This domain, detectedrelay.online, was observed hosting a generic phishing campaign and is currently taken offline. The domain was registered on October 26, 2025 through NameCheap, Inc., and its authoritative nameservers are amy.ns.cloudflare.com and kai.ns.cloudflare.com, indicating the use of Cloudflare’s DNS service. DNS resolution points to the IP address 172.67.183.232, which belongs to AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. and is geolocated in the United States. No TLS certificate is presented for the host, and an HTTP request returns a 404 Not Found page title, suggesting that the malicious landing page has been removed or is otherwise inaccessible.
The infrastructure has been flagged by the PhishDestroy blocklist and appears on one additional security blocklist, confirming that at least one external sinkhole or reputation service has taken action against the domain. A scan on VirusTotal involved 95 antivirus and URL‑reputation engines; none reported a detection at the time of analysis, though the absence of detections does not guarantee that the domain is benign. Gridinsoft assigns a trust score of 0 out of 100, reflecting a very low confidence in the domain’s legitimacy. Defenders should continue to block traffic to the domain and its resolving IP, even though the site is presently offline, because the hosting provider may be reused for future malicious activity.
Monitoring of DNS queries for the domain and its nameservers is advised, as well as periodic re‑scanning on multi‑engine platforms to capture any delayed detections. Adding the domain to internal blocklists, updating web‑filter rules, and ensuring that endpoint protection solutions ingest the latest blocklist entries will mitigate potential re‑use. Because the site currently returns a 404 status and lacks an SSL certificate, any future activation is likely to involve a new payload; therefore, continuous threat‑intel correlation with other Cloudflare‑hosted phishing domains is recommended.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:08:15 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-27 16:22:26 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-27 16:22:26 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,023.87hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-29 16:18:40 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='detectedrelay.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnection
detectedrelay.online
已保存的结果
无法访问
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Template-based draft · optional AI wording assistance requires separate consent
AI辅助草稿——事件详细信息由AI提供商处理 · 自行审核并提交
After a phishing incident
针对受害者的建议与指导
Choose the steps that match what you shared. Keep a copy of this report alongside your own records.
我应该立即采取什么措施？
紧急
Stop using the suspicious site. Open the real service through its official app or an address you already trust.
更改所有密码 — 电子邮件、Exchange 账户，以及任何使用同一密码的账户
启用双因素认证 使用身份验证器应用（而非短信）。禁用基于短信的恢复功能
冻结卡片 如果您在钓鱼网站上输入了银行信息
我应该为报告收集哪些信息？
联邦调查局（FBI）指南
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
当地警方 — 即使无法立即采取行动，也能留下正式记录
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
How do phishing scams typically work?
虚假网站 — 与正规网站完全一致的克隆网站，仅域名略有改动
猪的屠宰 — 通过Telegram/WhatsApp/交友软件花数周时间建立信任，随后钱被骗走
退款诈骗 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
