What xmrwallet[.]com Actually Did
Since 2016, xmrwallet[.]com marketed itself as a free, open-source Monero wallet. Our live network capture on February 18, 2026 proved it was doing something very different: stealing private Monero view keys on every login and hijacking transactions server-side.
Core Theft Mechanism
The theft is built into the core architecture instead of being injected. A session system across 8 PHP endpoints transmitted the victim's private view key 40+ times per session. When users sent XMR, their transaction was silently discarded (raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0) and replaced with the scammer's.
User opens wallet
View key exfiltrated (Base64)
TX hijacked server-side
XMR sent to scammer
Six security vendors on VirusTotal flagged it as malicious. There are fifteen documented victims across Trustpilot, Sitejabber, and BitcoinTalk. One victim lost 590 XMR (~$177,000) in a single theft.

Screenshot 3: VirusTotal, where 6/93 vendors flagged xmrwallet.com as malicious. Fortinet classified it as "Phishing."

Screenshot 4: ScamAdviser Trust Score 1/100, "Very Likely Unsafe."
Three Registrars Did Their Job
We filed identical abuse reports with all four registrars hosting xmrwallet domains. Three acted immediately:
PublicDomainRegistry
xmrwallet.cc
Suspended
India · Days to act
WebNic
xmrwallet.biz
Suspended
Malaysia · Days to act
NICENIC
xmrwallet.net
DNS Dead
China · Weeks to act
NameSilo
xmrwallet.com
Refused
USA · Defended scammer
Three countries, three independent conclusions.
The registrars in India, Malaysia, and China reviewed the evidence, found fraud, and suspended the domains. No questions asked.
NameSilo Chose a Different Path
The fourth registrar, NameSilo, LLC (USA), which hosted the primary domain with the most evidence and most victims, did the opposite. They contacted the scammer, believed his story, and published a public statement defending him:

Screenshot 6: NameSilo's public statement on X (Twitter), March 12, 2026. Every claim in this post was false.
"Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago... After an extensive investigation, our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant... The registrant is also working to get the website delisted from VT reports."
— NameSilo, via X (Twitter)
We analyzed this statement line by line. Every claim was false.
The Operator's Own Words
Before NameSilo intervened, the operator responded directly to our abuse report. His emails confirm awareness and intent:

Screenshot 7: The operator's response, "This is not phishing, we've been running for over 8 years."

Screenshot 8: The operator's second response, "This is the data we need to offer the service." The "data" was the victim's private view key.
Seven Lies, Exposed
LIE #1: "The domain was compromised"
The theft mechanism is the core architecture: 8 PHP endpoints, Base64 key exfiltration, and a 5.3-year GitHub commit gap. This system was built over years, not injected in a hack.
LIE #2: "We had received no prior abuse reports"
Six VirusTotal vendors, Trustpilot complaints going back years, a BitcoinTalk warning thread, the operator banned from r/Monero in 2018. A single Google search would have shown this.
LIE #3: "Not involving the registrant"
The operator registered 4 escape domains across 4 registrars (prepaid 5-10 years each) before the investigation was published. He also deleted 21+ GitHub issues and hired developers for a captcha system. Those are the actions of an operation, not a victim.
LIE #4: "They immediately took steps to reverse it"
The theft code was running in production during NameSilo's statement. There were zero GitHub commits addressing any incident, and nothing was reversed.
LIE #5: "Working to get delisted from VirusTotal"
NameSilo praised the scammer for lobbying to remove Fortinet's "Phishing" detection without removing the phishing code. That is suppressing security warnings.
LIE #6: "Is the abuse recent?"
This shifts the burden of proof to the reporter so they can close the case. The evidence was in the report. Three peer registrars didn't need to ask.
LIE #7: "We will re-open the investigation"
"Re-open" implies it was once open. Their investigation consisted of calling the scammer and writing down what he said. That is dictation.
Infrastructure Evidence

Screenshot 10: URLScan data showing all xmrwallet domains (.com, .cc, .biz, .net, .me, .app) resolving to the same infrastructure.
Timeline: The Fall of xmrwallet
2016
xmrwallet[.]com begins operation, marketing as "free open-source Monero wallet"
2018
Operator banned from r/Monero. First victim reports appear on Trustpilot
Feb 4, 2026
Escape domain xmrwallet.cc registered (8yr prepaid), before investigation published
Feb 13, 2026
Issue #35 published: full TX hijacking mechanism exposed
Feb 18, 2026
Issue #36: live capture of 109 requests and 43 viewkey transmissions in a single session
Feb 23, 2026
xmrwallet.cc SUSPENDED (PDR). xmrwallet.biz SUSPENDED (WebNic). Operator panic-deletes Issues #35 & #36
Feb 26, 2026
More panic: xmrwallet.net and .me registered (10yr prepaid, same IPs as suspended domains)
Mar 8, 2026
xmrwallet.net DNS DEAD (NICENIC). 3 of 4 escape domains neutralized
Mar 2026
NameSilo publishes statement: "The registrant is the victim." Helps suppress VirusTotal detections
Mar 27, 2026
Formal ICANN complaint filed (RAA Section 3.18). Evidence submitted to law enforcement. This report published.
The Verdict
NameSilo didn't ignore the evidence. They read it, called the scammer, believed him, declared him innocent, and helped suppress security warnings. Then they asked the researchers to prove the abuse is "recent."
That goes beyond negligence: it is a partnership.
The domain is down and the scam is over. But a US registrar chose to publicly fabricate a cover story to shield a $2M crypto thief, and that will follow NameSilo for a very long time. Their statement will be Exhibit A in every filing from this point forward.
If you vouch for the thief, you share his bill.
Evidence & Resources
Related Investigations
This investigation is based on publicly available evidence, live network captures, OSINT, public review platforms, and NameSilo's own verbatim public statement. No unauthorized access was performed. All findings are independently reproducible.