Analysis conducted on July 25, 2026 identifies polymarket.special.markets as a phishing endpoint that was recently taken offline. Infrastructure analysis reveals the domain was hosted behind Cloudflare (AS13335) and resolved to the IPv6 address 2606:4700:3037::6815:59f0, geolocated in the United States. The domain was registered through Cloudflare, Inc., and no nameservers were detected at the time of assessment, indicated by the NS_NOT_FOUND status. The SSL certificate was issued by Google Trust Services under the WE1 intermediate, a common configuration for Cloudflare-proxied domains.
The endpoint returned an HTTP 404 status with the page title ERR_NGROK_3200 - The endpoint polymarket.special.markets is offline, suggesting prior use of ngrok tunneling for hosting, though the exact phishing payload or targeted brand remains unconfirmed. Detection data shows the domain appeared on one security blocklist, specifically PhishDestroy, and was flagged by 12 of 95 security vendors on VirusTotal, indicating moderate detection coverage. Technologies detected include Cloudflare and HTTP/3, consistent with modern phishing infrastructure designed to evade IP-based blocking. Defenders should treat this domain as part of a broader phishing campaign leveraging Cloudflare’s CDN and ngrok for temporary hosting.
The absence of nameservers and the offline status suggest the campaign may have been short-lived or disrupted. Network administrators are advised to block the resolved IPv6 address and monitor for related domains registered through Cloudflare with similar naming patterns. Further investigation into the ngrok tunnel logs, if accessible, could reveal additional compromised endpoints or campaign infrastructure. The domain’s current offline status limits deeper forensic analysis, but the available indicators align with known phishing tactics observed in 2026.
For the registrable domain special.markets behind this subdomain, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Certificate fingerprintae45d7cfce938480049e6837c789bc1ca38d6263382291f1301926540558dcfdCertificate names · 1 SANs
special.markets
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Latest HTTP observationRedirectingHTTP redirect observed80%2026-10-19 22:35:16 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-19 22:35:16 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
使用技術 · 2 identified
Cloudflare
CDN
Web infrastructure and security company providing CDN, DDoS mitigation, and DNS services.
I am writing to report a confirmed wallet compromise that resulted in the theft of funds from my Polymarket-connected wallet. The attacker drained my USDC balance via a malicious phishing site mimicking your platform.
### Incident Details:
- Phishing Site Used: https://po
1 report filed for polymarket.special.markets (1 written by a person) · category: Phishing · source checked
“I am writing to report a confirmed wallet compromise that resulted in the theft of funds from my Polymarket-connected wallet. The attacker drained my USDC balance via a malicious phishing site mimicking your platform.
### Incident Details:
- Phishing Site Used: https://polymarket.special.markets (Note: I mistakenly attempted to log in multiple times, believing it was official.)
- Compromised Wallet Address (please blacklist):`0x4F46459146b7Bf7572eC82235136399a0c906687`
- Theft Tran”
— reported by Anonymous on Nov 3, 2025 · Source: ChainAbuse (TRM Labs) — full report and evidence there.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
