Analysis as of 23 July 2026 confirms that telstrasystemreactivation.framer.website is being used for credential phishing targeting Telstra customers. The domain was registered on 19 November 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc. and resolves to the Amazon‑owned address 52.223.52.2 (AS16509, United States). A Let's Encrypt certificate (E7) is active, and the site presents the title “Sign in with your Telstra ID”, indicating a direct attempt to harvest Telstra credentials. HTTP requests return a 404 status, and the site has been taken offline, but evidence from security feeds shows it was previously reachable.
The hosting stack includes Framer Sites, React, HSTS and HTTP/3, consistent with a modern templated phishing kit. The domain appears on one external blocklist and has been flagged by PhishDestroy. VirusTotal scans reported 12 of 93 security vendors labeling the domain as malicious. Nameservers are ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com and ns-792.awsdns, confirming use of AWS DNS services.
Uncertainty remains regarding any additional payloads or redirects that may have been delivered before takedown, as the live content is no longer accessible for forensic capture. Defenders should immediately block the domain and the associated IP address, add the domain to internal phishing blocklists, and monitor for other subdomains hosted on the same AWS infrastructure that employ Framer or React templates. Continuous re‑scanning of the IP range and observation of new TLS certificates issued by Let's Encrypt for similar naming patterns are recommended to detect re‑use of the infrastructure.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:15:43 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-05 10:01:08 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:39:00 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-05 10:01:08 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:39:00 UTC · 615.63hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-18 05:50:04 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
17 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
