On 23 July 2026 the domain assemblev2.online was observed to host a brand‑impersonation page targeting WalletConnect. The domain was registered on 21 October 2025 through HOSTINGER operations, UAB and uses the generic parking name servers ns1.dns‑parking.com and ns2.dns‑parking.com. DNS resolution points to the IP address 82.29.157.232, which belongs to AS47583 Hostinger International Limited and is geolocated in the United States. No TLS certificate was presented, indicating that the site operated over plain HTTP only. Reputation services flag the domain as highly suspicious: Gridinsoft assigns a trust score of 0 / 100, and VirusTotal reports 15 detections out of 95 scanned engines.
The host appears on five public blocklists and has been cited in seventeen AlienVault OTX threat‑intelligence pulses. The page title returned by the server is “WalletConnect”, matching the declared brand target. The domain is currently taken offline, and blocklist providers such as PhishDestroy, ScamSniffer, Polkadot, Enkrypt and Codeesura have already listed it. Analysis confirms that the infrastructure is typical of low‑cost phishing kits hosted on shared hosting platforms.
The lack of an SSL certificate and the use of parking name servers suggest a rapid provisioning workflow rather than a sustained operation. While the site is no longer reachable, the observed indicators—IP address, registrar, detection counts, and blocklist listings—remain useful for correlation with other malicious activities. Defenders should continue to monitor traffic to 82.29.157.232, add the domain and its IP to internal deny lists, and ensure that any WalletConnect‑related authentication flows are protected by strict certificate pinning and domain validation. Threat‑intel feeds should be updated to reflect the observed OTX pulses and blocklist entries to improve early detection of similar impersonation attempts.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年3月24日score 90/1001 brand signal
Submitted URLhttp://assemblev2.online/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非アクティブreason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation不明Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:12:03 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-26 10:29:18 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-26 10:29:18 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,053.76hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-29 01:22:06 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='assemblev2.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErr
assemblev2.online
保存済みの結果
到達不能
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(LT)
