On July 24, 2026, analysis of the domain app-stark.online confirms a brand‑impersonation operation targeting the cryptocurrency platform celer. The site was registered on 22 December 2025 via HOSTINGER operations, UAB and resolves to the IPv4 address 92.113.16.248, which belongs to AS47583 (Hostinger International Limited) in Germany. DNS resolution is served by ns1.dns‑parking.com and ns2.dns‑parking.com, typical of parked or low‑cost hosting. No TLS certificate was observed, indicating that the site was delivered over plain HTTP. The only visible content indexed by security tools is the page title “Starknet (STRK) to Bounce Back?
RSI Divergence Hinting at a Potential Upward Move”, which appears unrelated to celer and suggests a content‑spoofing tactic aimed at attracting crypto‑interested users. Reputation checks show a Gridinsoft trust score of 0 / 100 and inclusion on a single security blocklist. The domain is listed as blocked by the PhishDestroy service, and 7 of 93 VirusTotal scanners flagged the host as malicious, reinforcing the suspicion of abuse. The site’s current HTTP status is offline, but the historical presence on blocklists indicates that it was previously reachable and active. Uncertainties remain regarding the exact payload delivered to visitors, as no SSL handshake, login page, or malware sample has been captured.
The limited number of detections suggests that the site may have been operational for a short window before takedown. Defenders should add app‑stark.online to network‑level deny lists, monitor outbound connections to 92.113.16.248, and flag any DNS queries to its parking nameservers. Because the registrar is Hostinger, future domains created under the same account should be scrutinised. Continuous re‑scanning of the IP address is advised to detect any resurgence of malicious content.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年4月23日score 60/1004 brand signals
Submitted URLhttp://app-stark.online/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非アクティブreason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation不明Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:07:51 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-16 21:50:07 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-16 21:50:07 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,282.41hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-24 07:02:31 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Last analyzed Previous stored snapshot: 6 detections
ChainPatrol
alphaMountain.ai
CyRadar
Forcepoint ThreatSeeker
Seclookup
SOCRadar
Registration & observation details8
Availability observations
Last reachable observation
Outcome first observed
Observation window starts
Observation window ends
Estimated change time
Observation window · hours
3282.41
Estimate basis
Bounded by observations
Estimate precision
very_low
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='app-stark.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErro
app-stark.online
保存済みの結果
到達不能
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(LT)
