The domain curver.finance was registered on 19 January 2026 through Hostinger Operations, UAB and is currently resolved to the IPv6 address 2a02:4780:84:1485:354a:ef59:48db:de97, which is assigned to AS47583 Hostinger International Limited in Lithuania. The domain’s nameservers are ns1.dns-parking.com and ns2.dns-parking.com, a configuration typically associated with parked or inactive sites. As of the report date (24 July 2026) the site is offline, preventing live content inspection. However, the page title that was observed prior to takedown reads “Swap - Curve”, directly referencing the Curve DeFi platform. The threat profile classifies the site as a wallet/seed phishing operation that impersonates Curve, aiming to harvest private keys or recovery phrases from unsuspecting users.
Security telemetry shows that 16 of 95 VirusTotal scanners flagged the domain, indicating a moderate-to-high level of malicious detection across independent engines. The site lacks an SSL/TLS certificate, meaning any HTTP connections would be unencrypted and vulnerable to interception. The Gridinsoft trust score is 0 / 100, reinforcing the assessment of a low‑trust entity. Google Safe Browsing has flagged the URL for social engineering, and the domain appears on three external blocklists, including PhishDestroy, MetaMask, and SEAL.
These blocklists have already taken action to prevent access from wallets and browsers that support crypto interactions. Given the evidence, analysts should treat curver.finance as a high‑risk impersonation vector. Defensive measures include adding the domain to internal DNS and URL filtering rules, monitoring the associated IP range and registrar for future registrations, and alerting users of Curve to never disclose seed phrases or private keys to unsolicited “Swap” interfaces. Continuous watch‑listing of Hostinger‑registered domains that resolve to the same IPv6 subnet can help pre‑empt re‑deployment of similar phishing infrastructure.
Extracted from stored page analysis
Observed indicators
2 wallet · 4 Telegram
Full extracted values, their blockchain and collection source. An address found in page content does not establish who controls it.
扫描说明:unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='curver.finance', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionError(
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年3月24日score 15/1004 brand signals
IoC Extractionscanned 2026年8月2日2 wallet · 4 Telegram IoCs
Submitted URLhttp://curver.finance/
案件 ID
ICANN OVERSIGHT
认证和 RAA 背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-13 01:09:23 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-04-21 22:27:32 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-04-21 22:27:32 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,881.79hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-11 19:21:13 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
13 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(LT)
