Analysis as of July 25 2026 identifies hyperfoundation.claims as a recently registered crypto‑drainer infrastructure that has been taken offline. The domain was created on 21 February 2026 and is registered through Web Commerce Communications Limited. It resolves to the IPv6 address 2a06:98c1:3121::3, which belongs to AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. in the United States and is served by Cloudflare’s DNS (chloe.ns.cloudflare.com, memphis.ns.cloudflare.com). The site presented the page title “Just a moment…”, and the SSL certificate is identified only as “WE1”.
Technical fingerprints show enforcement of HSTS, use of Cloudflare Browser Insights, and HTTP/3 support, indicating a modern CDN configuration. Reputation data show the domain is listed on two public blocklists and has been flagged by the PhishDestroy and ScamSniffer filtering services as a crypto‑scam. VirusTotal reports a single positive detection out of 93 scanned security vendors, and Gridinsoft assigns a trust score of 0 / 100, reflecting a highly suspicious rating. The domain appears in the “Crypto Scam” category and has been explicitly labeled a crypto drainer.
The available evidence confirms malicious intent, yet the limited number of vendor detections suggests the payload or abuse vector may not have been widely observed before the takedown. No further details about the exact phishing page, payment addresses, or malware payload are currently available. Defenders should continue to block hyperfoundation.claims at DNS and proxy layers, monitor the associated IP range for any re‑use of the Cloudflare address, and ingest the blocklist entries into automated threat‑intelligence feeds. Ongoing observation of the registrar’s activity and the SSL certificate issuance pattern may reveal future campaigns that reuse the same registration profile.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
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