This domain, ripple.giving, poses a high-risk threat as a crypto wallet drainer targeting users of the XRP cryptocurrency. Analysis indicates the domain is designed to mimic legitimate XRP-related services, tricking victims into connecting their wallets to malicious smart contracts. Once connected, the drainer siphons funds by executing unauthorized transactions, often leaving victims with empty wallets and no recourse for recovery. The threat is particularly insidious due to its use of brand impersonation, leveraging the trust associated with the XRP name to deceive users into compromising their assets. Infrastructure analysis reveals the domain was registered on February 21, 2026, and has since been flagged by 12 out of 95 security vendors on VirusTotal. Additionally, the domain appears on five independent security blocklists, further confirming its malicious intent. The registrar details, while not publicly disclosed in this report, align with patterns observed in other high-risk crypto drainer campaigns. The domain's current offline status suggests takedown efforts, but similar domains often re-emerge under different names or TLDs, maintaining the threat landscape. Users who visited ripple.giving or interacted with any associated links should immediately revoke all wallet permissions granted to unknown or suspicious contracts. It is critical to audit wallet activity for unauthorized transactions and transfer remaining funds to a new, secure wallet. Additionally, users should monitor their devices for malware, as crypto drainers often deploy secondary payloads to maintain persistence. If financial loss occurred, report the incident to relevant authorities and provide all transaction hashes, timestamps, and domain interaction details for further investigation. Proactive measures, such as verifying domain legitimacy and avoiding unsolicited wallet connection requests, are essential to mitigate future risks.
探测与规避分析
隐身和流量分配检查
未观察到在存储的扫描图像中未观察到遮蔽现象
针对该主机的爬虫与浏览器观察记录，以及针对“Keitaro”式流量分配系统的实时指纹检测。
存储的隐身标志
未观察到
伪装评分
0/6
上次隐形扫描
扫描说明:unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='ripple.giving', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionError("
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-11 01:29:13 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-15 22:18:09 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-15 22:18:09 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 353.95hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-23 07:16:32 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Last analyzed Previous stored snapshot: 15 detections
ADMINUSLabs
alphaMountain.ai
BitDefender
Chong Lua Dao
CRDF
Forcepoint ThreatSeeker
Fortinet
G-Data
Google Safe Browsing
Gridinsoft
Lionic
Sophos
VIPRE
Webroot
威胁响应 Pipeline
发现
Analysis
Monitoring
11 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
