Analysis as of July 22, 2026 indicates that the domain iranxfin.online was registered on July 09, 2026 through Namecheap Inc. The authoritative name servers are dns1.registrar-servers.com and dns2.registrar-servers.com, and DNS resolution points to the IPv4 address 35.159.10.46. The domain is currently active and has been observed on a single security blocklist. The anti‑phishing service PhishDestroy has explicitly blocked the domain, and VirusTotal reports that four of ninety‑five scanned security vendors have flagged the host as malicious. No additional public reputation services, Safe Browsing checks, or Open Threat Exchange (OTX) entries were supplied in the intelligence set.
The limited detection footprint suggests that the infrastructure is either newly deployed or employing evasion techniques to avoid broader cataloging. The hosting provider or autonomous system for the IP address has not been disclosed, and no SSL certificate details, HTTP response codes, or page title information are available, leaving the surface‑web characteristics of the site unverified. Defenders should add iranxfin.online to inbound and outbound filtering rules, monitor DNS queries for the associated name servers, and enforce blocklist updates that include the domain.
Given the presence on a dedicated phishing blocklist and the multiple vendor detections, it is prudent to treat any communications referencing this domain as malicious. Continuous observation of the IP address 35.159.10.46 for changes in hosting, reputation, or new payload delivery is recommended, as is periodic re‑query of VirusTotal and other analysis platforms to capture any escalation in detection counts. Organizations employing email security gateways should explicitly deny URLs that resolve to this domain, and SOC teams should correlate any login or credential submission attempts to iranxfin.online with potential credential harvesting campaigns.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
