Analysis as of July 24, 2026 indicates that the domain vote-aura.finance is currently offline but was previously identified as a generic phishing infrastructure targeting cryptocurrency users. The site presented the page title “Aura Finance · DeFi’s Yield & Liquidity Hub,” suggesting an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Aura Finance service. The domain was registered through Cloudflare, Inc. and resolves to the Cloudflare edge address 172.67.207.134, which is hosted in the United States under ASN 13335. No SSL certificate was observed, meaning traffic was not protected by HTTPS during its brief activity window. The domain appears on one public security blocklist and was actively blocked by the PhishDestroy service.
Independent scanning on VirusTotal recorded eleven detections out of ninety‑five security vendors, reinforcing the malicious classification. The associated nameservers, merlin.ns.cloudflare.com and michelle.ns.cloudflare.com, are standard Cloudflare DNS endpoints, offering no indication of separate hosting. Gridinsoft assigned a trust score of zero out of one hundred, reflecting a high confidence of malicious intent. The listed scam type is “Crypto Scam,” consistent with the deceptive use of the Aura Finance brand in the page title. Uncertainty remains regarding the exact phishing kit employed, the presence of any credential‑stealing forms, and whether the domain was ever reachable via HTTPS.
No evidence of additional infrastructure such as command‑and‑control servers or exfiltration endpoints was recovered. Defenders should continue to monitor the IP address 172.67.207.134 for any future reuse, enforce outbound filtering to block connections to the identified nameservers, and update internal blocklists with the domain and associated IP. Given the Cloudflare registrar, any re‑registration under a different subdomain could appear rapidly, so automated detection based on the observed page title and the eleven‑vendor detection pattern is recommended.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年4月23日score 78/1001 brand signal
Submitted URLhttps://vote-aura.finance/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非アクティブreason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation不明Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:10:28 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-18 00:12:20 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-18 00:12:20 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,256.04hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-24 20:13:37 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='vote-aura.finance', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErr
vote-aura.finance
保存済みの結果
到達不能
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
