature means somethingA qualified signature over the commitments binds the firm to every hidden value, not only to the cover letter.
Titles do not matterThe check is arithmetic. It needs the copy, the envelope and the authority's key, not anyone's word.

None of this needs new infrastructure. German supervisory authorities already publish OpenPGP keys: the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection lists one for every unit, and the LfDI Baden-Württemberg offers its public key for encrypted e-mail. German courts already receive filings through the EGVP, whose end-to-end encryption is based on the OSCI protocol.

PhishDestroy's position. Who gave counsel the right to decide what is significant and what is not? Lawyers should not make that decision. Everything should be handed over: not under black rectangles that anyone can remove, but sealed for the key of a court or a regulator, so that there is no room for “errors”, for “misunderstandings”, or for showing only what is convenient.

The honest model: full data, a declared rule, the key with the authority

The requester gets everything that is not in dispute, at once. Anything withheld is not covered with a drawing and not kept back in silence. It goes, complete and signed, encrypted to the key of the authority that is entitled to decide on it.

What happened and what the model does
QuestionWhat happenedHonest model
Who decides what is withheldCounsel of the party in the disputeA rule declared and signed when the copy is made; the authority reviews it
What the requester receivesSelected rows; whole categories absent; a cut-off with no record behind itEvery record not in dispute, immediately
Third parties' dataCovered with drawings and still in the fileRemoved from the requester's copy; kept in the original for the authority
Withheld partsUnknown in number, unknown in contentCounted in the signed manifest; full original encrypted to the authority's key
Proof of how the copy was chosenExists only because the redaction failedBuilt in: rule, count, hash of the original
Disputed fieldsDecided by the letter: “every court will agree”Decided by the regulator or court, who can open them
Time106 daysExport plus delivery
Role of counselSets scope, burden of proof and verdictArgues the dispute in court; does not edit the requester's data

The authority does not need trust either. Art. 58(1)(e) GDPR already empowers a supervisory authority to obtain access to all personal data a controller processes. The model only hands it over in a form that can be verified on arrival.

The reasons given in the letters, ownership doubts, payments by third parties, complaints, suspected phishing, explain why Art. 15 was not fulfilled. They do not fulfil it. Whatever the basis, the outcome is the same: the requester did not receive his data, other people's data was delivered under drawings, and the selection could be checked only by accident. Data access is a right of the data subject, not a bargaining chip in someone else's dispute.

How TgWitness keeps originals and makes copies checkable

TgWitness exports conversations as evidence. Its design starts from the lesson of this case: an export should not ask to be believed because of who hands it over. The original captured journal is retained. A sharing copy records the selected records and fields, the disclosure rules and the number of excluded records in its signed manifest. Zero trust applies to everyone, including us.

Preserve

Keep the original

Retain the full captured journal and its signatures. Keep a checkpoint independently so a later replacement or truncation can be checked.

Protect

Encrypt the delivery

Encrypt the archive for a recipient key or protect a delivery with a password. Decryption requires the corresponding key or password.

Disclose

Name the omissions

Put the purpose and rules in the signed manifest. Mark minimised records, count excluded records and retain links to the source journal.

TgWitness already seals complete originals for a recipient key, with the envelope used in the demonstration above, and marks what a disclosure withholds. The verifier checks record signatures and the sharing copy's link to the source journal; checking withheld content against its original hash requires the retained full original. Per-field salted commitments for an authority are the step this case argues for.

Case file and TgWitness export features
In Anlage 1TgWitness featureRecorded check
Text under black rectanglesWithheld fields removed from the sharing copy; original retained separatelyNamed omissions and the original record hash
50 descriptions visible; 1,944 coveredSigned disclosure rules and excluded-record countsThe selected scope and its source-journal reference
PDF attachmentEncrypted delivery of the captured archiveAuthenticated decryption; archive signatures and hashes
File identified by SHA-256 belowRecord hashes, signatures and retained checkpointsComparison with the previously saved journal

What the software is built to guarantee

Integrity of the dataEvery record is hashed into a chain and signed with Ed25519. The verifier recomputes every record, so any change shows.
Delivery you can checkArchives travel encrypted for their recipient; large ones in encrypted parts with a signed manifest, assembled and verified locally.
Other people's data stays closedA sharing copy withholds by rule and names what it withheld. Revealing a masked value in the panel is audited.
No room for errorThe checks are arithmetic: the file, a trusted key fingerprint and a retained checkpoint. Nobody's word is needed.
No room for manipulationEdits and deletions become new records, a shortened journal fails against a retained checkpoint, and a disclosure never looks complete when it is not.

A typo in a name does not change data signed by the software. A month past a deadline does not change the original records. Any change breaks the chain, and the verifier says so. Try both below.

SHA-256 · IN YOUR BROWSEREdit either line
86582990a7b364adbd83071c9edb4774ed6e8ea50b80dca1ae426c3fa679a1d6
17fae25500c51998112b146c76b21b04bf3d4034407f2f958bced7d6d6e928ba

1 character apart60 of 64 hex digits differ128 of 256 bits differ

One character apart. Two unrelated fingerprints.

A hash noticed the one letter that the signing process did not. A title is only more bytes: it changes the fingerprint, never the facts.
SIGNED JOURNAL · SIMPLIFIEDIllustrative records
RECORD 117.06.2025 · access requestadc396074b0f04…= saved hash
RECORD 201.10.2025 · letterhead p.zurheode0b8eda5c2f43ae…= saved hash
RECORD 301.10.2025 · Anlage 1 · 830 pagesdbe2eef85bfb5a…= saved hash

Each record holds the fingerprint of the one before it. Changing record 2 changes its hash and breaks the link from record 3.

Simplified: each fingerprint covers the previous fingerprint and one line of text. TgWitness hashes nine canonical event fields, one of them the previous hash, and signs every digest with Ed25519. See the full chain with checkpoints

How TgWitness sharing copies work · The sealed envelope · Implementation and verification scope

Verify it yourself

Any regulator, court or auditor holding the files can repeat every check on this page offline. Aggregate results only: reporter logins, account identifiers and profile data are not published here.

All months: 2021–2025
Complaint records in the supplied export, by year and month
YearJanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecTotal
2021020002000012025
20221074392721176513122
202311148156595253665273445358825
20246958111363346835354707982774
2025923235201217473———249

0 means no record for that month in this export; — is after its September 2025 cutoff. Total: 1,995.

All report categories in the supplied table
Report types recorded in Anlage 1, grouped across products
Recorded report typeAll recordsReadable descriptionsCovered descriptions
Offensive Profile1,14801,147
Suspected Hijacker31243269
Cheating2902288
Offensive Persona Name87186
Offensive Avatar57354
Harassment46145
Spamming37037
Spoofing16016
Auto Moderation101
Trade Scam101

The Offensive Profile total includes the one empty description. Totals: 1,995 records, 50 readable descriptions, 1,944 covered descriptions, 1 empty description.

Logins and security history

Anlage 1, page 1: Last Client/Web Logon Time: 2025-05-23 20:48:31 (UTC) and Date of Report: 09-29-2025. The login history on pages 1–119 lists the most recent logins first; its latest entries are from May 2025, and none is later.

Page 830, “Security History”, is under black rectangles. Its last password change is from July 2024; it records no change in 2025. Dates, addresses and identifiers from those rows are not reproduced.

pdftotext -f 1 -l 1 Anlage1.pdf -        # last logon, date of report
pdftotext -f 830 -l 830 Anlage1.pdf -    # security history
PDF metadata and signature declarations

PDF metadata: producer Aspose.PDF for .NET 20.8; creation 1 October 2025, 19:58:05; modification 19:58:41, both UTC+02:00. The two timestamps are 36 seconds apart.

Both letters declare a qualified electronic signature on their final page: „Dieses Schreiben ist qualifiziert elektronisch signiert“. Signature validation is a separate check from the content and redaction checks shown here.

Reproduce the counts and compare source hashes

The counting script is pinned to the Anlage 1 hash below. It reconstructs table rows on pages 444–620 and joins 118 cells that continue across page boundaries. Visibility is determined by word-box intersection with opaque black rectangles; the one empty description is recorded separately.

Cyrillic counts use U+0400–U+052F. The login-format comparison uses the full-string pattern [A-Za-z]+[0-9]{3,5}. Repetitions are counted after extraction whitespace is normalised. Word counts in the covered descriptions match word stems in any case. These are descriptive measurements, not an automated finding of common authorship or misconduct.

Optional language estimates in the JSON use Lingua 2.2.0 locally; short and ambiguous texts remain unassigned. The 905,672-character check counts each non-space character whose bounding box intersects a black rectangle once; 1,044 of 1,329 black rectangles overlap such text.

Aggregate counts · JSON · Local counting script · Python

python signed-export-audit.py Anlage1.pdf --output counts.json
sha256sum Anlage1.pdf
pdfinfo Anlage1.pdf | grep -E "Producer|CreationDate|ModDate"
pdftotext -layout Anlage1.pdf - | less

The script requires PyMuPDF and lingua-language-detector. It makes no network requests and outputs aggregates, not complaint texts or logins.

FileSHA-256
Dok.-Nr. 42603633 (Dr. Zurheide)de0fdcf6bfaccedc98d1670438bc7ca3330479096875e716dbb9678922b43ab9
Dok.-Nr. 42282474 (Dr. Schelinski)b48e09c28ee40a46f1d404041751f718fb185d1eb774ddabb4373fdd53bbe2f1
Anlage 12bb927e2c42fdc2e3ad089ae302dd887c343f6798aba00fcfac279224ff7d6af

The lesson for any export. Lawyers can sign an export. The signature says who sent it, not what is true in it. Truth is what survives a check that anyone can repeat.

Our position

PhishDestroy's position. We respect the law and the courts. The law is not an opponent of the truth. Those who bend it in order not to comply with it are no allies of a court, and a doctoral prefix cannot be an authority for one.

A doctorate is a historical fact: one piece of research in a narrow theoretical field, defended once. It does not make anyone an IT lawyer.

As far as we can see, nothing in the title answers for the errors: not the arguments written under the signature, not the misspelled name, not the leak of the data the letters themselves claimed to protect.

Both signatories later filed search-delisting requests under Art. 17 (see the operator notice). The right to be forgotten should not erase a professional's professional negligence. And is anyone checking documents that go out under a qualified signature? These letters read like an e-mail to a friend, not like a document of public significance.

Zero trust, towards everyone. Money is good. Selling the laws of one's own country for it is, in our view, not the best use of it. But we are not experts.

PhishDestroy is not a party to the dispute and does not say whether blocking the Steam account was justified. The data subject is not identified on this page; account identifiers, logins, IP addresses and personal data are not reproduced. Complaint texts are quoted without the reporters' logins, including texts under black rectangles, which remain in the file's text layer. Letters: Dok.-Nr. 42282474, 15 August 2025 (3 pages); Dok.-Nr. 42603633, 1 October 2025 (9 pages). Attachment: Anlage 1 (830 pages). Page references use PDF page order. English renderings of German quotations are ours. Wider case dossier · The 106-day GDPR file.