treasury-pool-ethena.finance is currently taken offline, returning HTTP 403 for all requests. The domain resolves to 188.114.96.3, an address owned by AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. in the United States. Registration was performed through Cloudflare, Inc., and the authoritative name servers are carol.ns.cloudflare.com and marty.ns.cloudflare.com. TLS termination is provided by a Google Trust Services certificate issued to the WE1 organization, indicating a legitimate certificate chain but not guaranteeing benign intent. Dynamic analysis on VirusTotal shows that 15 of 95 scanning engines label the domain as malicious, and two independent blocklists (PhishDestroy and ScamSniffer) have already listed it.
The page title returned by the server is the generic string “Just a moment…”, and no additional content has been captured, leaving the exact phishing lure unclear. The supplied intelligence classifies the activity as an “Investment Scam”, suggesting the site attempts to lure victims with fraudulent financial opportunities, although the specific target brand or campaign is not disclosed. Technical fingerprints include the use of Cloudflare’s edge network and HTTP/3 protocol, which are common in both legitimate and malicious services. The combination of a Cloudflare‑hosted IP, a valid SSL certificate, and a 403 response is a typical pattern for domains that are staged for future activation or that have been seized by takedown actions.
Defenders should immediately block DNS resolution for treasury-pool-ethena.finance and add its IP address 188.114.96.3 to network deny lists. Because the domain is hosted on Cloudflare, monitoring for new sub‑domains or related domains under the same account may provide early warning of re‑use. Security appliances that leverage threat‑intel feeds should ingest the two blocklist entries and the VirusTotal detection count to raise alerts on any attempted connections.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
