trust-card[.]site

Domain trust-card.site is assessed as a Web3-oriented credential theft / crypto drainer infrastructure presenting itself as “TrustCard — Ваш доступ к Web3”. The page imitates wallet onboarding flows and Web3 access dashboards to trick users into connecting crypto wallets and approving malicious transaction signatures. The observed content and branding alignment suggest a deliberate impersonation of generic Web3 identity and access management services. Analysis indicates intent to harvest authentication credentials and trigger unauthorized blockchain asset transfers rather than provide legitimate service functionality.

Infrastructure analysis shows VirusTotal score 0/95 detections, indicating no current antivirus engine flags despite malicious behavior reports. The domain is registered via NAMECHEAP INC and resolves to IP 188.114.96.3. Creation date is March 30 2026. It is observed on 3 security blocklists and actively blocked by MetaMask, PhishDestroy, and SEAL. The SSL certificate is issued by Let's Encrypt, indicating automated certificate provisioning consistent with rapid deployment cycles. Detected technologies include Node.js, Express, Tailwind CSS, Cloudflare, Cloudflare Browser Insights, and HTTP/3, suggesting a modern reverse-proxy web stack commonly used for rapidly deployed fraud sites. The presence of Cloudflare fronting may obscure origin infrastructure and hinder attribution.

Current status remains active and under_investigation. Despite low automated detection (0/95), external reputation signals and wallet-blocking systems indicate high confidence malicious behavior. Users attempting interaction risk credential compromise and unauthorized transaction signing. The primary attack vector involves persuading users to connect Web3 wallets, leading to approval of token permissions or direct asset draining through malicious smart contract interactions. Recommended response actions include domain blocking at DNS/firewall level, IP 188.114.96.3 null-routing, and monitoring for related domains under similar infrastructure patterns. Security teams should also track TLS/hosting reuse indicators and identical frontend templates for clustering related campaigns. Continued surveillance is required due to potential fast redeployment under alternate domains.