zimbrapatrikaclient.netlify.app was a credential phishing page that copied the Zimbra Web Client sign-in screen. It targeted employees and members of organizations that run Zimbra for their email. PhishDestroy first detected it on 2026-09-17. The site has been offline since 2026-09-26, and on 2026-10-19 the address still served no content.
How the scam works
The page carried the title "Zimbra Web Client Sign In" and hid inside a free Netlify subdomain built to sound like an official mail client. Victims usually reach pages like this through an email warning of a full mailbox, an expiring password or a pending message, with a link to "sign in". Whatever is typed into the form goes to the operator, not to Zimbra. A stolen webmail login gives the attacker the inbox, the contact list and the password-reset emails for other accounts. Attackers often use that access for internal phishing and invoice fraud.
Evidence
Within two days of our first detection, 13 of 89 VirusTotal engines flagged the address on 2026-09-19. The flagging vendors include alphaMountain.ai, BitDefender, ESET, Emsisoft, Fortinet, G-Data, Gridinsoft and Kaspersky. Several established vendors reaching the same conclusion independently is strong backing for a short-lived phishing page. urlscan.io gave a malicious verdict and identified the Zimbra brand on the page. The domain is listed on the PhishDestroy blocklist.
Infrastructure
The operator registered nothing. The page ran on a Netlify subdomain, so it inherited the platform's reputation and HTTPS at no cost. Traffic was served from Amazon.com, Inc. infrastructure in Germany. This throwaway setup is cheap to replace, and the site lasted roughly nine days after we spotted it before going dark. Expect the same lure to reappear under new free-hosting names.
What to do
If you entered your Zimbra credentials on this page, change your mail password immediately. Change it on every other service where you reused it. Enable two-factor authentication if your provider supports it. Check your mailbox for forwarding rules, filters and sent messages you did not create, and tell your IT team so they can end active sessions. Watch for follow-up phishing sent to your contacts from your account. Defenders should block the hostname, search mail logs for messages linking to it, and reset credentials for any user who clicked through.
Certificate fingerprintbc3a8134c21a842e64ea34d488826dd2ba50f59a3bcbaed1e6b71a4242de1478Certificate names · 1 SANs
netlify.app
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
