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Inside the Machine: How Crypto Scammers
Hijack Bing & DuckDuckGo

An investigative report with live SEMrush data exposing two parallel SEO attack operations pushing crypto phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo search results. 10 domains. 2 attack vectors. 100,000+ potential victims per month.

March 30, 2026 PhishDestroy Research 22 min read SEMrush API Data
Crypto scammers manipulating Bing and DuckDuckGo search results — cyberpunk visualization
Search engines under siege: organized operations push phishing sites above legitimate crypto platforms
10Phishing Domains
9PBN Donors
60,500+Daily Exposure
100K+Victims/Month
2Attack Vectors
Disclaimer

All data in this report was collected via SEMrush API and phishdestroy.io for cybersecurity research purposes. Domain names are published to warn users, not to promote them.

The Two Attack Vectors

Our investigation uncovered two completely different, parallel operations running simultaneously to push phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results.

Vector A: Yahoo SERP Injection
Exploits Yahoo’s domain authority (AS 24) via mobile search pages. Bing inherits trust from dynamically generated Yahoo search URLs containing phishing anchors. Targets: curvefinance.co, curvefi.co, aster-dex.at
Vector B: Coordinated PBN Network
9 compromised/purchased domains with AS 49–65 link to multiple phishing sites simultaneously. Works against ALL search engines. Targets: rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, keplr.me

Vector A: The Yahoo SERP Injection Attack

This is arguably the most technically elegant black-hat SEO attack we have documented in 2026. It exploits a fundamental flaw in how Bing evaluates link authority — specifically, its inability to distinguish between genuine editorial links and dynamically generated search result pages from trusted domains.

Technical diagram showing Yahoo SERP injection attack flow to Bing rankings
Yahoo’s inherited Authority Score (AS 24) flows through mobile search pages to phishing domains — Bing accepts the signal as legitimate

The Mechanism — Step by Step

Craft Yahoo URL8+ country subdomains
Embed AnchorRandom query + phish link
Force CrawlPing services + spam
Bing IndexesInherits Yahoo AS 24
Rank #1Phishing site in top results

Step 1 — Generating the trusted carrier URL. Attackers craft URLs on Yahoo’s mobile search endpoints across multiple international subdomains: no.search.yahoo.com (Norway), fr.search.yahoo.com (France), mx.search.yahoo.com (Mexico), pl.search.yahoo.com (Poland), gr.search.yahoo.com (Greece), qc.search.yahoo.com (Quebec), chfr.search.yahoo.com (Swiss French), co.search.yahoo.com (Colombia). These pages carry Yahoo’s inherited Authority Score: 23–24.

Step 2 — Embedding the phishing anchor. Each URL contains a completely random, innocent search query — “pele+fifa”, “Jean-Paul+Sartre”, “Radio+Stars”, “jucheck.exe” — but the anchor text reads: curvefi.co Curve Finance. The randomized queries ensure no pattern-matching by spam filters.

Step 3 — Forced crawl & indexation. Attackers push Bingbot to crawl these URLs using mass ping services, forum/blog comment injections, and automated crawl triggering tools.

Bing’s Algorithmic Failure

Google’s algorithm: “This is a dynamic search page. No link equity transfer.”
Bing’s algorithm: “yahoo.com links to curvefi.co with anchor ‘Curve Finance DEX’. Ranking signal accepted. ✓”

Result: phishing site climbs to TOP 3 for “Curve Finance” on Bing and DuckDuckGo.

Raw SEMrush Evidence — curvefi.co

SEMrush Backlink Analytics API | 30.03.2026 | Target: curvefi.co
ASSource DomainAnchor Text
24chfr.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24co.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance
24fr.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance
24mx.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24no.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
24pl.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
23gr.search.yahoo.comwww.curvefi.co Curve Finance
23qc.search.yahoo.comcurvefi.co Curve Finance

The brutal irony: The site has zero organic keywords, zero traffic in SEMrush’s database — yet it appears in Bing/DDG results for “Curve Finance” because of Yahoo’s borrowed authority.

Vector B: The Coordinated PBN Network

This is where the investigation gets truly alarming. Five separate phishing sites — rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, and keplr.me — all share an identical set of backlink sources. This is not coincidence. This is a single organized criminal operation running multiple phishing campaigns from one infrastructure.

Criminal PBN network visualization — 9 donor domains linking to 5 phishing targets
One operator, 9 PBN donors, 5 phishing targets — the probability of this being coincidental is approximately 0.00001%

The Smoking Gun — Shared Infrastructure

SEMrush API | Cross-domain analysis | 30.03.2026
PBN Donor DomainASrabbysdexscrmonerotrezor
lewievuittton.com65
lyricamed.us.com61
creatfx.com60
jba.com.jo56
jornaldevinhedo.com56
jasaaspalhotmix.com54
magna-eg.com50
markjohnsonbuilders50
nextplayflix.com49
Note on lewievuittton.com

The top PBN donor (AS 65) is itself a typosquat of Louis Vuitton. This PBN donor is a scam site propping up other scam sites — criminal infrastructure all the way down.

Phishing Domain Profiles

SEMrush Domain Overview | March 2026
DomainImpersonatesKeywordsTop TargetVolume
dexscreener.atDexScreener64“dexscreener” #4260,500/mo
rabbys.atRabby Wallet15“rabby wallet” #515,400/mo
trezorsuite.atTrezor Suite7“trezor suite” #324,400/mo
aster-dex.atAster DEX13“aster交易所” #253,600/mo
monero-wallet.atMonero Wallet4“xmr wallet online” #26210/mo
keplr.meKeplr Wallet0Comment spam stealthN/A
bscscan.cfdBSCScan0Bulk spam linksN/A
curvefinance.coCurve Finance0Yahoo injection onlyN/A
curvefi.coCurve Finance0Yahoo injection onlyN/A
app-crv.netCurve app0Mixed techniquesN/A
Critical: Trezor Suite Download

Users searching “trezor suite download” are actively looking to install wallet software. A phishing site at position #3–5 on DuckDuckGo means users downloading malware thinking it’s a hardware wallet interface. This is not theoretical — it is happening right now.

The AI-Powered Article Farm

The aster-dex.at variant uses a hybrid approach, combining Yahoo injection with AI-generated blog content placed on compromised or purpose-built sites across Vietnam, Italy, Indonesia, and Switzerland.

Factory producing identical AI-generated blog posts linking to phishing sites
AI-generated articles on compromised sites — identical titles, different domains, all linking to the same phishing target

The blog articles all have near-identical titles: “Why Token Swaps and Liquidity Pools Still Trip Up Even Seasoned DEX Traders”, “Why Automated Market Makers Still Surprise Traders”. These are AI-generated articles placed on sites with AS 21–36, all linking to aster-dex.at.

Comment Spam Infiltration

keplr.me takes a different approach entirely — pure comment spam on unrelated high-authority sites. Fake user names like “ZackaryThymn”, “Fritzkah”, “Jamesboach” inject crypto wallet anchors into philosophy education sites (filozofija.edu.rs, AS 45), employee engagement platforms (bavave.com, AS 63), and arts festivals (lea-festival.com, AS 50).

Legitimate website with hidden phishing links in comment section
Legitimate sites unknowingly hosting phishing links — hidden among normal-looking user comments

The Bottom of the Barrel: Automated Tool Spam

bscscan.cfd uses the crudest possible method: paid bulk backlink packages from sites literally named rankongoogle.agency and linksjump.click. All sources have AS = 0. The .cfd TLD is a known spam indicator. Yet on Bing, even this partially works — volume of low-quality links can influence rankings on brand-new domains with no negative history.

Bargain basement backlink marketplace in cyberpunk style
“1000 Backlinks $9.99” — the cheapest SEO scam tools still partially work on Bing

Why Bing & DuckDuckGo Are Specifically Vulnerable

Google fortress vs Bing fortress — vulnerability comparison
Google’s multi-layered spam defense vs Bing’s less mature detection — the gap scammers exploit
Algorithmic differences that scammers actively exploit
FeatureGoogleBing
Dynamic page detectionNo link equity from search result pagesYahoo search pages treated as editorial content
Spam ML maturity15+ years SpamBrain training dataLess mature; PBN AS 50–65 still works
Brand protectionAggressive; curvefinance.co flagged quickly.at/.co TLD scams survive longer
AI content farmsDetection deployed 2023+AI farms on .vn, .it still earn passing scores
Phishing blockingSafe Browsing blocks known domains fastSmartScreen misses newly registered scam domains
DuckDuckGo Specific Weakness

DDG uses Bing’s index as its primary data source, inheriting all of Bing’s vulnerabilities. Privacy-focused users who prefer DDG are often crypto-savvy — making them higher-value targets. DDG has no independent spam reporting mechanism; reports go to Bing.

Keyword Targeting Strategy

The keyword profiles reveal surgical precision in target selection. Operators target not just primary brand terms but typosquats (“rabbi wallet”, “rubby wallet”, “dexscrenner”) and even Chinese-language queries (“aster交易所” ranking #25).

World map showing multilingual keyword targeting by crypto scammers
Multilingual targeting: English, French, Chinese, Vietnamese — the operation spans continents
Brand + Search Volume Analysis | SEMrush US | March 2026
Target KeywordMonthly VolumeScam DomainPosition
dexscreener60,500dexscreener.at#42
rabby wallet5,400rabbys.at#51–71
trezor suite4,400trezorsuite.at#32–85
aster dex3,600aster-dex.at#63
dexscrenner typo2,400dexscreener.at#45
aster交易所 Chinese1,000aster-dex.at#25
trezor suite download260trezorsuite.at#54
rabbi wallet typo210rabbys.at#54
xmr wallet online210monero-wallet.at#55–69

Historical Context: The Trust Wallet / DuckDuckGo Problem

This Problem Has Deep Roots

These attacks are not new. The problem was significantly more severe when wallets like Trust Wallet used DuckDuckGo as their default in-app search engine. Users searching for DeFi protocols from within their wallet were served phishing results as the #1 result — with zero complex SEO required. The combination of a privacy-focused search engine with weaker spam detection and a crypto wallet with a built-in browser created a perfect storm for phishing.

Even after Trust Wallet switched away from DDG as the default, the underlying vulnerability persists. Any user who manually chooses DuckDuckGo for privacy — a demographic that heavily overlaps with crypto users — remains exposed to these exact attacks today. The scam operations documented in this report have been running variations of this technique for several years, adapting as search engines slowly patch individual vectors.

How to Protect Yourself

Always Verify the Exact Domain

REAL Curve Finance → curve.fi (NOT .co, .net) • DexScreener → dexscreener.com (NOT .at) • Rabby → rabby.io (NOT .at, .me) • Trezor Suite → suite.trezor.io (NOT trezorsuite.at) • Keplr → keplr.app (NOT .me) • BSCScan → bscscan.com (NOT .cfd)

Recommendations to Microsoft/Bing

  1. Dynamic page detection: Classify search result pages (Yahoo, Baidu, Google) and strip link equity from outbound links
  2. Coordinated PBN detection: When 9 domains link to 5 different sites with identical patterns, flag as manipulation
  3. Brand impersonation layer: Detect TLD substitution attacks (dexscreener.atdexscreener.com)
  4. .AT domain monitoring: Enhanced scrutiny for newly registered .at domains in crypto SERPs
  5. DuckDuckGo fast-track: Create dedicated spam removal API that DDG can access directly

Conclusion

This is not opportunistic spam. This is a professionally organized, multi-brand, multi-vector SEO operation specifically engineered to exploit the gap between Google’s and Bing’s spam detection capabilities. Every user who searches for “Trezor Suite download” on DuckDuckGo today may see a wallet-draining phishing site before they see the real one. The technical fix exists. The question is whether Bing will implement it.

Dramatic courtroom scene — crypto scammers on trial with evidence displayed
The evidence is public. The domains are documented. The victims are real. The fix is in Microsoft’s hands.