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Final Investigation Report

The End of xmrwallet[.]com:

NameSilo Lied to Protect a $2M Thief

After 10 years of stealing Monero private keys, the operation is destroyed. Three registrars acted within days. The fourth, NameSilo, contacted the scammer, believed his story, and became his press secretary.

12 min read Updated March 27, 2026
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Editorial illustration: The End of xmrwallet[.]com:

In short

PhishDestroy says xmrwallet.com stole Monero view keys from 2016, with an estimated $2M+ stolen and fifteen documented victims. After identical abuse reports, registrars in India, Malaysia and China suspended or disabled their xmrwallet domains, while NameSilo, which held xmrwallet.com, refused and publicly called the registrant a victim. PhishDestroy then filed an ICANN complaint.

Key findings

estimated stolen
$2M+
active, since 2016
10 years
registrars suspended xmrwallet domains
3/4
lost by one victim in a single theft (~$177,000)
590 XMR
On this page
$2M+
Estimated Stolen
10
Years Active
3/4
Registrars Suspended
7
NameSilo Lies Proven
8
Theft PHP Endpoints

What xmrwallet[.]com Actually Did

Since 2016, xmrwallet[.]com marketed itself as a free, open-source Monero wallet. Our live network capture on February 18, 2026 proved it was doing something very different: stealing private Monero view keys on every login and hijacking transactions server-side.

Editorial illustration: Private keys exfiltrated from a browser session to an operator server
Core Theft Mechanism

The theft is built into the core architecture instead of being injected. A session system across 8 PHP endpoints transmitted the victim's private view key 40+ times per session. When users sent XMR, their transaction was silently discarded (raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0) and replaced with the scammer's.

User opens wallet
View key exfiltrated (Base64)
TX hijacked server-side
XMR sent to scammer
Editorial illustration: Multiple server endpoints dedicated to collecting wallet credentials

Six security vendors on VirusTotal flagged it as malicious. There are fifteen documented victims across Trustpilot, Sitejabber, and BitcoinTalk. One victim lost 590 XMR (~$177,000) in a single theft.

VirusTotal scan showing 6 of 93 vendors flagging xmrwallet.com as malicious including Fortinet Phishing detection
Screenshot 3: VirusTotal, where 6/93 vendors flagged xmrwallet.com as malicious. Fortinet classified it as "Phishing."
ScamAdviser showing xmrwallet.com as Very Likely Unsafe with Trust Score 1 out of 100
Screenshot 4: ScamAdviser Trust Score 1/100, "Very Likely Unsafe."

Three Registrars Did Their Job

We filed identical abuse reports with all four registrars hosting xmrwallet domains. Three acted immediately:

Editorial illustration: Three intermediaries acting on the evidence and one refusing

PublicDomainRegistry

xmrwallet.cc
Suspended

India · Days to act

WebNic

xmrwallet.biz
Suspended

Malaysia · Days to act

NICENIC

xmrwallet.net
DNS Dead

China · Weeks to act

NameSilo

xmrwallet.com
Refused

USA · Defended scammer

Three countries, three independent conclusions.

The registrars in India, Malaysia, and China reviewed the evidence, found fraud, and suspended the domains. No questions asked.

NameSilo Chose a Different Path

The fourth registrar, NameSilo, LLC (USA), which hosted the primary domain with the most evidence and most victims, did the opposite. They contacted the scammer, believed his story, and published a public statement defending him:

NameSilo public statement on X Twitter defending xmrwallet.com operator claiming domain was compromised
Screenshot 6: NameSilo's public statement on X (Twitter), March 12, 2026. Every claim in this post was false.
"Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago... After an extensive investigation, our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant... The registrant is also working to get the website delisted from VT reports."

— NameSilo, via X (Twitter)

We analyzed this statement line by line. Every claim was false.

The Operator's Own Words

Before NameSilo intervened, the operator responded directly to our abuse report. His emails confirm awareness and intent:

xmrwallet operator email response claiming this is not phishing and has been running for 8 years
Screenshot 7: The operator's response, "This is not phishing, we've been running for over 8 years."
xmrwallet operator email response denying theft accusations and defending data collection practices
Screenshot 8: The operator's second response, "This is the data we need to offer the service." The "data" was the victim's private view key.

Seven Lies, Exposed

LIE #1: "The domain was compromised"

The theft mechanism is the core architecture: 8 PHP endpoints, Base64 key exfiltration, and a 5.3-year GitHub commit gap. This system was built over years, not injected in a hack.

LIE #2: "We had received no prior abuse reports"

Six VirusTotal vendors, Trustpilot complaints going back years, a BitcoinTalk warning thread, the operator banned from r/Monero in 2018. A single Google search would have shown this.

LIE #3: "Not involving the registrant"

The operator registered 4 escape domains across 4 registrars (prepaid 5-10 years each) before the investigation was published. He also deleted 21+ GitHub issues and hired developers for a captcha system. Those are the actions of an operation, not a victim.

LIE #4: "They immediately took steps to reverse it"

The theft code was running in production during NameSilo's statement. There were zero GitHub commits addressing any incident, and nothing was reversed.

LIE #5: "Working to get delisted from VirusTotal"

NameSilo praised the scammer for lobbying to remove Fortinet's "Phishing" detection without removing the phishing code. That is suppressing security warnings.

LIE #6: "Is the abuse recent?"

This shifts the burden of proof to the reporter so they can close the case. The evidence was in the report. Three peer registrars didn't need to ask.

LIE #7: "We will re-open the investigation"

"Re-open" implies it was once open. Their investigation consisted of calling the scammer and writing down what he said. That is dictation.

Infrastructure Evidence

Editorial illustration: Suspended domains alongside replacements registered in advance
URLScan results showing xmrwallet domains resolving to same IPs across multiple TLDs
Screenshot 10: URLScan data showing all xmrwallet domains (.com, .cc, .biz, .net, .me, .app) resolving to the same infrastructure.
Editorial illustration: Theft endpoints and network captures preserved in a public evidence repository

Timeline: The Fall of xmrwallet

2016
xmrwallet[.]com begins operation, marketing as "free open-source Monero wallet"
2018
Operator banned from r/Monero. First victim reports appear on Trustpilot
Feb 4, 2026
Escape domain xmrwallet.cc registered (8yr prepaid), before investigation published
Feb 13, 2026
Issue #35 published: full TX hijacking mechanism exposed
Feb 18, 2026
Issue #36: live capture of 109 requests and 43 viewkey transmissions in a single session
Feb 23, 2026
xmrwallet.cc SUSPENDED (PDR). xmrwallet.biz SUSPENDED (WebNic). Operator panic-deletes Issues #35 & #36
Feb 26, 2026
More panic: xmrwallet.net and .me registered (10yr prepaid, same IPs as suspended domains)
Mar 8, 2026
xmrwallet.net DNS DEAD (NICENIC). 3 of 4 escape domains neutralized
Mar 2026
NameSilo publishes statement: "The registrant is the victim." Helps suppress VirusTotal detections
Mar 27, 2026
Formal ICANN complaint filed (RAA Section 3.18). Evidence submitted to law enforcement. This report published.

The Verdict

NameSilo didn't ignore the evidence. They read it, called the scammer, believed him, declared him innocent, and helped suppress security warnings. Then they asked the researchers to prove the abuse is "recent."

That goes beyond negligence: it is a partnership.

The domain is down and the scam is over. But a US registrar chose to publicly fabricate a cover story to shield a $2M crypto thief, and that will follow NameSilo for a very long time. Their statement will be Exhibit A in every filing from this point forward.

If you vouch for the thief, you share his bill.

Evidence & Resources

Related Investigations

This investigation is based on publicly available evidence, live network captures, OSINT, public review platforms, and NameSilo's own verbatim public statement. No unauthorized access was performed. All findings are independently reproducible.

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