Analysis of onradar.network indicates a brand impersonation campaign aimed at Discord users, specifically targeting wallet or seed information. The domain resolves to IP 188.114.97.3, an address owned by Cloudflare (AS13335) and located in the United States. No SSL/TLS certificate is presented, and the site is currently offline, preventing real‑time content inspection. Public threat feeds list the domain on four blocklists, and it is actively blocked by PhishDestroy, Polkadot, Enkrypt, and Codeesura. VirusTotal scans show two of ninety‑five security vendors flag the domain, reinforcing the suspicion of malicious intent.
Gridinsoft assigns a trust score of zero out of one hundred, and the registrar information confirms registration through Cloudflare, Inc., with authoritative nameservers craig.ns.cloudflare.com and vida.ns.cloudflare.com. The page title captured from the site references "We Didn’t Start the Fire. Gearing up for the launch of Firelight…" and mentions a Firelight Protocol article from September 2025, which does not align with the Discord branding and suggests a possible content repurposing tactic. The declared scam type is wallet/seed phishing, implying that the site likely solicits private seed phrases from Discord users under the guise of a legitimate Discord service.
Uncertainties remain regarding the exact payload delivered to victims, the specific phishing page layout, and whether any credential harvesting succeeded before the domain was taken offline. Defenders should add onradar.network to deny lists, enforce DNS filtering, and monitor Cloudflare‑hosted subdomains for similar impersonation patterns. User education campaigns should warn Discord communities about unsolicited requests for seed phrases and advise verification of URLs before entering any sensitive data. Continuous threat‑intel collection is recommended to capture any re‑hosting attempts or related infrastructure that may emerge.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年4月23日score 65/1004 brand signals
Submitted URLhttps://onradar.network/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非アクティブreason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation不明Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-19 01:09:13 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-06-17 22:12:48 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-06-17 22:12:48 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 2,514.04hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-08-09 07:13:51 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Check for cloaking
Compare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
No cloaking flag in this check
unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='onradar.network', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionError
onradar.network
保存済みの結果
到達不能
Stored observation history11
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
