On July 22, 2026 analysts examined ethereal-vote.finance, which was observed hosting a Google brand impersonation campaign. The domain resolved to 142.250.185.100, an address owned by AS15169 Google LLC in the United States, and employed Cloudflare’s network services, including HTTP/3 support. DNS records listed derek.ns.cloudflare.com and maleah.ns.cloudflare.com as authoritative nameservers, confirming registration through Cloudflare, Inc. The site presented a page title of "Google," aligning with the declared target brand, and presented a TLS certificate issued by Google Trust Services under the WE1 designation, suggesting an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate Google endpoint.
VirusTotal scans reported that two of ninety‑five security vendors flagged the domain, indicating partial detection of malicious activity. The domain appeared on a single external blocklist and was actively blocked by the PhishDestroy service, reinforcing its classification as a phishing infrastructure element. Current infrastructure status is offline, implying that the hosting or content has been taken down, though the underlying registration and DNS configuration remain intact.
Uncertainties remain regarding the specific phishing kit or payload used, as no page content beyond the title has been disclosed. Defenders should continue to monitor DNS queries for the domain and its associated IP address, enforce blocklist rules that already flag ethereal-vote.finance, and consider adding the domain to internal URL filtering policies. Additional scrutiny of outbound traffic to the IP may uncover residual command‑and‑control activity, and any future re‑registration of the domain should be treated as high‑risk given its prior abuse of Google branding.
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年10月20日score 25/1002 brand signals
Submitted URLhttps://ethereal-vote.finance/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
認定と RAA の背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
