rbcmobile.support is an impersonation phishing domain whose name pairs RBC with "mobile" and "support" to pass as an official help channel for RBC mobile banking customers. PhishDestroy first flagged it on 2026-09-07. As of 2026-10-19 the domain still responds, but its DNS is inactive, so it serves no content right now. The domain is still registered and can be pointed at a new phishing page at any time.
How the scam works
Bank-support impersonation usually starts with a text, email or call about a locked account, a suspicious charge or a required app update, with a link to a look-alike "support" site. The victim is asked to sign in, confirm card details, or read back a one-time code sent by the real bank. That information gives the attacker control of the online banking session. The page title shows only the bare domain name rather than RBC branding, while our classification rests on the brand-bearing domain itself.
Evidence
VirusTotal shows 13 of 89 engines flagging the domain as of 2026-09-18. The vendors include alphaMountain.ai, BitDefender, Chong Lua Dao, CRDF, CyRadar, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, Fortinet and G-Data. Agreement across that many unrelated vendors is a strong signal for a domain that does not even serve visible content. The domain also appears in three AlienVault OTX threat pulses, and it is listed on the PhishDestroy blocklist.
Infrastructure
The domain was registered on 2025-08-25 through Web Commerce Communications Limited dba WebNic.cc, more than a year before PhishDestroy detected it. That gap fits a domain bought ahead of time and kept unused until a campaign needed it. It resolves to an address on the Bodis, LLC network in the US, a provider that hosts parked domains. That matches its current state of no active content.
What to do
If you entered RBC credentials, card numbers or a verification code on this site, call RBC right away using the number printed on your card. Ask them to lock online access and review recent transactions. Change your banking password from the official app, and confirm that your 2FA phone number and email have not been changed. Treat any later "RBC support" contact that asks for codes or remote access as fraud. Defenders should block the domain at DNS and email gateways and watch for traffic to it, since it can be reactivated without warning.
对于该 gTLD，上述注册商依据 ICANN 认证协议运营。以下链接提供官方收费标准及现行的 DNS 滥用合规指南。
认证资格只是一份合同，并非安全认证。
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-22 10:06:46 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-15 22:18:08 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-04 22:13:35 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-15 22:18:08 UTC → 2026-10-04 22:13:35 UTC · 455.92hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-25 10:15:51 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
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