VirusTotal
12 / 91 engine detections
打开报告“sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com”
钓鱼: sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com — 内容不可用. 证据摘要: VirusTotal 12/91 (BitDefender, CRDF, CyRadar, Fortinet, G-Data); URLQuery 2 det.; PhishDestroy score 90/100.…
为保留原始取证记录,下方的 PhishDestroy AI 详细分析仍使用英文。
12 / 91 engine detections
打开报告2 det.
打开报告no community references
打开报告provider verdict: clean
打开报告No threat flag
打开报告No malicious flag
打开报告Results reflect each source’s collection time. Zero detections do not guarantee safety. OTX references are community publications.
PhishDestroy threat report
sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com is an impersonation phishing page. Its hostname copies the naming of the electronic office (sede electrónica) of Spain's Dirección General de Tráfico (DGT), which makes drivers and vehicle owners in Spain its targets. PhishDestroy first saw it on 2026-09-23. The site went offline on 2026-09-24, and on 2026-10-19 its DNS still did not resolve.
DGT impersonation scams usually start with an SMS or email about a pending traffic fine, an unpaid toll, or a problem with a driving licence or vehicle registration. The link opens a page made to look like the official portal. It asks for personal details and then a small payment to settle the matter. Victims hand over full card data, including the CVV and often the one-time bank code, plus ID and contact details that can be reused for more fraud. The page title showed only the hostname, so the deception depended on the government-style address, not on visible branding.
On 2026-09-25, 12 of 91 VirusTotal engines flagged the address. The vendors included BitDefender, CRDF, CyRadar, Fortinet, G-Data, Gridinsoft, LevelBlue and Lionic. That is a minority of engines, but several independent commercial vendors reached the same verdict, which supports the classification. PhishDestroy is the only blocklist that lists it.
The parent domain was registered on 2020-02-28 through Web Commerce Communications Limited dba WebNic.cc, more than six years before this DGT-style subdomain appeared. The parent name has no connection to Spanish government services. All of the government branding sits in the subdomain prefix, which suggests the impersonation was added to an existing domain rather than registered for the purpose. Hosting was on the PT. DEWATA TELEMATIKA network in Indonesia, far from the Spanish audience it targeted. The page stayed online for about a day after PhishDestroy first detected it.
If you entered card details on this page, call your bank immediately to block the card and dispute any charges. Watch your statements for small test transactions. If you also typed in an SMS code from your bank, tell the bank, because that code may have approved a payment. If you gave your DNI/NIE, address or phone number, expect convincing follow-up messages, and check any fine only through official DGT channels you open yourself. Defenders should block the domain and the hosting IP 111.221.42.175 and flag SMS and emails that link to hostnames imitating Spanish government services.
ns58c.daxa.netns59c.daxa.netLocation describes the IP network.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Google PageSpeed Insights — mobile performance audit of sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com · checked Sep 23, 2026
An estimated time describes an observation window. It does not prove a registrar action or the exact moment a site became unavailable.
Dated changes retained by the monitor and source collectors. Newest observations appear first; source states are not proof of a takedown.
未知→dns_inactive
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可访问→不可用
No threat flag
View source12/91 engine detections
View sourcePD-20260923-B4DC15
Page captured
View sourcesede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com
View sourceCompare what a browser and a crawler receive, and check for Keitaro traffic routing.
sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com
PD-20260923-B4DC15 Recipient: abuse@daxa.net 如果您输入了帐户凭据、个人或付款信息,或者从此域下载了文件,请立即采取措施。以下资源可帮助您报告事件并保护自己。
选择您所在的国家/地区以获取 官方网络犯罪联系人 或 创建投诉草稿 →。
Template-based draft · optional AI wording assistance requires separate consent
Choose the steps that match what you shared. Keep a copy of this report alongside your own records.
Stop using the suspicious site. Open the real service through its official app or an address you already trust.
Keep original emails, receipts, messages and screenshots in a secure place. A factual timeline helps the receiving authority understand what happened. IC3 evidence guidance ↗
sede-dgt-gob-es.pandjul.com)即使你并不了解所有细节—— 不管怎样都要提交报告. 即使信息不完整,对调查仍有帮助。
A report is not a guarantee of recovery or investigation, but prompt, accurate transaction data can help authorities and service providers trace the incident.
Further guidance: NIST · phishing responseFBI IC3 · reports & evidenceFTC · recovery scams
This report combines saved page captures, registration and network records, scanner results and PhishDestroy reporting history. Each source keeps its own observation date. Open a source report to inspect the original result.
The AI-assisted analysis was written on . It describes the evidence available at that time; later source checks can change.
A capture documents what was shown. A scanner result records that provider’s assessment at the time of its check. Neither a valid certificate nor a zero-detection result is a guarantee of safety.