Analysis of telstraupdatingmailbox.framer.website performed on July 24 2026 shows that the domain is actively leveraging a credential‑phishing kit targeting Telstra customers. The site presents the page title "Sign in with your Telstra ID," which aligns with the declared brand target of Telstra, confirming the impersonation intent. The domain resolves to the IPv4 address 35.71.142.77, an Amazon Web Services host belonging to AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc., and the geolocation resolves to the United States. Registration data indicates the domain was created on November 19 2021 and was registered through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., a registrar commonly seen in malicious infrastructure.
The hosting environment presents several technology fingerprints: Framer Sites, React, HTTP/3 support, and enforced HSTS, suggesting a modern web stack that may help evade basic detection mechanisms. DNS resolution is serviced by four Amazon‑owned nameservers (ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns). An SSL certificate issued by Let’s Encrypt (identifier E7) is in place, providing encrypted transport but offering no assurance of authenticity.
HTTP testing returned a 404 status, indicating the landing page is no longer publicly reachable; however, the domain remains listed on the PhishDestroy blocklist, and VirusTotal reports that 11 of 93 security vendors have flagged the host as malicious, reinforcing the threat assessment. Given the combination of brand impersonation, credential‑phishing classification, confirmed hosting on a cloud provider, and active blocklist presence, defenders should add the domain and its resolved IP to network deny lists, monitor DNS queries for the associated nameservers, and consider sinkholing the address to disrupt any remaining command‑and‑control activity. Continuous re‑evaluation is advised in case the site is re‑hosted or re‑activated, as the current offline status does not preclude future exploitation.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
