treasury-pool-ethena.finance is currently taken offline, returning HTTP 403 for all requests. The domain resolves to 188.114.96.3, an address owned by AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. in the United States. Registration was performed through Cloudflare, Inc., and the authoritative name servers are carol.ns.cloudflare.com and marty.ns.cloudflare.com. TLS termination is provided by a Google Trust Services certificate issued to the WE1 organization, indicating a legitimate certificate chain but not guaranteeing benign intent. Dynamic analysis on VirusTotal shows that 15 of 95 scanning engines label the domain as malicious, and two independent blocklists (PhishDestroy and ScamSniffer) have already listed it.
The page title returned by the server is the generic string “Just a moment…”, and no additional content has been captured, leaving the exact phishing lure unclear. The supplied intelligence classifies the activity as an “Investment Scam”, suggesting the site attempts to lure victims with fraudulent financial opportunities, although the specific target brand or campaign is not disclosed. Technical fingerprints include the use of Cloudflare’s edge network and HTTP/3 protocol, which are common in both legitimate and malicious services. The combination of a Cloudflare‑hosted IP, a valid SSL certificate, and a 403 response is a typical pattern for domains that are staged for future activation or that have been seized by takedown actions.
Defenders should immediately block DNS resolution for treasury-pool-ethena.finance and add its IP address 188.114.96.3 to network deny lists. Because the domain is hosted on Cloudflare, monitoring for new sub‑domains or related domains under the same account may provide early warning of re‑use. Security appliances that leverage threat‑intel feeds should ingest the two blocklist entries and the VirusTotal detection count to raise alerts on any attempted connections.
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-15 22:18:13 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:48:44 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-15 22:18:13 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:48:44 UTC · 363.51hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-23 12:03:28 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 2 identified
Cloudflare
CDN
Web infrastructure and security company providing CDN, DDoS mitigation, and DNS services.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
12 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
