bitbridge.exchange is a newly registered domain (04‑Apr‑2026) that resolves to 104.21.74.200, a Cloudflare‑provided address located in Canada. The domain is hosted behind Cloudflare’s DNS (rose.ns.cloudflare.com, vern.ns.cloudflare.com) and presents a TLS certificate issued by Google Trust Services (WE1), indicating a legitimate‑looking HTTPS connection. The site returns HTTP 403, and its only visible metadata is the page title “Uphold – Buy, Sell, and Send BTC, XRP, And MORE In Seconds,” suggesting an attempt to masquerade as the Uphold cryptocurrency service. The infrastructure is typical of bridge‑scam operations: a short‑lived domain, use of a reputable CDN to obscure origin, and a low Gridinsoft trust score of 0/100. Threat intelligence flags the domain on one public blocklist and PhishDestroy has already blocked it; AlienVault OTX includes it in a single pulse, and three of ninety‑four VirusTotal scanners have generated detections. The risk rating is high and the threat type is generic_phishing. At present, no additional content or payload has been observed, and the exact phishing page layout remains unknown. Defenders should add the domain and its IP to deny‑list rules, monitor DNS queries for the associated Cloudflare nameservers, and enforce URL filtering that blocks any HTTP/HTTPS request to bitbridge.exchange. Continuous re‑scanning with multi‑engine services is recommended to capture any future malicious payloads.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Latest HTTP observationRedirectingHTTP redirect observed80%2026-10-21 02:02:08 UTC
RDAP registration不明
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-10-21 02:02:08 UTC
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
Payment records — if you paid, save the receipt, amount, date, payment provider and recipient details.
Your bank or payment provider — contact its fraud team promptly through official contact details if money or card information was exposed.
地元の警察 — たとえ直ちに行動を起こせなくても、公式な記録が残される
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
詐欺による金銭の返還を装った詐欺 — fraudsters pose as recovery agents and demand upfront fees. Never share a seed phrase or pay before independently verifying the provider
About this reportSources, observation dates and corrections
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.
(US)
