The Two Attack Vectors
Our investigation uncovered two completely different, parallel operations running simultaneously to push phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results.
Published Updated
Using live SEMrush data, this report exposes two parallel SEO attack operations that push crypto phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo search results. In total: 10 domains, 2 attack vectors, and 100,000+ potential victims per month.

PhishDestroy documented two SEO operations: Yahoo search-page URLs carrying phishing anchors that Bing treats as trusted links, and a PBN of nine donor domains. A follow-up traced 26 DeFi phishing domains to one operator and NiceNIC; seven ranked #1 on Bing with a $2 domain and a copied title tag, while Google blocks all 26.
Google blocks all 26 domains.
Part I figure, based on SEMrush data.
All data in this report was collected via SEMrush API and phishdestroy.io for cybersecurity research purposes. Domain names are published to warn users, not to promote them.
Our investigation uncovered two completely different, parallel operations running simultaneously to push phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results.

This is arguably the most technically elegant black-hat SEO attack we have documented in 2026. It exploits a fundamental flaw in how Bing evaluates link authority: Bing cannot tell genuine editorial links apart from dynamically generated search result pages on trusted domains.

Step 1: Generating the trusted carrier URL. Attackers craft URLs on Yahoo's mobile search endpoints across multiple international subdomains: no.search.yahoo.com (Norway), fr.search.yahoo.com (France), mx.search.yahoo.com (Mexico), pl.search.yahoo.com (Poland), gr.search.yahoo.com (Greece), qc.search.yahoo.com (Quebec), chfr.search.yahoo.com (Swiss French), co.search.yahoo.com (Colombia). These pages carry Yahoo's inherited Authority Score: 23–24.
Step 2: Embedding the phishing anchor. Each URL contains a completely random, innocent search query ("pele+fifa", "Jean-Paul+Sartre", "Radio+Stars", "jucheck.exe"), but the anchor text reads: curvefi.co Curve Finance. The randomized queries leave spam filters no pattern to match.
Step 3: Forced crawl & indexation. Attackers push Bingbot to crawl these URLs using mass ping services, forum/blog comment injections, and automated crawl triggering tools.
Google's algorithm: "This is a dynamic search page. No link equity transfer."
Bing's algorithm: "yahoo.com links to curvefi.co with anchor 'Curve Finance DEX'. Ranking signal accepted. ✓"
Result: phishing site climbs to TOP 3 for "Curve Finance" on Bing and DuckDuckGo.
| AS | Source Domain | Anchor Text |
|---|---|---|
| 24 | chfr.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 24 | co.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 24 | fr.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 24 | mx.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 24 | no.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 24 | pl.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 23 | gr.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance |
| 23 | qc.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance |
The irony: The site has zero organic keywords and zero traffic in SEMrush's database, yet it appears in Bing/DDG results for "Curve Finance" because of Yahoo's borrowed authority.
Five separate phishing sites (rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, and keplr.me) all share an identical set of backlink sources. Behind them is a single organized criminal operation running multiple phishing campaigns from one infrastructure.

| PBN Donor Domain | AS | rabbys | dexscr | monero | trezor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
lewievuittton.com | 65 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
lyricamed.us.com | 61 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
creatfx.com | 60 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
jba.com.jo | 56 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
jornaldevinhedo.com | 56 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
jasaaspalhotmix.com | 54 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
magna-eg.com | 50 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
markjohnsonbuilders | 50 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
nextplayflix.com | 49 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
The top PBN donor (AS 65) is itself a typosquat of Louis Vuitton. In other words, a scam site is propping up other scam sites. It is criminal infrastructure all the way down.
| Domain | Impersonates | Keywords | Top Target | Volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|
dexscreener.at | DexScreener | 64 | "dexscreener" #42 | 60,500/mo |
rabbys.at | Rabby Wallet | 15 | "rabby wallet" #51 | 5,400/mo |
trezorsuite.at | Trezor Suite | 7 | "trezor suite" #32 | 4,400/mo |
aster-dex.at | Aster DEX | 13 | "aster交易所" #25 | 3,600/mo |
monero-wallet.at | Monero Wallet | 4 | "xmr wallet online" #26 | 210/mo |
keplr.me | Keplr Wallet | 0 | Comment spam stealth | N/A |
bscscan.cfd | BSCScan | 0 | Bulk spam links | N/A |
curvefinance.co | Curve Finance | 0 | Yahoo injection only | N/A |
curvefi.co | Curve Finance | 0 | Yahoo injection only | N/A |
app-crv.net | Curve app | 0 | Mixed techniques | N/A |
Users searching "trezor suite download" are actively looking to install wallet software. A phishing site at position #3–5 on DuckDuckGo means users downloading malware thinking it's a hardware wallet interface. This is happening right now.
The aster-dex.at variant uses a hybrid approach, combining Yahoo injection with AI-generated blog content placed on compromised or purpose-built sites across Vietnam, Italy, Indonesia, and Switzerland.

The blog articles all have near-identical titles: "Why Token Swaps and Liquidity Pools Still Trip Up Even Seasoned DEX Traders", "Why Automated Market Makers Still Surprise Traders". These are AI-generated articles placed on sites with AS 21–36, all linking to aster-dex.at.
keplr.me takes a different approach entirely: pure comment spam on unrelated high-authority sites. Fake user names like "ZackaryThymn", "Fritzkah", "Jamesboach" inject crypto wallet anchors into philosophy education sites (filozofija.edu.rs, AS 45), employee engagement platforms (bavave.com, AS 63), and arts festivals (lea-festival.com, AS 50).

bscscan.cfd uses the crudest possible method: paid bulk backlink packages from sites literally named rankongoogle.agency and linksjump.click. All sources have AS = 0. The .cfd TLD is a known spam indicator. Yet on Bing even this partially works: the volume of low-quality links can influence rankings on brand-new domains with no negative history.


| Feature | Bing | |
|---|---|---|
| Dynamic page detection | No link equity from search result pages | Yahoo search pages treated as editorial content |
| Spam ML maturity | 15+ years SpamBrain training data | Less mature; PBN AS 50–65 still works |
| Brand protection | Aggressive; curvefinance.co flagged quickly | .at/.co TLD scams survive longer |
| AI content farms | Detection deployed 2023+ | AI farms on .vn, .it still earn passing scores |
| Phishing blocking | Safe Browsing blocks known domains fast | SmartScreen misses newly registered scam domains |
DDG uses Bing's index as its primary data source, so it inherits all of Bing's vulnerabilities. Privacy-focused users who prefer DDG are often crypto-savvy, which makes them higher-value targets. DDG has no independent spam reporting mechanism; reports go to Bing.
The keyword profiles show precise targeting. Besides primary brand terms, operators go after typosquats ("rabbi wallet", "rubby wallet", "dexscrenner") and even Chinese-language queries ("aster交易所" ranking #25).

| Target Keyword | Monthly Volume | Scam Domain | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| dexscreener | 60,500 | dexscreener.at | #42 |
| rabby wallet | 5,400 | rabbys.at | #51–71 |
| trezor suite | 4,400 | trezorsuite.at | #32–85 |
| aster dex | 3,600 | aster-dex.at | #63 |
| dexscrennertypo | 2,400 | dexscreener.at | #45 |
| aster交易所Chinese | 1,000 | aster-dex.at | #25 |
| trezor suite download | 260 | trezorsuite.at | #54 |
| rabbi wallettypo | 210 | rabbys.at | #54 |
| xmr wallet online | 210 | monero-wallet.at | #55–69 |
These attacks are not new. The problem was significantly more severe when wallets like Trust Wallet used DuckDuckGo as their default in-app search engine. Users searching for DeFi protocols from within their wallet were served phishing results as the #1 result, with no complex SEO required. The combination of a privacy-focused search engine with weaker spam detection and a crypto wallet with a built-in browser created a perfect storm for phishing.
Even after Trust Wallet switched away from DDG as the default, the underlying vulnerability persists. Any user who manually chooses DuckDuckGo for privacy (a demographic that heavily overlaps with crypto users) remains exposed to these exact attacks today. The scam operations documented in this report have been running variations of this technique for several years and adapt as search engines slowly patch individual vectors.
REAL Curve Finance → curve.fi (NOT .co, .net) • DexScreener → dexscreener.com (NOT .at) • Rabby → rabby.io (NOT .at, .me) • Trezor Suite → suite.trezor.io (NOT trezorsuite.at) • Keplr → keplr.app (NOT .me) • BSCScan → bscscan.com (NOT .cfd)
!bang shortcut: !g curve finance forces Google searchdexscreener.at ≈ dexscreener.com)What we found is a professionally organized, multi-brand, multi-vector SEO operation built specifically to exploit the gap between Google's and Bing's spam detection capabilities. Every user who searches for "Trezor Suite download" on DuckDuckGo today may see a wallet-draining phishing site before they see the real one. The technical fix exists. The question is whether Bing will implement it.


We ran RDAP queries on all 26 phishing domains. Every single one returned the same registrar: NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited. That covers all 23 of 23 successfully queried domains; 3 queries hit rate-limit errors before verification (their infrastructure patterns match).

| Domain | Impersonates | Created | Cloudflare NS Pair |
|---|---|---|---|
star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | Stargate Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena |
app-vesper.finance | Vesper Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena |
app-vvs.finance | VVS Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena |
orbit-protocol-lending.net | Orbit Protocol | 2025-10-10 | terry/ximena |
vvsfnance.com | VVS Finance | 2025-07-12 | april/kayden |
spooky-swap.net | SpookySwap | 2025-04-15 | april/kayden |
thorwsap.com | THORSwap | 2025-07-24 | april/kayden |
hyperlokc.com | Hyperlock Finance | 2025-07-12 | arnold/destiny |
shadow-ex.net | Shadow Exchange | 2025-06-24 | amos/tricia |
v2velodrome.com | Velodrome Finance | 2025-09-04 | dayana/marvin |
layerbank-v3.com | LayerBank | 2024-09-07 | austin/cheryl |
biasterswap.xyz | BiSwap | 2024-09-07 | lady/langston |
v2-olympusdao.com | OlympusDAO | 2026-03-29 | nash/romina |
uncx.org | UNCX Network | 2025-12-24 | cory/megan |
amblent.cc | Ambient Finance | 2026-02-09 | nicole/salvador |
juicefi.cc | Juice Finance | 2026-02-09 | nicole/salvador |
rhea-finance.com | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — |
rhea-finance.net | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — |
rhea-rhea.org | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — |
silo-finance-silofinance.net | Silo Finance | 2025-05-30 | — |
Shared Cloudflare NS pairs and identical creation dates prove batch registration:
terry/ximena)nicole/salvador)The attack needs neither sophisticated SEO nor months of link building. Below is the complete, verified sequence that produces Bing #1 results.

| Real Project | Real Domain | Phishing Domain | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|
| VVS Finance | vvs.finance | vvsfnance.com | Dropped letter (i) |
| THORSwap | thorswap.com | thorwsap.com | Swapped letters (a/w) |
| Hyperlock | hyperlock.fi | hyperlokc.com | Swapped letters (c/k) |
| Arbitrum Bridge | bridge.arbitrum.io | arbtrumbridge.cc | Swap + cheap TLD |
| Ambient Finance | ambient.finance | amblent.cc | Phonetic misspelling |
| Thruster Finance | thruster.finance | thnuster.cc | Dropped letter (r→n) |
| Optimism Bridge | app.optimism.io | optrnismbirdge.cc | Multiple typos |
| Stargate Finance | stargate.finance | star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | Keyword stuffing |
The operator copies the exact <title> tag and meta description from the real project's website. This is the single most important step. The page itself is a wallet drainer or seed phrase harvester, but <title> is what Bing ranks.
The operator visits any of 15 PBN sites (bye.fyi, atomizelink.icu, etc.), types the domain into a form labeled "Enter your URL", and clicks "Shorten." One submit creates a page on all 15 sites at once, because they share one database.
app.thnuster.cc reached Bing #1 for "Thruster Finance" with exactly 1 backlink, a cached Yahoo SERP page. The PBN wasn't even necessary.
| What | Cost | Time |
|---|---|---|
| Domain (.cc/.com via NiceNIC) | $1-2 | 2 min |
| Cloudflare DNS (free plan) | $0 | 1 min |
| Clone title tag from real site | $0 | 5 min |
| Submit to PBN (bye.fyi etc.) | $0 | 1 min |
| Wait for indexation | $0 | 2-8 weeks |
| TOTAL | $1-2 | ~10 min |
We fetched and analyzed the actual HTML source code from the PBN network. Every page on every domain runs the same cloaking engine.

<body style="overflow: hidden;">
<div style="position:absolute; top:0; left:0;
width:100%; height:5000px;
background:white; z-index:1000000;
font-size:32px; text-align:center;">
<p>The domain report has Expired!</p>
</div> White div covers the entire viewport. z-index:1000000 keeps anything from rendering above it. overflow:hidden on body prevents scrolling past. User sees "Expired" and leaves.
// work.js — identical on all 15 domains:
window.location.replace("https://scrib.li/ai-article-generator"); If user bypasses the white wall, JavaScript redirects to scrib.li (affiliate monetization). Triple protection against human visitors.
Bingbot ignores the CSS overlay because it parses raw HTML. It sees a "URL Shortener" site with a search form, which looks legitimate.
<p>Learn More Here <a rel="nofollow"
href="https://PHISHING-TARGET.finance">PHISHING-TARGET.finance</a></p>
... x 3,500 links ... The phishing domain is buried among 3,500 random domains. Bing treats rel="nofollow" as an indexation signal and crawls the target anyway.
orbit-protocol-lending.net appears across multiple PBN domains with sequential IDs from the same database:

| PBN Domain | URL Pattern | ID |
|---|---|---|
blogsphere.top | /stats/49207 | 49207 |
optimizeflow.top | /stats/49207 | 49207 |
websites.freemyip.com | /share/49207 | 49207 |
shortenurls.eu | /share/49207 | 49207 |
jake.eu | /share/49207 | 49207 |
dailymusings.top | /stats/49208 | 49208 |
screenshots.wiki | /report/49208 | 49208 |
atomizelink.icu | /report/49208 | 49208 |
byteshort.xyz | /report/49208 | 49208 |
Same IDs across different "brands" = one backend, one operator. All 15 domains share the same HTML template, the same CSS (style.css), the same JavaScript (work.js), and the same 3,500-link pages.
A separate, more aggressive link network provides dofollow backlinks to select targets. Its master server, all-aged-domains.com, is a WordPress 6.6.2 installation serving CSS, JS, and templates to 50-80 satellite domains.
| Feature | Network A (Cloaked PBN) | Network B (Domain Checker) |
|---|---|---|
| Sites | ~15 | ~50-80 |
| Cloaking | Yes (CSS + JS redirect) | No |
| Link type | 99.4% nofollow | 99.99% dofollow |
| Links per page | ~3,500 | ~10,000 |
| Page size | 400KB | 4MB |
| CMS | Custom PHP | WordPress 6.6.2 |
| Master server | Shared database (sequential IDs) | all-aged-domains.com |
| Google Tag Manager | No | Yes (tracks traffic) |
Despite having 10× more backlinks and all dofollow, Network B targets did NOT reach Bing #1. biasterswap.xyz has 110 dofollow links and layerbank-v3.com has 98, yet neither ranks #1.
Meanwhile, app.thnuster.cc has 1 backlink and ranks #1.
The nofollow cloaked PBN + title match works better than mass dofollow spam for Bing.

app.thnuster.cc has exactly ONE backlink (a cached Yahoo SERP page), yet it ranks #1 in Bing for "Thruster Finance." This proves Bing's ranking for low-competition brand queries relies primarily on:
Google would require substantial authority signals and would cross-reference against known brand domains. Bing does not.
| Metric | Bing | |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing domains at #1 | 7 | 0 |
| Phishing domains in top 10 | 7 | 0 |
| Time to rank from domain creation | 2-8 weeks | never |
| Query | #1 Result (Phishing) | Backlinks |
|---|---|---|
| "Stargate Finance" | star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | 20 |
| "Shadow Exchange" | shadow-ex.net | 16 |
| "UNCX Network" | www.uncx.org | 51 |
| "Thruster Finance" | app.thnuster.cc | 1 |
| "Orbit Protocol" | orbit-protocol-lending.net | 15 |
| "VVS Finance" | vvsfnance.com (#1) + www.app-vvs.finance (#10) | 36 + 37 |
Stargate Finance → stargate.finance (NOT star-gate-finance-stargate.finance) • VVS Finance → vvs.finance (NOT vvsfnance.com) • THORSwap → thorswap.com (NOT thorwsap.com) • Velodrome → velodrome.finance (NOT v2velodrome.com) • UNCX → uncx.network (NOT uncx.org) • SpookySwap → spooky.fi (NOT spooky-swap.net) • OlympusDAO → olympusdao.finance (NOT v2-olympusdao.com) • Thruster → thruster.finance (NOT thnuster.cc) • Ambient → ambient.finance (NOT amblent.cc)
One customer batch-registered 26 phishing domains over 18 months, and no abuse action was taken. This is now publicly documented. Reference: When Abuse Reports Go Nowhere and NiceNIC: Systemic Enabler.
All 26 domains use Cloudflare DNS and proxy. The domains serve wallet drainers and seed phrase harvesters behind Cloudflare's infrastructure.
Part II traces a professionally operated, 18-month-long campaign by a single operator who has discovered that Bing's ranking algorithm can be defeated with a $2 domain and a copied title tag. Seven phishing sites currently sit at position #1 in Bing, above the legitimate platforms they impersonate.
The cloaking infrastructure we documented (15 identical sites with shared databases, CSS-based content hiding, and JavaScript redirect fallbacks) is a purpose-built tool for search engine manipulation at scale.
Google blocks all 26 domains, while Bing ranks 7 of them at #1. The technical fix exists, and the evidence, the domains, and the registrar are all on the public record. Whether anything will be done is still an open question.