On July 24, 2026, analysis of the domain app-stark.online confirms a brand‑impersonation operation targeting the cryptocurrency platform celer. The site was registered on 22 December 2025 via HOSTINGER operations, UAB and resolves to the IPv4 address 92.113.16.248, which belongs to AS47583 (Hostinger International Limited) in Germany. DNS resolution is served by ns1.dns‑parking.com and ns2.dns‑parking.com, typical of parked or low‑cost hosting. No TLS certificate was observed, indicating that the site was delivered over plain HTTP. The only visible content indexed by security tools is the page title “Starknet (STRK) to Bounce Back?
RSI Divergence Hinting at a Potential Upward Move”, which appears unrelated to celer and suggests a content‑spoofing tactic aimed at attracting crypto‑interested users. Reputation checks show a Gridinsoft trust score of 0 / 100 and inclusion on a single security blocklist. The domain is listed as blocked by the PhishDestroy service, and 7 of 93 VirusTotal scanners flagged the host as malicious, reinforcing the suspicion of abuse. The site’s current HTTP status is offline, but the historical presence on blocklists indicates that it was previously reachable and active. Uncertainties remain regarding the exact payload delivered to visitors, as no SSL handshake, login page, or malware sample has been captured.
The limited number of detections suggests that the site may have been operational for a short window before takedown. Defenders should add app‑stark.online to network‑level deny lists, monitor outbound connections to 92.113.16.248, and flag any DNS queries to its parking nameservers. Because the registrar is Hostinger, future domains created under the same account should be scrutinised. Continuous re‑scanning of the IP address is advised to detect any resurgence of malicious content.
探测与规避分析
隐身和流量分配检查
未观察到在存储的扫描图像中未观察到遮蔽现象
针对该主机的爬虫与浏览器观察记录，以及针对“Keitaro”式流量分配系统的实时指纹检测。
存储的隐身标志
未观察到
伪装评分
0/6
上次隐形扫描
扫描说明:unavailable: raw=connection_error; http=0; via=http_proxy; error=SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(host='app-stark.online', port=80): Max retries exceeded with url: / (Caused by NewConnectionErro
DOM Analysisanalyzed 2026年4月23日score 60/1004 brand signals
Submitted URLhttp://app-stark.online/
ICANN OVERSIGHT
认证和 RAA 背景
Registrar accreditation and DNS abuse obligations
For this gTLD, the registrar above operates under an ICANN accreditation agreement. The links below provide the official fee schedule and current DNS abuse compliance guidance.
Accreditation is a contract, not a safety certification.
RAA §3.18 establishes abuse-contact and handling requirements. This report can document stored outbound notices and later technical observations; it does not by itself establish receipt, investigation, remediation, or contractual non-compliance.
Primary outcomeDNS 非活动reason: DNS NXDOMAIN80% confidence
Attributionsource: Dns Cache
Evidence layersAvailability: DNS inactiveContent: UnreachableDNS: NXDOMAINRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation未知Probe Inconclusive20%2026-10-13 01:08:55 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-05-16 21:50:07 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-05-16 21:50:07 UTC → 2026-09-30 16:14:55 UTC · 3,282.41hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-07-24 07:02:31 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Last analyzed Previous stored snapshot: 6 detections
ChainPatrol
alphaMountain.ai
CyRadar
Forcepoint ThreatSeeker
Seclookup
SOCRadar
Forensic History & Detection Timeline
ThreatLifecycleTelemetry
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
11 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(LT)
