This site is an impersonation phishing page dressed up as the homepage of Southland Capital Trust Bank. Its tab reads "Home - Southland Capital Trust Bank." The address is built to fool a quick glance: "southlandctb.com" is only a subdomain prefix, and the real domain underneath is valleyctb.com. PhishDestroy first flagged it on 2026-09-18, and it was still online and serving content when last checked on 2026-10-19.
How the scam works
Bank impersonation pages copy a bank's branding and navigation closely enough that a visitor arriving from a link in an email, text or search ad believes they are on the real site. When the visitor clicks to sign in, any username, password, one-time code or personal detail they type goes to the operators instead of the bank. With those credentials the attackers can try to access the account, change contact details, start transfers, or reuse the stolen identity information elsewhere. Scanners classified the page as a generic banking lure, which fits a cloned financial-institution front rather than a crypto wallet trap.
Evidence
On 2026-09-29, 12 of 91 VirusTotal engines marked the site as malicious. The engines that flagged it include ESET, Kaspersky, Fortinet, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, alphaMountain.ai, CRDF, Ermes and Gridinsoft. Twelve engines is a modest count, but it is consistent across several unrelated vendors. urlscan.io independently returned a malicious verdict and matched the page to generic banking branding. PhishDestroy's blocklist carries the domain.
Infrastructure
The domain was registered on 2025-10-20 through Global Domain Group LLC, almost eleven months before PhishDestroy detected it. That long gap suggests it was either held in reserve or used quietly before this lure surfaced. It resolves to 23.153.104.17 on the Aquiryn LLC network in the United States. A free Let's Encrypt certificate gives it the padlock icon, so the padlock tells visitors nothing about who runs the site.
What to do
If you entered a username, password or security answers here, change them right away on the bank's real website, which you should reach by typing the address yourself. Then turn on or reset two-factor authentication. Call the bank using the number on your card or statement to report the exposure, and review recent transactions and payees for anything you did not authorize. If you shared ID numbers or other personal details, watch for identity fraud and consider a credit freeze. Security teams should block the full valleyctb.com domain and its subdomains at mail and web gateways, and search logs for users who visited it.
発行者 Let's Encrypt / YR1· stored validity ends in 41 days
Network & certificates
Stored technical evidence
Network & DNS
Resolved IP
23.153.104.17
Network ASN
AS32561
Organization
Aquiryn LLC
Observed location
Sheridan, US
Server header
LiteSpeed
ネームサーバー 1
ns8.my-control-panel.com
Location describes the IP network.
TLS証明書
Issuer
Let's Encrypt / YR1
Valid from
2026-09-02 09:23:32
Valid until
2026-12-01 09:23:31
Hostname coverage
Certificate hostname mismatch
Validity
Within stored validity dates
Collection time
2026-10-11 04:02:13 UTC
Collection source
PhishDestroy collector
Certificate fingerprint06375a7e30a6995125e79d766bfb9d85b5ef326e5d9557df034e5e3514c7e55fCertificate names · 5 SANs
alliantcb.com
southlandctb.com
valleyctb.com
www.alliantcb.com.valleyctb.com
www.southlandctb.com.valleyctb.com
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Primary outcomeReachable but protectedreason: Captcha85% confidence
Attributionmechanism: Challengesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Reachable but protectedContent: UnknownDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observationReachable but protectedCaptchaChallenge85%2026-10-19 22:32:56 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-19 22:35:38 UTClast content: 2026-10-19 01:55:28 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
