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Inside the Machine: How Crypto Scammers Hijack Bing & DuckDuckGo

Using live SEMrush data, this report exposes two parallel SEO attack operations that push crypto phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo search results. In total: 10 domains, 2 attack vectors, and 100,000+ potential victims per month.

March 30, 2026 22 min read SEMrush API Data
Editorial illustration: Inside the Machine: How Crypto Scammers Hijack Bing & DuckDuckGo

In short

PhishDestroy documented two SEO operations: Yahoo search-page URLs carrying phishing anchors that Bing treats as trusted links, and a PBN of nine donor domains. A follow-up traced 26 DeFi phishing domains to one operator and NiceNIC; seven ranked #1 on Bing with a $2 domain and a copied title tag, while Google blocks all 26.

Key findings

DeFi phishing domains traced to one operator and NiceNIC
26
of those domains ranking #1 on Bing1
7
cost per domain in the Bing #1 playbook
$2
potential victims per month2
100K+

Google blocks all 26 domains.

Part I figure, based on SEMrush data.

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On this page
10Phishing Domains
9PBN Donors
60,500+Daily Exposure
100K+Victims/Month
2Attack Vectors
Disclaimer

All data in this report was collected via SEMrush API and phishdestroy.io for cybersecurity research purposes. Domain names are published to warn users, not to promote them.

The Two Attack Vectors

Our investigation uncovered two completely different, parallel operations running simultaneously to push phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results.

Editorial illustration: Organised operations pushing phishing sites above legitimate platforms in search results
Vector A: Yahoo SERP Injection
Exploits Yahoo's domain authority (AS 24) via mobile search pages. Bing inherits trust from dynamically generated Yahoo search URLs containing phishing anchors. Targets: curvefinance.co, curvefi.co, aster-dex.at
Vector B: Coordinated PBN Network
9 compromised/purchased domains with AS 49–65 link to multiple phishing sites simultaneously. Works against ALL search engines. Targets: rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, keplr.me

Vector A: The Yahoo SERP Injection Attack

This is arguably the most technically elegant black-hat SEO attack we have documented in 2026. It exploits a fundamental flaw in how Bing evaluates link authority: Bing cannot tell genuine editorial links apart from dynamically generated search result pages on trusted domains.

Editorial illustration: Authority borrowed from trusted search pages flowing into a phishing domain

The Mechanism, Step by Step

Craft Yahoo URL8+ country subdomains
Embed AnchorRandom query + phish link
Force CrawlPing services + spam
Bing IndexesInherits Yahoo AS 24
Rank #1Phishing site in top results

Step 1: Generating the trusted carrier URL. Attackers craft URLs on Yahoo's mobile search endpoints across multiple international subdomains: no.search.yahoo.com (Norway), fr.search.yahoo.com (France), mx.search.yahoo.com (Mexico), pl.search.yahoo.com (Poland), gr.search.yahoo.com (Greece), qc.search.yahoo.com (Quebec), chfr.search.yahoo.com (Swiss French), co.search.yahoo.com (Colombia). These pages carry Yahoo's inherited Authority Score: 23–24.

Step 2: Embedding the phishing anchor. Each URL contains a completely random, innocent search query ("pele+fifa", "Jean-Paul+Sartre", "Radio+Stars", "jucheck.exe"), but the anchor text reads: curvefi.co Curve Finance. The randomized queries leave spam filters no pattern to match.

Step 3: Forced crawl & indexation. Attackers push Bingbot to crawl these URLs using mass ping services, forum/blog comment injections, and automated crawl triggering tools.

Bing's Algorithmic Failure

Google's algorithm: "This is a dynamic search page. No link equity transfer."
Bing's algorithm: "yahoo.com links to curvefi.co with anchor 'Curve Finance DEX'. Ranking signal accepted. ✓"

Result: phishing site climbs to TOP 3 for "Curve Finance" on Bing and DuckDuckGo.

Raw SEMrush Evidence: curvefi.co

SEMrush Backlink Analytics API | 30.03.2026 | Target: curvefi.co
ASSource DomainAnchor Text
24chfr.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24co.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance
24fr.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance
24mx.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24no.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24pl.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
23gr.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
23qc.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance

The irony: The site has zero organic keywords and zero traffic in SEMrush's database, yet it appears in Bing/DDG results for "Curve Finance" because of Yahoo's borrowed authority.

Vector B: The Coordinated PBN Network

Five separate phishing sites (rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, and keplr.me) all share an identical set of backlink sources. Behind them is a single organized criminal operation running multiple phishing campaigns from one infrastructure.

Editorial illustration: Nine donor domains linking simultaneously to five phishing targets from one operator

The Smoking Gun: Shared Infrastructure

SEMrush API | Cross-domain analysis | 30.03.2026
PBN Donor DomainASrabbysdexscrmonerotrezor
lewievuittton.com65✓✓✓✓
lyricamed.us.com61✓✓✓✓
creatfx.com60✓✓✓✓
jba.com.jo56✓✓✓✓
jornaldevinhedo.com56✓✓✓✓
jasaaspalhotmix.com54✓✓✓✓
magna-eg.com50✓✓✓✓
markjohnsonbuilders50✓✓✓✓
nextplayflix.com49✓✓✓✓
Note on lewievuittton.com

The top PBN donor (AS 65) is itself a typosquat of Louis Vuitton. In other words, a scam site is propping up other scam sites. It is criminal infrastructure all the way down.

Phishing Domain Profiles

SEMrush Domain Overview | March 2026
DomainImpersonatesKeywordsTop TargetVolume
dexscreener.atDexScreener64"dexscreener" #4260,500/mo
rabbys.atRabby Wallet15"rabby wallet" #515,400/mo
trezorsuite.atTrezor Suite7"trezor suite" #324,400/mo
aster-dex.atAster DEX13"aster交易所" #253,600/mo
monero-wallet.atMonero Wallet4"xmr wallet online" #26210/mo
keplr.meKeplr Wallet0Comment spam stealthN/A
bscscan.cfdBSCScan0Bulk spam linksN/A
curvefinance.coCurve Finance0Yahoo injection onlyN/A
curvefi.coCurve Finance0Yahoo injection onlyN/A
app-crv.netCurve app0Mixed techniquesN/A
Critical: Trezor Suite Download

Users searching "trezor suite download" are actively looking to install wallet software. A phishing site at position #3–5 on DuckDuckGo means users downloading malware thinking it's a hardware wallet interface. This is happening right now.

The AI-Powered Article Farm

The aster-dex.at variant uses a hybrid approach, combining Yahoo injection with AI-generated blog content placed on compromised or purpose-built sites across Vietnam, Italy, Indonesia, and Switzerland.

Editorial illustration: Mass-produced identical articles published across unrelated sites to link to one target

The blog articles all have near-identical titles: "Why Token Swaps and Liquidity Pools Still Trip Up Even Seasoned DEX Traders", "Why Automated Market Makers Still Surprise Traders". These are AI-generated articles placed on sites with AS 21–36, all linking to aster-dex.at.

Comment Spam Infiltration

keplr.me takes a different approach entirely: pure comment spam on unrelated high-authority sites. Fake user names like "ZackaryThymn", "Fritzkah", "Jamesboach" inject crypto wallet anchors into philosophy education sites (filozofija.edu.rs, AS 45), employee engagement platforms (bavave.com, AS 63), and arts festivals (lea-festival.com, AS 50).

Editorial illustration: Legitimate websites unknowingly hosting phishing links hidden among normal comments

The Bottom of the Barrel: Automated Tool Spam

bscscan.cfd uses the crudest possible method: paid bulk backlink packages from sites literally named rankongoogle.agency and linksjump.click. All sources have AS = 0. The .cfd TLD is a known spam indicator. Yet on Bing even this partially works: the volume of low-quality links can influence rankings on brand-new domains with no negative history.

Editorial illustration: Bulk low-quality backlink packages sold cheaply and still partially effective

Why Bing & DuckDuckGo Are Specifically Vulnerable

Editorial illustration: A mature multi-layer spam defence compared with a weaker single-layer one
Algorithmic differences that scammers actively exploit
FeatureGoogleBing
Dynamic page detectionNo link equity from search result pagesYahoo search pages treated as editorial content
Spam ML maturity15+ years SpamBrain training dataLess mature; PBN AS 50–65 still works
Brand protectionAggressive; curvefinance.co flagged quickly.at/.co TLD scams survive longer
AI content farmsDetection deployed 2023+AI farms on .vn, .it still earn passing scores
Phishing blockingSafe Browsing blocks known domains fastSmartScreen misses newly registered scam domains
DuckDuckGo Specific Weakness

DDG uses Bing's index as its primary data source, so it inherits all of Bing's vulnerabilities. Privacy-focused users who prefer DDG are often crypto-savvy, which makes them higher-value targets. DDG has no independent spam reporting mechanism; reports go to Bing.

Keyword Targeting Strategy

The keyword profiles show precise targeting. Besides primary brand terms, operators go after typosquats ("rabbi wallet", "rubby wallet", "dexscrenner") and even Chinese-language queries ("aster交易所" ranking #25).

Editorial illustration: Multilingual keyword targeting spanning several continents
Brand + Search Volume Analysis | SEMrush US | March 2026
Target KeywordMonthly VolumeScam DomainPosition
dexscreener60,500dexscreener.at#42
rabby wallet5,400rabbys.at#51–71
trezor suite4,400trezorsuite.at#32–85
aster dex3,600aster-dex.at#63
dexscrennertypo2,400dexscreener.at#45
aster交易所Chinese1,000aster-dex.at#25
trezor suite download260trezorsuite.at#54
rabbi wallettypo210rabbys.at#54
xmr wallet online210monero-wallet.at#55–69

Historical Context: The Trust Wallet / DuckDuckGo Problem

This Problem Has Deep Roots

These attacks are not new. The problem was significantly more severe when wallets like Trust Wallet used DuckDuckGo as their default in-app search engine. Users searching for DeFi protocols from within their wallet were served phishing results as the #1 result, with no complex SEO required. The combination of a privacy-focused search engine with weaker spam detection and a crypto wallet with a built-in browser created a perfect storm for phishing.

Even after Trust Wallet switched away from DDG as the default, the underlying vulnerability persists. Any user who manually chooses DuckDuckGo for privacy (a demographic that heavily overlaps with crypto users) remains exposed to these exact attacks today. The scam operations documented in this report have been running variations of this technique for several years and adapt as search engines slowly patch individual vectors.

How to Protect Yourself

Always Verify the Exact Domain

REAL Curve Finance → curve.fi (NOT .co, .net) • DexScreener → dexscreener.com (NOT .at) • Rabby → rabby.io (NOT .at, .me) • Trezor Suite → suite.trezor.io (NOT trezorsuite.at) • Keplr → keplr.app (NOT .me) • BSCScan → bscscan.com (NOT .cfd)

  • NEVER connect your wallet from a search result
  • Bookmark legitimate sites directly
  • Use DDG's !bang shortcut: !g curve finance forces Google search
  • Install MetaMask's phishing detection extension
  • Check any domain at PhishDestroy before connecting

Recommendations to Microsoft/Bing

  1. Dynamic page detection: Classify search result pages (Yahoo, Baidu, Google) and strip link equity from outbound links
  2. Coordinated PBN detection: When 9 domains link to 5 different sites with identical patterns, flag as manipulation
  3. Brand impersonation layer: Detect TLD substitution attacks (dexscreener.at ≈ dexscreener.com)
  4. .AT domain monitoring: Enhanced scrutiny for newly registered .at domains in crypto SERPs
  5. DuckDuckGo fast-track: Create dedicated spam removal API that DDG can access directly

Conclusion

What we found is a professionally organized, multi-brand, multi-vector SEO operation built specifically to exploit the gap between Google's and Bing's spam detection capabilities. Every user who searches for "Trezor Suite download" on DuckDuckGo today may see a wallet-draining phishing site before they see the real one. The technical fix exists. The question is whether Bing will implement it.

Editorial illustration: Public evidence presented for accountability over documented phishing domains
Follow-Up Investigation, April 17, 2026

Part II: The $2 Playbook (26 Phishing Sites, 1 Registrar, 7 Bing #1 Results)

A follow-up to this March investigation identified 26 new phishing domains, all impersonating DeFi protocols and currently ranking #1 on Bing for their target brand queries. Using SEMrush API backlink data, RDAP registration records, and direct source code analysis, we traced every single domain to one operator, one registrar (NiceNIC), and one cloaked PBN network of 15 sites. Cost per domain: $2. Time: 10 minutes.

Editorial illustration: One operator placing dozens of cheap phishing hooks into a single search engine
26Phishing Domains
1Registrar (NiceNIC)
7Bing #1 Positions
15Cloaked PBN Sites
0Google Rankings

One Operator, 26 Domains, One Registrar

We ran RDAP queries on all 26 phishing domains. Every single one returned the same registrar: NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited. That covers all 23 of 23 successfully queried domains; 3 queries hit rate-limit errors before verification (their infrastructure patterns match).

Editorial illustration: Every checked phishing domain tracing back to the same registrar with no abuse action

RDAP Registration Data: Evidence of Batch Registration

RDAP query results | April 2026 | 23 of 26 successfully queried
DomainImpersonatesCreatedCloudflare NS Pair
star-gate-finance-stargate.financeStargate Finance2025-09-08terry/ximena
app-vesper.financeVesper Finance2025-09-08terry/ximena
app-vvs.financeVVS Finance2025-09-08terry/ximena
orbit-protocol-lending.netOrbit Protocol2025-10-10terry/ximena
vvsfnance.comVVS Finance2025-07-12april/kayden
spooky-swap.netSpookySwap2025-04-15april/kayden
thorwsap.comTHORSwap2025-07-24april/kayden
hyperlokc.comHyperlock Finance2025-07-12arnold/destiny
shadow-ex.netShadow Exchange2025-06-24amos/tricia
v2velodrome.comVelodrome Finance2025-09-04dayana/marvin
layerbank-v3.comLayerBank2024-09-07austin/cheryl
biasterswap.xyzBiSwap2024-09-07lady/langston
v2-olympusdao.comOlympusDAO2026-03-29nash/romina
uncx.orgUNCX Network2025-12-24cory/megan
amblent.ccAmbient Finance2026-02-09nicole/salvador
juicefi.ccJuice Finance2026-02-09nicole/salvador
rhea-finance.comRhea Finance2025-05-30—
rhea-finance.netRhea Finance2025-05-30—
rhea-rhea.orgRhea Finance2025-05-30—
silo-finance-silofinance.netSilo Finance2025-05-30—
Batch Registration: One Operator, Many Sessions

Shared Cloudflare NS pairs and identical creation dates prove batch registration:

  • 2025-09-08: star-gate + app-vesper + app-vvs (all terry/ximena)
  • 2025-05-30: rhea-finance.com + .net + rhea-rhea.org + silo-finance (4 domains, one session)
  • 2026-02-09: amblent.cc + juicefi.cc (nicole/salvador)
  • 2024-09-07: layerbank-v3.com + biasterswap.xyz (operation running 18+ months)

The $2 Playbook, Step by Step

The attack needs neither sophisticated SEO nor months of link building. Below is the complete, verified sequence that produces Bing #1 results.

Editorial illustration: Four cheap steps that push a brand-new phishing domain to the top of search results
Register typosquat$1-2 at NiceNIC
Clone title tagCopy from real site
Submit to PBNbye.fyi, 15 sites
Wait 2-8 weeksBing indexes & ranks
Bing #1Above real project

Step 1: Typosquat Registry

Typosquat techniques across 8 of the 26 domains
Real ProjectReal DomainPhishing DomainTechnique
VVS Financevvs.financevvsfnance.comDropped letter (i)
THORSwapthorswap.comthorwsap.comSwapped letters (a/w)
Hyperlockhyperlock.fihyperlokc.comSwapped letters (c/k)
Arbitrum Bridgebridge.arbitrum.ioarbtrumbridge.ccSwap + cheap TLD
Ambient Financeambient.financeamblent.ccPhonetic misspelling
Thruster Financethruster.financethnuster.ccDropped letter (r→n)
Optimism Bridgeapp.optimism.iooptrnismbirdge.ccMultiple typos
Stargate Financestargate.financestar-gate-finance-stargate.financeKeyword stuffing

Step 2: Clone the Title Tag ($0, 5 minutes)

The operator copies the exact <title> tag and meta description from the real project's website. This is the single most important step. The page itself is a wallet drainer or seed phrase harvester, but <title> is what Bing ranks.

Step 3: Submit to the Cloaked PBN ($0, 1 minute)

The operator visits any of 15 PBN sites (bye.fyi, atomizelink.icu, etc.), types the domain into a form labeled "Enter your URL", and clicks "Shorten." One submit creates a page on all 15 sites at once, because they share one database.

Step 4: Wait (2-8 weeks, $0)

Proof: 1 Backlink = Bing #1

app.thnuster.cc reached Bing #1 for "Thruster Finance" with exactly 1 backlink, a cached Yahoo SERP page. The PBN wasn't even necessary.

Total Cost Breakdown

WhatCostTime
Domain (.cc/.com via NiceNIC)$1-22 min
Cloudflare DNS (free plan)$01 min
Clone title tag from real site$05 min
Submit to PBN (bye.fyi etc.)$01 min
Wait for indexation$02-8 weeks
TOTAL$1-2~10 min

Inside the Cloaking Engine

We fetched and analyzed the actual HTML source code from the PBN network. Every page on every domain runs the same cloaking engine.

Editorial illustration: A blank overlay hiding thousands of links from users while crawlers still read them

Page Architecture: 400KB HTML, 3,500+ links, 4 Layers

Layer 1: The Cloaking Wall (what users see)
<body style="overflow: hidden;">
  <div style="position:absolute; top:0; left:0;
              width:100%; height:5000px;
              background:white; z-index:1000000;
              font-size:32px; text-align:center;">
    <p>The domain report has Expired!</p>
  </div>

White div covers the entire viewport. z-index:1000000 keeps anything from rendering above it. overflow:hidden on body prevents scrolling past. User sees "Expired" and leaves.

Layer 2: The JS Redirect (backup protection)
// work.js — identical on all 15 domains:
window.location.replace("https://scrib.li/ai-article-generator");

If user bypasses the white wall, JavaScript redirects to scrib.li (affiliate monetization). Triple protection against human visitors.

Layer 3: The Fake Facade (what bots see)

Bingbot ignores the CSS overlay because it parses raw HTML. It sees a "URL Shortener" site with a search form, which looks legitimate.

Layer 4: The Link Mass (3,500 nofollow links)
<p>Learn More Here <a rel="nofollow"
     href="https://PHISHING-TARGET.finance">PHISHING-TARGET.finance</a></p>
... x 3,500 links ...

The phishing domain is buried among 3,500 random domains. Bing treats rel="nofollow" as an indexation signal and crawls the target anyway.

Proof: One Network, One Database

orbit-protocol-lending.net appears across multiple PBN domains with sequential IDs from the same database:

Editorial illustration: Fifteen different front domains serving identical content from one shared backend
Sequential IDs across "different" PBN brands, proof of a shared backend
PBN DomainURL PatternID
blogsphere.top/stats/4920749207
optimizeflow.top/stats/4920749207
websites.freemyip.com/share/4920749207
shortenurls.eu/share/4920749207
jake.eu/share/4920749207
dailymusings.top/stats/4920849208
screenshots.wiki/report/4920849208
atomizelink.icu/report/4920849208
byteshort.xyz/report/4920849208

Same IDs across different "brands" = one backend, one operator. All 15 domains share the same HTML template, the same CSS (style.css), the same JavaScript (work.js), and the same 3,500-link pages.

The Second PBN: A Domain Checker Network

A separate, more aggressive link network provides dofollow backlinks to select targets. Its master server, all-aged-domains.com, is a WordPress 6.6.2 installation serving CSS, JS, and templates to 50-80 satellite domains.

Cloaked PBN (Network A) vs Domain Checker (Network B)
FeatureNetwork A (Cloaked PBN)Network B (Domain Checker)
Sites~15~50-80
CloakingYes (CSS + JS redirect)No
Link type99.4% nofollow99.99% dofollow
Links per page~3,500~10,000
Page size400KB4MB
CMSCustom PHPWordPress 6.6.2
Master serverShared database (sequential IDs)all-aged-domains.com
Google Tag ManagerNoYes (tracks traffic)
The Irony

Despite having 10× more backlinks and all dofollow, Network B targets did NOT reach Bing #1. biasterswap.xyz has 110 dofollow links and layerbank-v3.com has 98, yet neither ranks #1.

Meanwhile, app.thnuster.cc has 1 backlink and ranks #1.

The nofollow cloaked PBN + title match works better than mass dofollow spam for Bing.

Why Bing Falls for This

Editorial illustration: One search engine blocking phishing at the gate while another lets it walk through

The Title-Match Vulnerability

app.thnuster.cc has exactly ONE backlink (a cached Yahoo SERP page), yet it ranks #1 in Bing for "Thruster Finance." This proves Bing's ranking for low-competition brand queries relies primarily on:

  1. Title tag exact-match to the search query
  2. Domain is indexed (any signal suffices, even one nofollow link)
  3. No negative trust signals (domain is new, clean history)

Google would require substantial authority signals and would cross-reference against known brand domains. Bing does not.

Bing vs Google: ranking outcomes across 26 domains
MetricBingGoogle
Phishing domains at #170
Phishing domains in top 1070
Time to rank from domain creation2-8 weeksnever

Bing #1 Results (verified via SerpAPI, April 2026)

Query#1 Result (Phishing)Backlinks
"Stargate Finance"star-gate-finance-stargate.finance20
"Shadow Exchange"shadow-ex.net16
"UNCX Network"www.uncx.org51
"Thruster Finance"app.thnuster.cc1
"Orbit Protocol"orbit-protocol-lending.net15
"VVS Finance"vvsfnance.com (#1) + www.app-vvs.finance (#10)36 + 37

Updated Protection List (Part II brands)

Always Verify the Exact Domain

Stargate Finance → stargate.finance (NOT star-gate-finance-stargate.finance) • VVS Finance → vvs.finance (NOT vvsfnance.com) • THORSwap → thorswap.com (NOT thorwsap.com) • Velodrome → velodrome.finance (NOT v2velodrome.com) • UNCX → uncx.network (NOT uncx.org) • SpookySwap → spooky.fi (NOT spooky-swap.net) • OlympusDAO → olympusdao.finance (NOT v2-olympusdao.com) • Thruster → thruster.finance (NOT thnuster.cc) • Ambient → ambient.finance (NOT amblent.cc)

Recommendations (Part II)

To Microsoft/Bing:

  1. Title-match alone is not authority. A matching title should not rank a new domain #1 for brand queries. Require domain age, backlink authority, or brand verification signals.
  2. Detect CSS-based cloaking. Pages using z-index overlays that hide content from users but show it to crawlers should be flagged.
  3. Detect coordinated PBN networks. 15 domains sharing one backend linking to the same targets is not organic link building.
  4. Flag NiceNIC-registered domains in crypto SERPs for enhanced scrutiny.
  5. Create a DuckDuckGo spam fast-track. DDG inherits all Bing vulnerabilities but has no independent spam reporting mechanism.

To NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited:

One customer batch-registered 26 phishing domains over 18 months, and no abuse action was taken. This is now publicly documented. Reference: When Abuse Reports Go Nowhere and NiceNIC: Systemic Enabler.

To Cloudflare:

All 26 domains use Cloudflare DNS and proxy. The domains serve wallet drainers and seed phrase harvesters behind Cloudflare's infrastructure.

Part II Conclusion

Part II traces a professionally operated, 18-month-long campaign by a single operator who has discovered that Bing's ranking algorithm can be defeated with a $2 domain and a copied title tag. Seven phishing sites currently sit at position #1 in Bing, above the legitimate platforms they impersonate.

The cloaking infrastructure we documented (15 identical sites with shared databases, CSS-based content hiding, and JavaScript redirect fallbacks) is a purpose-built tool for search engine manipulation at scale.

Google blocks all 26 domains, while Bing ranks 7 of them at #1. The technical fix exists, and the evidence, the domains, and the registrar are all on the public record. Whether anything will be done is still an open question.