Analysis of comcastlogin.framer.website shows a credential‑phishing campaign that impersonates Xfinity. The site’s page title resolves to "Xfinity Sign In," directly matching the targeted brand. Technical fingerprinting indicates the site was built on the Framer Sites platform with a React front‑end, and it enforces HSTS while supporting HTTP/3, suggesting a modern web stack. The domain was registered on 19 November 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and uses four Amazon Route 53 name servers (ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns). DNS resolution points to 52.223.52.2, an address owned by Amazon.com, Inc. (AS16509) located in the United States.
The TLS certificate is issued by Let’s Encrypt (E7), which is typical for short‑lived, low‑cost deployments. An HTTP request returns a 404 status, indicating the content is no longer publicly reachable; the current status is recorded as offline. Security‑vendor telemetry on VirusTotal shows 11 of 93 scanners flag the domain, and the URL appears on at least one active blocklist. PhishDestroy has also listed the site as blocked. These indicators collectively confirm the domain’s use for brand impersonation and credential harvesting.
Uncertainty remains around the exact content that was served before the site went offline, as the 404 response prevents direct inspection of the phishing page. Defenders should continue to block the domain at perimeter controls, monitor for any re‑hosting attempts on the same IP range, and add the URL to internal threat‑intel feeds. Given the Amazon hosting and Let’s Encrypt certificate, future iterations could be rapidly redeployed; therefore, automated detection rules that flag the combination of the Xfinity‑related page title and the Framer/React stack are recommended. Continuous observation of the registrar CSC Corporate Domains for new domains using similar naming patterns is also advised.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
