The domain dapp.hyme.network resolves to the IP address 18.245.31.51, which belongs to Amazon.com, Inc. (AS16509) and is geolocated in Germany. Registration information shows the domain was created through ARIN. No SSL/TLS certificate is presented, indicating the site operates without HTTPS. The only page metadata retrieved is the title "HYME". The domain appears on a single security blocklist, specifically PhishDestroy, and receives a Gridinsoft trust score of 0 out of 100, suggesting a high‑risk assessment. VirusTotal reports indicate that the domain was scanned by 95 antivirus and URL‑reputation vendors, none of which flagged it as malicious at the time of the scan. The threat classification provided is a generic phishing activity with an investment‑scam focus. Current operational status is offline, limiting real‑time interaction data.
Infrastructure analysis points to standard cloud hosting on an AWS network, a common choice for short‑lived malicious infrastructure because of rapid provisioning and the ability to obscure attacker attribution. The lack of HTTPS reduces the site’s credibility and may be intended to avoid TLS fingerprinting, while also simplifying deployment. The zero detection count on VirusTotal does not constitute evidence of safety; it may reflect the domain’s brief activity window before takedown. The presence on PhishDestroy and a trust score of zero provide concrete indicators of malicious intent.
Uncertainties remain regarding the specific content delivered to victims, such as phishing forms, malicious downloads, or credential‑harvesting mechanisms, because only the page title is available and no payload analysis has been performed. Additional DNS records, subdomains, or associated infrastructure have not been disclosed.
Defenders should continue to block dapp.hyme.network at DNS and proxy layers, monitor the associated IP 18.245.31.51 for future re‑use, and incorporate the domain into internal deny lists.
For the registrable domain hyme.network behind this subdomain, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:08:20 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-06-14 22:18:13 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-06-14 22:18:13 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 2,585.95hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-08-07 19:16:34 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='dapp.hyme.network', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErr
dapp.hyme.network
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Template-based draft · optional AI wording assistance requires separate consent
AI辅助草稿——事件详细信息由AI提供商处理 · 自行审核并提交
After a phishing incident
针对受害者的建议与指导
Choose the steps that match what you shared. Keep a copy of this report alongside your own records.
我应该立即采取什么措施？
紧急
Stop using the suspicious site. Open the real service through its official app or an address you already trust.
更改所有密码 — 电子邮件、Exchange 账户，以及任何使用同一密码的账户
启用双因素认证 使用身份验证器应用（而非短信）。禁用基于短信的恢复功能
冻结卡片 如果您在钓鱼网站上输入了银行信息
我应该为报告收集哪些信息？
联邦调查局（FBI）指南
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
当地警方 — 即使无法立即采取行动，也能留下正式记录
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
How do phishing scams typically work?
虚假网站 — 与正规网站完全一致的克隆网站，仅域名略有改动
猪的屠宰 — 通过Telegram/WhatsApp/交友软件花数周时间建立信任，随后钱被骗走
退款诈骗 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
