On 23 July 2026 the domain assemblev2.online was observed to host a brand‑impersonation page targeting WalletConnect. The domain was registered on 21 October 2025 through HOSTINGER operations, UAB and uses the generic parking name servers ns1.dns‑parking.com and ns2.dns‑parking.com. DNS resolution points to the IP address 82.29.157.232, which belongs to AS47583 Hostinger International Limited and is geolocated in the United States. No TLS certificate was presented, indicating that the site operated over plain HTTP only. Reputation services flag the domain as highly suspicious: Gridinsoft assigns a trust score of 0 / 100, and VirusTotal reports 15 detections out of 95 scanned engines.
The host appears on five public blocklists and has been cited in seventeen AlienVault OTX threat‑intelligence pulses. The page title returned by the server is “WalletConnect”, matching the declared brand target. The domain is currently taken offline, and blocklist providers such as PhishDestroy, ScamSniffer, Polkadot, Enkrypt and Codeesura have already listed it. Analysis confirms that the infrastructure is typical of low‑cost phishing kits hosted on shared hosting platforms.
The lack of an SSL certificate and the use of parking name servers suggest a rapid provisioning workflow rather than a sustained operation. While the site is no longer reachable, the observed indicators—IP address, registrar, detection counts, and blocklist listings—remain useful for correlation with other malicious activities. Defenders should continue to monitor traffic to 82.29.157.232, add the domain and its IP to internal deny lists, and ensure that any WalletConnect‑related authentication flows are protected by strict certificate pinning and domain validation. Threat‑intel feeds should be updated to reflect the observed OTX pulses and blocklist entries to improve early detection of similar impersonation attempts.
探测与规避分析
隐身和流量分配检查
未观察到在存储的扫描图像中未观察到遮蔽现象
针对该主机的爬虫与浏览器观察记录，以及针对“Keitaro”式流量分配系统的实时指纹检测。
存储的隐身标志
未观察到
伪装评分
0/6
上次隐形扫描
扫描说明:unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='assemblev2.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErr
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年3月24日score 90/1001 brand signal
Submitted URLhttp://assemblev2.online/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
认证和 RAA 背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-13 01:13:56 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-26 10:29:18 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-26 10:29:18 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,053.76hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-29 01:22:06 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
13 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(LT)
