Results reflect each source’s collection time. Zero detections do not guarantee safety. OTX references are community publications.
ネットワークセキュリティインテリジェンス Registrar context
Registrar contextTrustname
Stored registration data identifies Trustname / Fewmoretaps OÜ (IANA 4318) as the registrar. PhishDestroy maintains a separate registrar investigation; that material is contextual and is not an independent detection for this domain.
whatsappweb-ok.com is an impersonation phishing site built around the WhatsApp Web name. The "-ok" suffix is meant to make it look like a working or approved login address. It targets WhatsApp users who expect to open their chats in a browser. PhishDestroy first flagged it on 2026-10-07, and on 2026-10-19 the domain was still alive and serving a redirect.
How the scam works
Fake WhatsApp Web pages copy the familiar login screen and ask the visitor to scan a QR code or enter a phone number and verification code. If the victim does either, the attacker's device is linked to the account or takes it over completely. The attacker can then read conversations, see contacts and message them as the victim. Hijacked accounts are commonly used to ask friends and family for urgent money or crypto transfers, so the damage spreads well beyond the first victim. The page title shows only the bare domain, so the WhatsApp disguise relies on the address itself.
Evidence
On 2026-10-07, 14 of 92 VirusTotal engines flagged the domain. Those engines include BitDefender, Fortinet, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, G-Data, alphaMountain.ai, Criminal IP, CRDF and CyRadar. Google Safe Browsing lists it under SOCIAL_ENGINEERING, so browsers that use the service show a warning before the page loads. The domain also appears in two AlienVault OTX threat pulses and on the PhishDestroy blocklist.
Infrastructure
The domain was registered on 2026-10-02 through Fewmoretaps OU d/b/a Trustname.com. PhishDestroy detected it five days later, a short gap typical of throwaway phishing domains. It resolves to Cloudflare (AS13335, US), so the origin server sits behind the proxy and is not exposed. Its Let's Encrypt certificate gives the site a browser padlock, but the padlock does not mean the site has anything to do with WhatsApp.
What to do
If you scanned a QR code or entered a code on this site, open WhatsApp on your phone, go to Linked Devices and log out of any session you do not recognize. Turn on two-step verification with a PIN, and never share the six-digit SMS code WhatsApp sends you. Warn your contacts that recent money or crypto requests sent from your account may not have come from you. Open WhatsApp Web only by typing the official address yourself or by using the official desktop app, never through links in messages or ads. Defenders should block the domain at DNS and proxy level, report it to Cloudflare and the registrar, and search mail and chat logs for links to it.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Latest HTTP observationRedirectingHTTP redirect observed80%2026-10-20 10:07:13 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-20 10:07:13 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(BY)
PhishDestroy Investigation
