The domain teltrservvisupprttttssystt.framer.website was identified as a credential‑phishing site targeting Telstra customers. The page title returned by the host is “Sign in with your Telstra ID”, confirming the intent to deceive users into providing Telstra credentials. Technical fingerprinting shows the site is built on Framer Sites and React, and it serves content over HTTPS with HSTS and HTTP/3 enabled. The TLS certificate is issued by Let’s Encrypt (E7) and validates correctly, which may lend superficial legitimacy.
DNS resolution points to the Amazon Web Services address 35.71.142.77, belonging to AS16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) and located in the United States. The domain was registered on 19 November 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and uses four AWS nameservers (ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns). A VirusTotal scan recorded 12 positive detections out of 93 scanning engines, indicating moderate consensus among security vendors that the domain is malicious. The host currently returns an HTTP 404 status, and the domain has been taken offline, yet it remains listed on one public blocklist and was actively blocked by the PhishDestroy service.
No additional content was captured, so the exact visual layout and credential‑capture mechanisms remain unknown. Defenders should add the domain and its associated IP address to network‑level deny lists, monitor for DNS queries to the listed nameservers, and consider sinkholing the IP range. Continuous observation of the registrar and any future re‑registration attempts is advised, as the infrastructure pattern—AWS hosting combined with a Let’s Encrypt certificate—matches other recent Telstra‑impersonation campaigns.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:00:28 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-02-14 16:34:20 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:01:14 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-02-14 16:34:20 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:01:14 UTC · 5,480.45hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-06-08 20:47:47 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
16 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
