Analysis of comcastlogin.framer.website shows a credential‑phishing campaign that impersonates Xfinity. The site’s page title resolves to "Xfinity Sign In," directly matching the targeted brand. Technical fingerprinting indicates the site was built on the Framer Sites platform with a React front‑end, and it enforces HSTS while supporting HTTP/3, suggesting a modern web stack. The domain was registered on 19 November 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and uses four Amazon Route 53 name servers (ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns). DNS resolution points to 52.223.52.2, an address owned by Amazon.com, Inc. (AS16509) located in the United States.
The TLS certificate is issued by Let’s Encrypt (E7), which is typical for short‑lived, low‑cost deployments. An HTTP request returns a 404 status, indicating the content is no longer publicly reachable; the current status is recorded as offline. Security‑vendor telemetry on VirusTotal shows 11 of 93 scanners flag the domain, and the URL appears on at least one active blocklist. PhishDestroy has also listed the site as blocked. These indicators collectively confirm the domain’s use for brand impersonation and credential harvesting.
Uncertainty remains around the exact content that was served before the site went offline, as the 404 response prevents direct inspection of the phishing page. Defenders should continue to block the domain at perimeter controls, monitor for any re‑hosting attempts on the same IP range, and add the URL to internal threat‑intel feeds. Given the Amazon hosting and Let’s Encrypt certificate, future iterations could be rapidly redeployed; therefore, automated detection rules that flag the combination of the Xfinity‑related page title and the Framer/React stack are recommended. Continuous observation of the registrar CSC Corporate Domains for new domains using similar naming patterns is also advised.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Template-based draft · optional AI wording assistance requires separate consent
AI 지원 초안 - 사고 세부정보는 AI 제공업체에서 처리됩니다. · 직접 검토하고 제출하세요.
After a phishing incident
피해자를 위한 권고 사항 및 조언
Choose the steps that match what you shared. Keep a copy of this report alongside your own records.
지금 당장 어떻게 해야 할까요?
긴급
Stop using the suspicious site. Open the real service through its official app or an address you already trust.
모든 비밀번호 변경 — 이메일, 익스체인지 계정 등, 동일한 비밀번호를 사용하는 모든 것
2단계 인증 활성화 인증 앱(SMS 제외)을 사용합니다. SMS 기반 복구 기능을 비활성화하세요.
카드 동결 피싱 사이트에 은행 계좌 정보를 입력한 경우
보고서를 작성하기 위해 어떤 정보를 수집해야 할까요?
FBI 지침
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
정확한 날짜 및 시간 — 각 거래 내역 및 사기범과의 첫 접촉 시점
스크린샷 — 사기 웹사이트, 채팅 메시지, 이메일, 지갑 거래, 소셜 미디어
모든 URL 및 도메인 사기꾼이 사용한 (다음과 같은 것들을 포함하여 comcastlogin.framer.website)
커뮤니케이션 — 사기꾼이 사용한 이메일, 문자, 전화번호, 사용자 이름
비록 모든 세부 사항을 알지 못하더라도 — 어쨌든 신고를 하세요. 부분적인 정보라도 수사에 도움이 됩니다.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
지역 경찰 — 비록 당장 조치를 취할 수는 없더라도 공식 기록을 남깁니다
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
How do phishing scams typically work?
가짜 웹사이트 — 도메인을 약간만 변경한, 정식 사이트와 픽셀 단위로 완벽하게 일치하는 복제 사이트
pig butchering — Telegram·왓츠앱·데이트 앱을 통해 몇 주에 걸쳐 신뢰를 쌓은 뒤, 돈을 훔쳐갔다
회복 사기 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
AI를 이용한 사기 — 딥페이크, 자동화된 피싱, AI로 생성된 사이트 등으로 인해 사기 행각을 적발하기가 더 어려워지고 있다
앞으로 어떻게 하면 스스로를 지킬 수 있을까요?
공식 사이트 즐겨찾기 추가 — 이메일, DM 또는 광고에 포함된 링크는 절대 클릭하지 마세요
도메인 확인 — 확인하기 PhishDestroy 상호작용을 시작하기 전에 HTTPS, 맞춤법, 도메인 등록 기간을 확인하세요.
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
