microsotf.comi-site.website is currently listed as an active brand‑impersonation campaign targeting Microsoft. The domain was registered on 2025-11-06 through a registrar associated with NAMECHEAP INC and resolves to the IPv4 address 212.83.61.198, which geolocates to Germany and is operated by the hosting provider 23media. The server presents a TLS certificate issued by Let’s Encrypt (YR1) and enforces HTTP Strict Transport Security, indicating a deliberately configured HTTPS service. Network resolution is handled by dns1.registrar-servers.com and dns2.registrar-servers.com. Passive fingerprinting reveals the presence of a .NET‑based web application framework, a cloud fronting service and a content‑delivery network, consistent with the use of Azure‑derived infrastructure and an Akamai edge node. These components suggest the operators have access to commercial cloud and CDN resources, which can aid in evading simple IP‑based blocking. The site mimics Microsoft branding and has been flagged by PhishDestroy and appears on a single public blocklist. No detections were reported by VirusTotal at the time of analysis (0/95 scans). The lack of antivirus hits does not imply benign intent; the observed brand‑impersonation behavior aligns with typical credential‑harvesting campaigns. The infrastructure’s recent creation date and active status indicate the campaign is still in its deployment phase. Defenders should add the domain and its resolving IP to URL filtering and network‑level deny lists. Monitoring of DNS queries for the two registrar‑provided nameservers can provide early warning of additional domains that reuse the same registration profile. Because the TLS certificate is publicly trusted, users should be educated to verify the exact spelling of the URL and to report any unexpected credential requests to the legitimate brand’s security channels.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年7月12日score 88/1001 brand signal
Submitted URLhttp://microsotf.comi-site.website/
Favicon Hash
ケース ID
ICANN OVERSIGHTRegistration: comi-site.website
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For the registrable domain comi-site.website behind this subdomain, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Certificate fingerprint2232e82be1b0d4d64670cf9c20bff3ed5b5a584116775042656c46f3810687aaCertificate names · 1 SANs
microsoft.comi-site.website
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Latest HTTP observationRedirectingHTTP redirect observed80%2026-10-19 22:34:53 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-19 22:34:53 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
使用技術 · 5 identified
M
Microsoft ASP.NET
Web frameworks
ASP.NET is an open-source, server-side web-application framework designed for web development to produce dynamic web pages.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
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