Analysis indicates that the domain metareg-eu.online was registered on 2 December 2025 through Hostinger Operations UAB. The domain resolves to the IP address 147.93.73.112, which belongs to AS47583 operated by Hostinger International Limited and is geolocated in Lithuania. Both authoritative name servers are ns1.dns-parking.com and ns2.dns-parking.com, typical of parking services. No TLS certificate is presented, and the site currently returns an HTTP status of offline, consistent with the “taken offline” note in the intelligence feed. The page title observed prior to takedown was “MetaMask Wallet Generator,” and the brand target is explicitly listed as MetaMask, indicating a crypto‑related brand impersonation campaign.
The malicious kit is classified as a crypto scam, and the domain appears on a single security blocklist. VirusTotal reports 12 of 95 scanners flagging the domain as malicious, and PhishDestroy has also blocked it. Gridinsoft assigned a trust score of 0 out of 100, reinforcing the malicious assessment. Uncertainty remains regarding the exact content served before the takedown, as no screenshot or HTML capture is available in the current data set. The lack of a TLS certificate prevents verification of potential credential‑harvesting forms, and no Safe Browsing or OTX identifiers were supplied.
Likewise, the specific phishing kit or reuse of infrastructure across other campaigns cannot be confirmed without additional indicator sharing. Defenders should add the A record (147.93.73.112) and the domain name to network‑level blocklists, enforce DNS sinkholing for metareg-eu.online, and monitor for any future subdomains or similar registrations that reuse the same hoster or name‑server pair. Given the association with MetaMask, security teams protecting cryptocurrency users should raise awareness of unsolicited “wallet generator” URLs and incorporate the domain into endpoint detection rules.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年3月24日score 95/1001 brand signal
Submitted URLhttp://metareg-eu.online/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非アクティブreason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation不明Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:09:08 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-04-21 22:27:46 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-04-21 22:27:46 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,881.79hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-11 19:21:20 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='metareg-eu.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErr
metareg-eu.online
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(LT)
