Analysis of telstraswiftwebmail.framer.website shows a domain created on 21 February 2026 and currently taken offline. The domain resolves to 52.223.52.2, an Amazon Web Services host located in the United States under ASN 16509. Nameservers are ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, confirming use of AWS Route 53. The site presented a 404 HTTP response and the page title returned “Site Not Found | Framer”, indicating the underlying Framer hosting service. SSL is provided by Let’s Encrypt with certificate identifier E7, and transport security includes HSTS and HTTP/3. Technology fingerprints list Framer Sites, React, and modern protocol support.
Registration records list CSC Corporate Domains, Inc. as the registrar. Threat intelligence classifies the domain as credential phishing, and VirusTotal records nine detections out of ninety‑five scanning engines. The domain appears on a single security blocklist and is listed as blocked by PhishDestroy. The low detection count (nine of ninety‑five) suggests limited exposure, but the presence on a blocklist confirms malicious use. No safe‑browse or OTX entries were observed, and no additional intelligence about phishing kits or credential drops is available.
Because the domain leverages a legitimate Framer service, reputation signals may be obscured, making static URL filtering essential. Defenders should block the resolved IP address and associated AWS name server prefixes, deny TLS connections to the Let’s Encrypt certificate, and add the domain to URL filtering rules. Continuous monitoring of AWS‑hosted infrastructure and related subdomains is advised, as the attacker may repurpose the same hosting configuration for future campaigns. Organizations should also inspect outbound traffic for connections to the IP address 52.223.52.2 and consider implementing threat‑intel feeds that contain the associated AWS name servers.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
