TgWitness / Documentation

What has been tested →

Reference / Security & project

TgWitness Test Results & Qualification Record

The live Telegram test, automated checks, browser checks and the next qualification runs.

TgWitness / Documentation · Evidence and verification

Evidence & verification

Updated 10 November 2026. Results are tied to the revision, environment and workload recorded for each run. Current capabilities describes the available workflows; this page records what has actually been checked.

These are selected validation results from the development history. Engineering tests, live acquisition, fault injection, recovery checks and artifact verification each have their stated scope.

On 8 November, the published installer at b35f8e18f3d1 was inspected without executing or installing it: wheel and dependency-lock SHA-256 and RSA signatures passed, and the wheel contained the Secret Chat backend, interface, API routes, collector hooks and optional dependency declaration. See the package check. CI for that revision and the installer run completed successfully. Older audit reports retain the findings for their original snapshots; current implementation and qualification are recorded separately.

Performance graphs · Signed English audit · Downloadable measurements

Latest evidence Result Scope
Account security and exports · 10 Nov Witness probe caught a second client on the same key; killed chat exports resumed; TDX quote checked offline RunPod pod, three test accounts; revisions 6c7171228 to 196a5bcd1
Phala / Intel TDX with live account · 9 Nov All 6 TDX checks passed; live Telegram collection; export verified CVM cvm_mjbvBdjM; commit 427621d4; session imported; self-attested tier
drand checkpoint + verify · 9 Nov drand round 33818717 in a signed checkpoint, confirmed via Cloudflare relay RunPod collector; --check-drand; lower time bound for the checkpoint
session.fingerprint in journal · 9 Nov auth_key_id logged at session.fingerprint on observation start Verifier can match session file after revocation
Release audit · 6 Nov 1,461 core tests passed; 37 platform skips Source 92e539af40d8; open findings retained
Fresh exports · 6 Nov 127.713 and 141.781 records/s, complete cycle Two accounts per server; text and metadata through WARP
Retained archives · 6 Nov 48 archives; 3,598,381 records verified Existing archives checked against pinned workspace keys
Trusted Live · 5 Nov Guarded CPU recording and WARP checks Official Desktop login and native export remain unqualified
Phala / Intel TDX · 4 Nov All 16 verifier checks passed on later runs Historical deployment; no Telegram account on the CVM
On this page

Phala Cloud with live Telegram account · 9 November 2026#

A fresh Phala Cloud deployment (phala-live-6) ran commit 427621d4 with a live Telegram account. The collector imported an existing session (key_origin: imported) and observed three channels for approximately three minutes. The panel exported a password-protected ZIP archive; tgwitness verify confirmed its integrity.

Setup Recorded value
Provider Phala Cloud · tdx.small · US-WEST-1
CVM cvm_mjbvBdjM · app 408d07581ad77680b4285b041f5924e52464437a
Commit 427621d4740f267e834c5cf754bc1007d6d01750 · v0.9.1
Collector fingerprint fcdbda2d3d69b43937a4883102e579bbd51a5915a1c85baa4ce154417ec7dd0f
Intel collateral issued 2026-11-09T20:40:09Z
TCB level 2025-08-13T00:00:00Z · status UpToDate
dstack OS image dstack-0.5.12 · hash 8db40cb23008d6213668b5816702d100b37b859a8a5bfd18d938ae3a1b3715bd
Account dedicated test account · key_origin imported
Targets three channels
Journal events 389
Export Password-protected ZIP · 2.9 MB
Report formats HTML + JSON + PDF (certificate TgWitness workspace fcdbda2d3d69b439)
source_tree_sha256 8c228874c7cfdd57ffac0184e5f0c12245ecaa0571e65ec84dee5ce08d0cbc6c

Intel TDX attestation — all 6 checks passed:

Check Result
Quote covers signed statement and challenge PASS
Intel vouches: genuine TDX, TCB UpToDate, v4 quote, not debug, not migratable PASS
RTMR3 measures the app-compose the collector reports PASS
Measured compose equals the deployed commit's compose byte for byte PASS
Quote comes from the deployed CVM with KMS keys and encrypted disk PASS
MRTD and RTMR0-2 equal values computed from the published dstack-0.5.12 image PASS

Verify output (excerpt):

events: 389  files_checked: 35  sha256sums: 34
Report seal verified: report.html, language en.
JSON report seal verified: report.json.
PDF signature and Ed25519 seal verified: report.pdf
  certificate: TgWitness workspace fcdbda2d3d69b439
SHA256SUMS matches the signed manifest.
Chat channel-A: IDs 1-32, 8 not observed in 7 ranges
Chat channel-B: IDs 1-210, 69 not observed in 35 ranges
Chat channel-C: IDs 1-122, 2 not observed in 2 ranges

Assurance tier is self_attested: the session was imported and the archive carried no external timestamp. Signing in by QR code or phone code through the panel creates the Telegram session key inside the TDX VM (key_origin: created).

Gap analysis summary:

Chat ID range Observed Missing Ranges
channel-B 1–210 141 69 35
channel-A 1–32 24 8 7
channel-C 1–122 120 2 2

Gaps are message IDs Telegram assigned that were never visible to this account. A gap records what the collector could not observe; attribution and cause are outside what the collector can determine.

drand checkpoint anchoring and verify · 9 November 2026#

A RunPod collector connected a dedicated test account. The checkpoint API returned a checkpoint signed with the collector key that embeds a live drand round from Cloudflare's relay; --check-drand confirmed the round against the network. A drand round is a lower time bound: the checkpoint was signed no earlier than that round. Existence by a time comes from RFC 3161, Bitcoin or a witness, so the tier stays as those checks set it.

Item Value
Collector RunPod CPU instance · session imported · key_origin imported
Journal events 387
drand chain 52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971
drand rounds in checkpoints 33818717 (not before 2026-11-09T21:25:15Z) and 33819014 (not before 21:40:06Z)
session.fingerprint logged auth_key_id logged at seq 18
coverage.gap logged seq 28 · reason updates delivered while observation was paused
Archive fingerprint f304aa2afd49a5f0b7a064bfb01167151387797b4723ceeb90357458a8f35673

Code changes verified in this run:

File Change Verified
tgwitness/evidence.py checkpoint() embeds drand_anchor from live Cloudflare relay ✓ round 33818717 in checkpoint
tgwitness/verifier/journal.py verify_checkpoint(check_drand=True) confirms the round against relays ✓ raises error on mismatch
tgwitness/collector.py session.fingerprint event logs auth_key_id on observation start ✓ seq 18 in journal
tgwitness/store.py session.* added to coverage kind group ✓ fingerprint visible in coverage

Release audit and fresh exports · 6 November 2026#

The audit used v0.9.1 at source 92e539af40d8368d198ff5e040f1d876f2c1310e, release 92e539af40d8-83e41104669e. Installed-package smoke checks passed on three servers. The signed report retains the state observed at that time.

Acquisition and complete export rates for two fresh workloads

Workload Records Acquisition Complete cycle Complete-cycle rate
Server A · two accounts 27,030 189.043 s 211.647 s 127.713 records/s
Server B · two accounts 29,299 182.513 s 206.650 s 141.781 records/s

Both exports began without resume, excluded attachments and avatars, and ended with zero duplicate or reused records. The complete cycle includes preparation, acquisition, selection, packaging and archive verification. Server A also ran a protected-chat read check. Four FloodWait events on A and three on B were respected.

Check Result Qualification
Core pytest 1,461 passed 37 platform skips
Browser / browser UX / evidence / site 102 / 66 / 15 / 9 passed These programs overlap other tests; counts are not additive
Capture addon 124 passed Three Official Web checks blocked by the required Chromium sandbox
API authorization 269 routes; 538 requests passed Missing credentials and revoked access
Retained archives 48 of 48 verified 3,598,381 records; pinned workspace keys
Live fleet read checks 24 of 40 profiles passed 16 WARP routes failed qualification; those profiles were not connected

The signed report records all open findings, including three defects in an unpublished secret-chat snapshot absent from the audited main build. The earlier public-history qualification used a different revision and workload; its rates must not be combined with this comparison.

Verify the original report using the pinned key and verifier. Its signature protects the retained report from alteration. The report identifies the tested revision, workload, environment and verification results for that run.

Trusted Live CPU Ubuntu and WARP · 5 November 2026#

The retained integration run used a CPU-only Ubuntu 24.04.5 guest (4 vCPU, 8 GiB) under QEMU inside a RunPod CPU host. The collector used 14e642a5; verification used 02072461. The final fixes merged in PR #114 as 755f78f6, whose tree matched the tested PR head. This was not a TEE.

  • A real WARP Connector reported healthy; proxied HTTPS reported WARP and Gateway enabled. Three probes saw the same egress address.
  • Disconnecting WARP made the proxied request fail. Direct gateway-service HTTPS was rejected. In the recorder namespace, direct IPv4/IPv6, external DNS and Docker's embedded UDP resolver were blocked.
  • A scoped read-only provider token could read health/connections and could not read the connector enrollment token. Signed provider observations included explicit unavailable samples. The witness ran on the operator's host; the test covers recording and retention.
  • Official Desktop reached its unauthenticated welcome screen. Guarded keyboard input was rejected during capture. Three H.264 display segments decoded and their clock overlay was inspected. The 18-event preflight archive verified against the pinned recorder key and retained checkpoint.
  • The final capture tests passed 114 cases on Windows and Linux CI, with real Chromium/FFmpeg. Five anchor tests and dependency advisory checks passed.

An initial 2 vCPU/4 GiB startup timed out under concurrent image-build load and stopped through the guard; it is not counted as success. Manual test-account login, native chat export, real hybrid comparison and Telegram-side logout remain pending. No supplied Telethon session was imported. Attachments, automatic OCR, local drand BLS verification and Trusted Live TDX attestation were not qualified.

Live Phala Cloud deployment · 4 November 2026#

Historical result: later deployments passed all 16 verifier checks, including Intel TDX and the quick tunnel. Restart evidence, signed address discovery and report timestamps were checked separately. Each test CVM was removed after its run.

Setup Recorded value
Provider Phala Cloud · tdx.small · US-WEST-1
Deployment --provider phala --quick-tunnel; initially empty workspace
Initial collector df7d860c · v0.8.1
Collector with all fixes 53a0f7e9
Production guest dstack-0.5.12; SSH access disabled
External services ntfy.sh, GitHub and Intel PCS
Observed cost Seven CVMs, about 1.9 US cents together; historical test pricing

The sequence below separates initial failures, fixes and completed checks. No Telegram account was connected to these CVMs.

Deployments 1–2 · provider differences and regression checks

The first two deployments found five differences from the simulated Phala Cloud. Private Phala regressions reproduce each difference and fail without its fix:

On Phala Cloud Before the fix Fix
compose_file.name is required HTTP 422, nothing created The compose carries the CVM name
Unless given an empty one, Phala adds its own pre-launch script to the measured app-compose (v0.0.20: Docker login, docker compose pull, root password, SSH keys from user_config) tdx_compose fails: code outside the published compose The app-compose sets pre_launch_script to ""; Phala then leaves it out
Without image Phala picks dstack-dev-0.5.12, the development build, with SSH access enabled server_state fails. The quote alone passed on this image; only the provider record and tdx_os show it The deployment asks for the production build of Phala's current release, dstack-0.5.12
With the dstack gateway off, the CVM details never get an instance_id Deploy waits 30 minutes and fails The instance ID is read from the CVM state
Restarts, stops and starts are CVM operations, not application revisions provider_actions did not list restarts The operations are read as well
Deployment 3 · attestation, access checks and restart evidence
  • The CVM ran dstack-0.5.12 with SSH access off. The collector posted its signed address about 1.5 minutes after creation. Deploy then passed tdx_binding, tdx_quote (Intel TCB UpToDate, quote v4, FMSPC 20a06f000000, not in debug mode, not migratable, collateral fetched from Intel), tdx_compose_hash, tdx_compose (byte for byte) and tdx_identity (KMS keys).
  • The panel at its trycloudflare.com address answered 401 without a token or with a wrong one, and 200 with the panel token.
  • verify with --source set to GitHub's archive of the commit and the fingerprint passed separately: server, server_state, firewall (no gateway, no public endpoint), provider log, statement, fingerprint, source hash, boot and the five tdx_* checks passed. Cloudflare and tdx_os were unavailable, so the result was INCOMPLETE.
  • Two restarts through Phala's API: each time the CVM was back in under two minutes with the same collector key, a new signed address, and the old one answering 530. verify reported the new boot and both restarts as REVIEW. With --evidence it confirmed the journal signatures and three starts, each with its own Intel TDX quote from the same CVM.
  • destroy removed only that CVM. The workspace was then empty, and the panel address stopped answering.
  • The panel wizard's price check read tdx.small at $0.058 an hour. A wrong key got a plain "did not accept the API key" message.
Follow-up fixes · signed address discovery and OS measurements
  • Without the address key, verify followed the newest well-formed post on the address topic, which is printed in the published compose. One forged post sent it to a host that does not exist, and statement failed: a forger could not pass as the collector, but could block third-party verification, for up to 12 hours with a forged future timestamp. The collector now also posts its address signed with its own key, verify accepts only such posts when the collector makes them, and posts are ordered by ntfy.sh's receive time. A private cloud-wizard regression replays the forged posts. A CVM runs this only from a commit that contains it, so this run's collector did not sign its address yet and verify said so.
  • tdx_os could not run without dstack-mr, whose current version has measure-os rather than the measure --json the documentation named. The verifier now computes MRTD and RTMR0-2 itself from the published image and the VM's shape, ACPI tables included.
Deployment 4 · all 16 checks, report seals and restart verification
  • Deploy downloaded the published dstack-0.5.12 once, matched it to the OS image hash the CVM reported, and tdx_os passed: MRTD, RTMR0, RTMR1 and RTMR2 equal the values computed for QEMU 8.2.2, 1 vCPU and 2 GiB. The same computation gave a different RTMR0 for a claimed 4 GiB, 2 vCPUs, QEMU 9.2.1 or a second network card, and failed for a changed kernel, firmware or command line and for the development image.
  • verify passed every one of its 16 checks, the quick tunnel's connector included, so the result was PASS. It wrote the HTML and PDF certificate, sealed with a qualified eIDAS time stamp from the Belgian government's time-stamping unit TSU 202301 (status granted on Belgium's trusted list), a FreeTSA time stamp and the verifier's signature; check-report confirmed all of them and the PDF's signature.
  • After a restart, verify --evidence confirmed two starts, each quoted inside the CVM and each booted from the published dstack-0.5.12; the restart and the new boot were REVIEW.
  • destroy left the workspace empty.
Deployment 5 · collector-signed discovery and forged-post rejection

The collector ran from commit 53a0f7e9, which includes the fixes above.

  • The collector posted its address signed with its own key, next to the operator's HMAC post. Two forged posts were then added to the topic, one with a zeroed HMAC and one signed by another Ed25519 key, both claiming a time in the year 2096. verify took the address signed by the collector key and passed all 16 checks; the seal again carried the qualified Belgian time stamp, FreeTSA's and the verifier's signature, and check-report confirmed them.
  • After a restart the collector posted the new address signed: verify found it at once, the operator's Find the current address 27 seconds later from the HMAC post, and both ignored the forged posts. verify --evidence confirmed two starts booted from dstack-0.5.12.
  • Deploy printed what Phala bills the CVM, disk included: $0.06078 an hour.

Panel wizard and remaining scope#

The panel wizard ran against Phala Cloud twice, once through its job API and once through the browser with a real Chromium: the price check, creation with the commit under Advanced, all six attestation checks passed, the server list showing the billed price (44.37 USD a month), Find the current address, the measured compose download, and deletion. The browser saw no page errors. Each time the workspace was empty afterwards.

Not covered: a Cloudflare domain on Phala, a Telegram account on the CVM, and the dstack-0.6.1 image. The wizard's price before creation is Phala's compute price only, as its API names the disk price only for an existing CVM; the server list shows the billed price after creation. All prices in this section were observed on 4 November 2026.

Live server journal inventory · 1 November 2026#

At approximately 19:15 UTC, sequential read-only SQLite query_only queries counted events in ten workspace databases on a running server. Collection continued during the queries, so this is not an atomic snapshot across workspaces.

Observed across the ten workspace databases Count
Workspaces with at least one message.new event 8
Journal records, including operational events 1,610,818
message.new events 900,232
message.edited events 80,683
message.deleted events 400,536
message.recovered events 53,403
message.snapshot events 2,183
media.saved events 50,418
media.failed events 5,575
coverage.gap events 11
Database bytes, excluding WAL files and media 7,909,003,264

These are event counts, not unique messages, people or media files. The same message can appear in more than one workspace, and an edit or deletion can produce another journal event. media.failed counts historical failure events, not the current media queue. The queries did not newly verify signatures and the full hash chain of all 1,610,818 records, measure delivery or throughput, or establish that every Telegram event was captured. No message content, account or chat IDs, workspace labels, credentials or private files are published here.

At this review, the separately configured public monitor covered three sources: one capture response was OK and two reported no_response. That monitor is not a ten-workspace health summary. no_response means the observer obtained no response at that check; message delivery is assessed from the journal. The smaller 29 October test below has its own explicit signature and hash-chain verification.

Recent offline and fault-injection checks · 1 November 2026#

These checks use fictional data and local files; they add regression evidence for the current source, not another live Telegram delivery measurement:

Check What it exercised
Source archive Two builds with identical source bytes but changed file times produced the same ZIP and checksum. Exact archived bytes and file hashes matched; private test files stayed out. A simulated write failure left the previous archive and checksum intact.
Account export recovery A simulated disk error on the second ZIP member left no published or partial ZIP. Resume kept every signed receipt byte-identical, produced an independently verifiable archive using the expected signing fingerprint, and retained the synthetic coverage gap as a partial result. Scale assertions guard against repeated task and receipt scans as histories grow.
Minimized disclosure privacy Synthetic Unicode names and aliases, nested metadata, unknown senders and media fields were checked in all three identity modes and with text omission. A masking-limit failure did not silently weaken redaction; the original signed account export stayed unchanged.
Linux media decoder and OCR A Linux Docker CI check at commit 5a9e0814 passed generated Ogg/Opus, MP3, M4A, MP4 with video, WAV and FLAC inputs; forged-duration and secondary-file-reference controls; and 48 mutated parser fixtures (34 rejected, 14 decoded within bounds). Real Tesseract OCR ran with original bytes unchanged. The decoder and OCR ran in network-isolated containers without a Whisper model.

The checks run in the pull-request and full Checks workflows. They test these failure boundaries, not every possible storage failure or whether a disclosure is automatically safe to publish. The media check does not measure speech recognition accuracy or Telegram delivery. Review each derivative before sharing.

Live Telegram test, whole account · 29 October 2026#

The same account kept running after the test below. On 29 October at 12:10 UTC its scope was switched to the whole account (channels, groups, private chats and bots); the panel asked for confirmation and the signed journal recorded it. By 17:59 UTC the journal held:

Recorded, 27 October 21:36 to 29 October 17:59 UTC Count
Journal records 9,968
New messages 5,308
of them after the switch to the whole account 3,878
Deletions 784
of them deleted after TgWitness had saved the message 596
Edits 41
Messages added by rechecks 2,273
Messages a recheck could no longer find 18
Messages saved by history snapshots 242
Saved attachments 247
Collector starts 19
Telegram FloodWait pauses 26
  • The panel's Verify check confirmed the signatures and hash chain of all 9,968 records.
  • Messages came from 2 groups or channels and 3 private chats and bots. One message button was pressed from Chats; the request and Telegram's answer are in the journal.
  • New chats were added when the collector rescanned the account at a restart. Saving the earlier messages of new chats was off (history = 0), so it is not covered here.

Not covered: reactions, membership changes, people profiles, sending messages, joining by invitation, proxies, notifications, the witness bot and several accounts at once. Public files contain only counts.

Password-protected export opened with libarchive · 29 October 2026#

An archive written by the export encryption code (WinZip AES-256, the format 7-Zip and WinRAR read) was opened with Windows tar (bsdtar 3.6.2, libarchive). With the right password the extracted file matched the original SHA-256; a wrong password was refused with "Incorrect passphrase". 7-Zip and WinRAR themselves were not run.

Live Telegram test · 27 to 29 October 2026#

One real Telegram account, signed in through the built-in API pair pool, recorded one supergroup from 27 October 21:36 UTC to 29 October 05:15 UTC. The collector was started 12 times in that period.

Recorded Count
Journal records, including heartbeats and service records 2,385
New messages 1,291
Deletions 472
of them deleted after TgWitness had saved the text 347
Edits 12
Messages missed while stopped, added by the recheck 12
Saved attachments 17
Attachments not downloaded (downloads off, or no file to download) 14
Telegram FloodWait pauses, 3 seconds each, during rechecks 8
  • The signatures and the hash chain of all 2,385 records verify against the journal's public key.
  • After a restart the collector resumes from the saved update state (pts) and Telethon catches up; the recheck then adds messages that are still missing.
  • On every FloodWait the collector waited the requested time and continued.
  • The account stayed signed in, and the same session reconnected on 29 October.

Not covered by this test: several accounts at once, administrator roles, proxies, outages longer than a few hours and the full live acceptance procedure. Public files contain only these counts: no account or chat identifiers, messages or credentials.

Synthetic local capacity measurement#

Private synthetic capacity run: 10,000 events across 100 chats.

Metric Observed
Input 10,000 synthetic message events across 100 synthetic selected sources
Message text 400 characters; no media or network
Ingestion 53.273 seconds; 187.7 events/second
Handler latency p50 4.162 ms; p95 7.784 ms; maximum 129.118 ms
ZIP export 19.868 seconds with tracemalloc enabled
Peak traced Python export allocations 0.51 MiB; not process RSS
ZIP size 4,610,962 bytes
Independent verification All 10,000 events verified

This measures the local serial recording/export path on this Windows host; live delivery, concurrent accounts, Telegram throttling and media are measured in the live runs above. The measurement predates the final offline timestamp tooling, which leaves the measured message path unchanged.

Full-text search on one million messages · 5 November 2026#

Command: python tools/bench_fulltext.py --messages 1000000 --work <empty directory>

A deterministic signed journal of 1,000,000 synthetic messages in 200 chats (Russian word forms, Ukrainian, English, Chinese, Japanese, links and handles) was indexed in 71 seconds; the index took 58 MiB beside a 1.50 GiB journal. Best-match searches took 9 to 190 ms (median), against 2.4 to 3.2 seconds for the previous substring search. Full results, hardware and limits: Full-text search. Private compatibility tests also verify a frozen signed archive made before full-text search with the current verifier, and a current archive with the frozen archive's own verify.py.

Parallel session and session integrity tests · 9 November 2026#

Telethon clients on a RunPod Linux pod, dedicated test accounts, several clients sharing one session.

Test Result
History reads with two and three clients on one session Every client read all messages: 10/10 and 15/15
auth.resetAuthorizations while an observer is connected Session left Telegram's list in 0.23 s; the observer's open connection kept working for over 60 s and completed 36 history requests
Enable, change and disable 2FA while an observer is connected Observer kept working through the 10 s observed; Telegram 777000 posted each change
auth.resetAuthorizations from a session under 24 hours old Rejected with FreshResetAuthorisationForbiddenError
Message to own Saved Messages as a push probe 0 of 22 delivered as push; the probe was dropped
Two clients on one auth_key for 90 s, a request every 2 s Both kept working; no AUTH_KEY_DUPLICATED
Import of Telethon SQLite, Pyrogram SQLite, TData ZIP and Account JSON All four connected; Pyrogram files are converted by TgWitness
Requests after auth.logOut get_me() returned None; reconnect reported not authorized; GetDialogs raised AuthKeyUnregisteredError. The collector takes the refusal cause from a real request
Telegram 777000 during login and 2FA changes Posted new logins with client and IP, login codes, logins through external services and each 2FA change; no push update reached a parallel session
Telegram's session list for an imported session Shows the client the session was created with, for example Telegram Widgets
Leaving a basic group History stayed readable after leaving

Session key created inside the TDX VM · 9 November 2026#

A separate run deployed commit 206fef76 to Phala Cloud tdx.small; all six attestation checks passed. The panel signed in by phone code inside the VM. A second session read the code from Telegram 777000 and passed it straight to the VM.

Item Result
Journal record 6 account.authorized key_origin: created
Telegram's date for the new session 5 min 9 s after the attested collector start, no restart in between
History of five sources 131 messages, 25 attachment jobs
External time on two evidence passes FreeTSA and Sectigo RFC 3161 replies; four OTS calendars pending at the end of the run
Second session on the same account Worked at the same time as the VM session
Secret Chats in the VM Unavailable: the Phala installer installs the hash lock without the secret-chats extra

Account security and interrupted exports · 10 November 2026#

A RunPod Linux pod (8 vCPU, 16 GB) ran the panel on loopback with three workspaces and dedicated test accounts: one imported as an auth key and DC line, one from an Account JSON and one signed in from its own workspace. Revisions 6c7171228, 4d6206a52 and 196a5bcd1; the chat exports below were read with observation paused, as the panel requires.

Check Result
Auth key and DC line import Recognised as Auth key HEX and DC; signed in within 4 s
Independent sign-in from a workspace key_origin: created after 19 s
Make this the only session on a key minutes old Telegram refused (FRESH_RESET_AUTHORISATION_FORBIDDEN); the panel named the 24-hour limit and the automatic option stayed on
Donor logged out 1–9 minutes after an independent sign-in (two accounts, November 2026) The approved workspace session ended 0.1 s and under 60 s later with AUTH_KEY_UNREGISTERED; TgWitness now never ends the approving session
Witness probe Answers arrived as live updates after 0.9–5.0 s. Workspaces with an imported key start in Read-only and record probe.skipped until it is turned off
A second client on the same session key for 5.5 min 3 of 4 probe answers did not reach the collector live and were found in history (coverage.gap, probe_ack_missed_live); intake stayed marked as failed until the next live answer (connection.restored)
New sign-in with a login code account.sessions listed it under added 65 s after Telegram's creation time; ended from Sessions of this account
Chat export stopped with kill -9 after 80,000 messages The signed partial copy survived; the next export resumed it with two sessions in acquisition.sessions; Start over discarded it
Crash in the files stage of a 106-message chat Resumed from the signed checkpoint added in #193: 106 messages carried over, 19 files reused, 23 downloaded; verify.py exit 0
Attachment reuse 42 of 42 files reused from observation media and earlier exports
Set-aside cleanup A copy set aside nine days earlier was removed at startup; newer copies stayed
TSA revocation data OCSP for the Belgian and Sectigo signing certificates and the FreeTSA CRL stored next to the replies
Phala TDX deployment from the panel Commit 6c7171228, 2.5 min, all six checks passed, TCB UpToDate; verify.py checked the journal's TDX quote offline with Intel's collateral; CVM deleted afterwards

The verifier summarised the probing workspace as "Witness probes: sent 32, answered live 28, answer missed live 4; slowest live answer 5.0 s", and the witness workspace as "seen 50, seen live 49, answered 50". Not checked in this run: alert delivery to an outside destination, which was not configured, and the automatic only-session run, which Telegram allows 24 hours after the key was created.

Qualification status#

The 9 November run added Phala Intel TDX deployment with a live Telegram account, drand checkpoint anchoring, session fingerprint logging, ID gap analysis, and verified export with HTML, JSON and PDF report seals.

The retained live journal establishes real collection, edits, deletion notices, attachments, rechecks and rate-limit handling. Docker/Compose and installation checks are recorded in CI; the real Phala deployment and external timestamp verification are described above. Saved MTProto state and catch-up are implemented. The newer backfill commits messages and cursors atomically and preserves available Recent Actions, with synthetic coverage today.

The following items remain unqualified:

  • Sealed export: a key was created inside the VM (see above). Verifying an export from such a run at the sealed tier, and QR login from a phone, remain open.
  • Secret Chats in the Phala image: the installer needs a hash-locked source for the secret-chats extra.
  • Message lifecycle matrix (send, edit, delete, reactions, membership): the 9 November run collected channel history without exercising the write path. Steps 4–8 of the live acceptance procedure remain unrun.
  • Proxy and MTProxy paths, Bitcoin-anchored OTS seal, witness tier, and external-key backup restore were not tested in this run.

Further controlled runs for role visibility, reaction actors, prolonged FloodWait, account bans, network and process interruption recovery, mobile QR confirmation, sustained high load and long-term archival follow the live acceptance matrix.

The public audit directory contains only the signed report and aggregate measurements. Detailed operational receipts, raw captures and account material remain private. Application screenshots in docs/assets/ use fictional demonstration data.