PhishDestroy first recorded icloudbr.support on 2026-09-06. Stored VirusTotal result: 10/92 engines flagged. Analysis time (as stored): 2026-09-25 06:11 UTC. Retrieved (as stored): 2026-10-22 10:33 UTC.
Page title: “iCloud”
More about the sources
Recorded security signals
Stored VirusTotal result: 10/92 engines flagged. Analysis time (as stored): 2026-09-25 06:11 UTC. Retrieved (as stored): 2026-10-22 10:33 UTC. Use caution — do not enter credentials or personal information.
Expert view has every section: DNS, TLS, network requests, hashes and the raw JSON.
Analysis
Domain summary
PhishDestroy first recorded icloudbr.support on 2026-09-06. Stored VirusTotal result: 10/92 engines flagged. Analysis time (as stored): 2026-09-25 06:11 UTC. Retrieved (as stored): 2026-10-22 10:33 UTC. Risk: critical (evidence score 95/100). Registrar: Gransy, s.r.o. Status: Content unavailable. Hosting: TIME-HOST LTD. Do not enter credentials or connect a wallet.
icloudbr.support was a phishing page posing as Apple's iCloud service. It carried the plain page title "iCloud", and its domain name pairs the brand with a support-style ending to look like an official help portal. The page targeted Apple device owners who could be led to believe they were signing in to their iCloud account. PhishDestroy first detected it on 2026-09-06. The site has been dead since 2026-09-21, and its DNS was still inactive when we checked on 2026-10-19.
How the scam works
Pages like this copy the look of the iCloud sign-in screen and ask for an Apple ID email and password. Victims usually arrive through links in texts or emails about a locked account, a lost device or a storage problem. Anything typed into the form goes to the operators, not to Apple. With a working Apple ID, attackers can read synced photos, notes and backups, track or remotely wipe devices through Find My, and lock the real owner out. For crypto holders, any seed phrases or wallet screenshots saved in iCloud are exposed along with the account.
Evidence
On 2026-09-17, 13 of 89 VirusTotal engines flagged the domain. The vendors that flagged it include BitDefender, ESET, Fortinet, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, G-Data, Gridinsoft, alphaMountain.ai and Chong Lua Dao. That is a meaningful number of independent security vendors agreeing on the verdict. The domain also appears in three AlienVault OTX threat pulses and on the PhishDestroy blocklist.
Infrastructure
The domain was registered on 2026-02-19 through Gransy, s.r.o. That is about six and a half months before we detected it, so it either sat unused for a while or ran unnoticed before activity picked up. It was hosted on the TIME-HOST LTD network in Russia. Its free Let's Encrypt certificate gave it a padlock in the browser, which shows only that the connection was encrypted. It says nothing about who ran the site.
What to do
If you entered your Apple ID on this site, change your password right away from Apple's official settings. Check that two-factor authentication is on and that your trusted phone numbers are ones you recognise. Review the devices signed in to your account and remove any you don't recognise. If you kept seed phrases, private keys or exchange passwords in iCloud Notes, Photos or Drive, treat them as compromised and move your funds to a new wallet. Defenders should block the domain, search mail and proxy logs for visits since 2026-09-06, and reset credentials for any user who reached the page.
This is a separate stored result. Its counts, vendors and dates do not replace the provider observation above. A retrieval date is not an analysis date.
Open report Page code check by a separate monitor · 10 / 100 · 2026-09-17 02:20 UTC
This dated monitor analysis is separate from the primary PhishDestroy analysis above. A heuristic score is not a measured probability.
Heuristic score
10
Analyzed at
2026-09-17T02:20:16Z
Source timestamp
2026-09-17 04:20:16
Technical metadata
PhishDestroy narrative
Narrative generation metadata
Open report Title, description and generation record
The narrative generation date is separate from observation dates. These are the retained publication fields, not an additional independent detection.
AI title
icloudbr.support — Apple iCloud Phishing Page
AI description
icloudbr.support was an Apple iCloud impersonation phishing page built to capture Apple ID logins from iCloud users. It is now offline.
AI summary
Overview icloudbr.support was a phishing page posing as Apple's iCloud service. It carried the plain page title "iCloud", and its domain name pairs the brand with a support-style ending to look like an official help portal. The page targeted Apple device owners who could be led to believe they were signing in to their iCloud account. PhishDestroy first detected it on 2026-09-06. The site has been dead since 2026-09-21, and its DNS was still inactive when we checked on 2026-10-19. How the scam works Pages like this copy the look of the iCloud sign-in screen and ask for an Apple ID email and password. Victims usually arrive through links in texts or emails about a locked account, a lost device or a storage problem. Anything typed into the form goes to the operators, not to Apple. With a working Apple ID, attackers can read synced photos, notes and backups, track or remotely wipe devices through Find My, and lock the real owner out. For crypto holders, any seed phrases or wallet screenshots saved in iCloud are exposed along with the account. Evidence On 2026-09-17, 13 of 89 VirusTotal engines flagged the domain. The vendors that flagged it include BitDefender, ESET, Fortinet, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, G-Data, Gridinsoft, alphaMountain.ai and Chong Lua Dao. That is a meaningful number of independent security vendors agreeing on the verdict. The domain also appears in three AlienVault OTX threat pulses and on the PhishDestroy blocklist. Infrastructure The domain was registered on 2026-02-19 through Gransy, s.r.o. That is about six and a half months before we detected it, so it either sat unused for a while or ran unnoticed before activity picked up. It was hosted on the TIME-HOST LTD network in Russia. Its free Let's Encrypt certificate gave it a padlock in the browser, which shows only that the connection was encrypted. It says nothing about who ran the site. What to do If you entered your Apple ID on this site, change your password right away from Apple's official settings. Check that two-factor authentication is on and that your trusted phone numbers are ones you recognise. Review the devices signed in to your account and remove any you don't recognise. If you kept seed phrases, private keys or exchange passwords in iCloud Notes, Photos or Drive, treat them as compromised and move your funds to a new wallet. Defenders should block the domain, search mail and proxy logs for visits since 2026-09-06, and reset credentials for any user who reached the page. Useful links urlscan.io scan and screenshot: https://urlscan.io/result/01a0a21a-2e1b-713c-95d8-8043c7bf0e01/ VirusTotal report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/icloudbr.support Google Safe Browsing status: https://transparencyreport.google.com/safe-browsing/search?url=icloudbr.support Report phishing to Google: https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/ Site owner? Request a review: https://phishdestroy.io/appeals/
Earlier stored analysis, not reviewed; text generation time is separate from source observation dates.
Results reflect each source’s collection time. Zero detections do not guarantee safety. OTX references are community publications.
Collected source details
Stored page, network and scanner observations, grouped by source and observation time.
Every stored field, with its source and date
Network Security Intelligence
Cloudflare Radar VerdictMalicious
Phishing
Questions about icloudbr.support
Is icloudbr.support legit?
PhishDestroy rates icloudbr.support as critical risk (evidence score 95/100) from the recorded evidence; it was first recorded on 2026-09-06. Stored VirusTotal result: 10/92 engines flagged. Analysis time (as stored): 2026-09-25 06:11 UTC. Retrieved (as stored): 2026-10-22 10:33 UTC. The local score and a listing do not prove fraud. Check each source’s date and the exact URL.
Is icloudbr.support safe to connect a wallet?
Because of the risk signals above, do not connect a wallet, sign messages or approve token permissions on icloudbr.support. A confirmed blockchain transaction cannot be reversed.
What should I do if I used icloudbr.support?
Entered a password — change it on that service and on every other site where you used the same password
Turn on two-factor authentication — where the service offers it; an authenticator app is stronger than SMS codes
Paid or entered card or bank details — contact your bank or payment service through the contacts on your card or its official website
Connected a wallet but signed nothing — disconnect the site in the wallet and reject pending requests; a connection by itself does not move funds
Approved token spending (approve / permit) — revoke that approval with a token-approval checker
Shared a seed phrase or private key — move the remaining funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase; the exposed wallet is no longer safe
Downloaded a file — do not open it and scan the device with security software
Keep the address, dates, payment or transaction details and messages for a report to the police or another competent authority. A report does not guarantee that money is returned. Step-by-step help: emergency guide.
IP Reputation170.168.89.1670/100abuse score · abuse reports about this server's IP address, not about the domain; higher = worseThis IP address has not been reported to the abuse database yet, but the domain itself is recognized as phishing.0 reportschecked 2026-09-15
What we count Elapsed time from the first stored abuse report to the first observation that the content was unavailable. This does not establish the cause.
What each report contains Stored outgoing-report records may reference evidence available at the time, such as vendor verdicts, registration data, hosting details, classifications, or screenshots. This page does not infer the exact payload delivered, receipt, acknowledgement, or action by a recipient.
Technical detailsProvenance & timestamps
First Detected2026-09-06
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026-09-17score 10/1002 brand signals
Favicon Hash
ICANN OVERSIGHT
Accreditation and RAA context
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Accountability draft Nothing is sent automatically.
Network & certificates
Stored technical evidence
Network & DNS
Resolved IP
170.168.89.167
Network ASN
AS212913
AS name
TIMEHOST-AS TIME-HOST LTD, GB
Organization
Time-Host Ltd
Observed location
Nekrasovka, RU
Server header
Apache
Nameservers 1
kia.ns.cloudflare.com
Location describes the IP network.
TLS certificate
Issuer
Let's Encrypt / YR1
Valid from
2026-08-15 23:17:09
Valid until
2026-11-13 23:17:08
Hostname match
Yes
Validity
Stored certificate expired
Collection time
2026-09-15 10:02 UTC
Collection source
PhishDestroy collector
Certificate fingerprintdfd2479c52143f51ace8305fed7e5336126266b8e6cf366d74dcedc5af72608aCertificate names · 1 SAN
icloudbr.support
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Primary outcomeDNS inactivereason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAIN
RDAP registration
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-21 01:42 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-21 01:42 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14 UTC · 230.55hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-25 20:58 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Technologies · 1 identified
A
Apache HTTP Server
Web servers
Apache is a free and open-source cross-platform web server software.
Network requests that the URLScan browser recorded while loading the page. URLScan does not provide a hash for every request. PhishDestroy retrieved this list on 2026-10-29 02:44 UTC.
Recorded events: 15. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
The latest stored checks indicate that the reported content is unavailable; this does not establish who or what caused the change.
Time to First Unavailability
Hours from detection to the first unavailable observation: 357
Recorded activity
5 entries
Lifecycle
Domain registered
Added to PhishDestroy+198 d 21 h
VirusTotal analysis with detections+18 d 17 h
VirusTotal
10/92 engine detections
+7 d 21 h
URLScan
Page captured
+29 min
AlienVault OTX
3 community references
+46 h 58 min
Cloudflare Radar
Phishing
+8 d 20 h
Added to PhishDestroy
icloudbr.support
How we investigate & report
Public scans, evidence and abuse channels
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
Supporting signal — Shares a page feature, infrastructure or a collector label; not proof of one operator.
Discovery only — Same registrar or CDN edge: listed for navigation, not evidence of a link.
Each spoke is one reason a domain is linked to this report. Node size marks VirusTotal detections, dashed nodes are already offline, and the full lists follow below. Full list of related reports
You are not alone and there is nothing to be ashamed of. Scammers are sophisticated criminals who exploit trust. Reporting your experience is the most powerful weapon against fraud — your report can prevent others from becoming victims and help law enforcement take action. Secure your accounts and funds first, then report. If credentials were compromised, report immediately. Do not engage with recovery scammers.
Act on what you actually did. Entered a password: change it, and wherever you reused it. Paid or gave card details: contact your bank or payment service. Downloaded a file: scan the device. Then report the incident.
Choose the steps that match what you shared. Keep a copy of this report alongside your own records.
What should I do immediately?
Urgent
Stop using the suspicious site. Open the real service through its official app or an address you already trust.
Entered a password — change it on that service and on every other site where you used the same password
Turn on two-factor authentication — where the service offers it; an authenticator app is stronger than SMS codes
Paid or entered card or bank details — contact your bank or payment service through the contacts on your card or its official website
Downloaded a file — do not open it and scan the device with security software
Shared a seed phrase or private key — move the remaining funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase; the exposed wallet is no longer safe
Connected a wallet but signed nothing — disconnect the site in the wallet and reject pending requests; a connection by itself does not move funds
Approved token spending (approve / permit) — revoke that approval with a token-approval checker (revoke.cash)
Sent crypto — save the transaction hash, your address and the receiving address; blockchain transactions cannot be reversed
What information should I collect for my report?
FBI guidelines
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Exact dates & times — of each transaction and first contact with scammer
Screenshots — scam website, chat messages, emails, wallet transactions, social media
All URLs & domains used by the scammer (including icloudbr.support)
Communications — emails, texts, phone numbers, usernames the scammer used
Even if you don't have all details — file a report anyway. Partial information still helps investigations.
Where should I report the scam?
FBI IC3 — Internet Crime Complaint Center (US federal reporting)
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
Local police — creates an official record, even if they can't act immediately
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
How do phishing scams typically work?
Fake websites — pixel-perfect clones of legitimate sites with slightly altered domains
Pig butchering — trust built over weeks via Telegram/WhatsApp/dating apps, then money stolen
Recovery scams — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
AI-powered scams — deepfakes, automated phishing, and AI-generated sites making fraud harder to detect
How can I protect myself in the future?
Bookmark official sites — never click links from emails, DMs, or ads
Verify domains — check on PhishDestroy before interacting. Check HTTPS, spelling, domain age
"Too good to be true" = scam — guaranteed returns, celebrity endorsements, urgent deadlines
Beware of recovery scammers! Recovery scammers may pose as investigators, lawyers, or tracing services. Do not pay upfront fees or disclose credentials.Learn more about recovery fraud →
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.