global-app.to is an impersonation phishing page that presents itself as the swap screen of Sushi, the decentralized exchange, under the page title "Swap | Sushi 🍣". It targets DeFi users who expect to trade tokens through a familiar interface and may not notice that the domain has nothing to do with Sushi. PhishDestroy first flagged it on 2026-09-13. As of 2026-10-19 the domain was still alive and serving a redirect, so it remains reachable.
How the scam works
Fake swap front-ends copy the look of a real DEX and prompt the visitor to connect a wallet to trade. Instead of executing a swap, the page asks the user to approve token spending or sign a permit or transaction that hands control of their assets to the operator. Once that signature is given, tokens can be moved out of the wallet without further interaction, and on-chain transfers cannot be reversed. A trader who thinks they are swapping on Sushi can lose every token covered by the approval.
Evidence
On 2026-09-20, 19 of 89 VirusTotal engines classified the domain as malicious, including BitDefender, ESET, Fortinet, Forcepoint ThreatSeeker, alphaMountain.ai, CRDF, CyRadar and Chong Lua Dao. That level of agreement among independent vendors is substantial for a site of this kind. Wallet-focused defenders have also listed it, with entries on the MetaMask and SEAL blocklists alongside PhishDestroy. Spamhaus lists it in its DBL as phishing, and six AlienVault OTX threat pulses reference it.
Infrastructure
The domain was registered on 2026-04-20, roughly five months before PhishDestroy detected it. This suggests it was either prepared well in advance or used quietly before surfacing. It sits under the .to country-code TLD, administered by the Government of the Kingdom of Tonga. Traffic passes through Cloudflare's network, with the serving address geolocated to Canada, which masks the actual origin server behind the proxy.
What to do
If you connected a wallet to global-app.to, use a token-approval checker to revoke any allowances granted while you were on the site, and move remaining funds to a fresh wallet if you signed anything you did not fully understand. Never enter a seed phrase on any swap site, and reach Sushi only through a bookmarked official address. If you suspect a loss, record the transaction hashes and report them to your wallet provider. Security teams should block the domain at DNS and proxy level and add it to wallet and browser protection lists.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Latest HTTP observationRedirectingHTTP redirect observed80%2026-10-20 10:06:33 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-20 10:06:33 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
使用技術 · 2 identified
Cloudflare
CDN
Cloudflare is a web-infrastructure and website-security company, providing content-delivery-network services, DDoS mitigation, Internet security, and distributed domain-name-server services.
Dear Team,
We are writing to report a phishing website operating at global-app[.]to. It was built to impersonate the SushiSwap crypto exchange and to steal cryptocurrency from the people who go looking for it.
It is a phishing redirect from global-app[.]to to sushi[.]com-vivid-
1 report filed for global-app.to (1 written by a person) · category: Phishing · source checked
“Dear Team,
We are writing to report a phishing website operating at global-app[.]to. It was built to impersonate the SushiSwap crypto exchange and to steal cryptocurrency from the people who go looking for it.
It is a phishing redirect from global-app[.]to to sushi[.]com-vivid-web[.]bond. The domain is indexed under the SushiSwap name, and not as one page — a whole "SushiSwap Exchange" section stands under it, complete with its own disclaimer, a cookie policy and tens of thousands of invented”
— reported by Anonymous on Sep 12, 2026 · Source: ChainAbuse (TRM Labs) — full report and evidence there.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(TO)
