This domain is a credential harvesting site designed to impersonate Telstra, Australia’s largest telecommunications provider. The page displays a fraudulent login interface titled 'Sign in with your Telstra ID,' tricking users into entering their account credentials. Analysis indicates the site is part of a phishing campaign targeting Telstra customers, with the intent to capture usernames, passwords, and potentially other sensitive information for unauthorized access or financial fraud. Infrastructure analysis reveals multiple technical indicators confirming malicious intent. The domain was registered on November 19, 2021, through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and resolves to IP address 35.71.142.77, hosted on Amazon Web Services (AS16509). VirusTotal reports that 10 out of 95 security vendors flag this domain as malicious, while it appears on 2 independent security blocklists. The SSL certificate, issued by Let’s Encrypt (serial number E7), does not mitigate the threat, as encrypted phishing sites are now commonplace. If you visited telstranewupdatesmodification.framer.website or entered credentials, take immediate action. Disconnect the affected device from the network to prevent further data transmission. Reset your Telstra account password using a separate, trusted device, and enable multi-factor authentication if not already active. Review recent account activity for unauthorized transactions or changes. Report the incident to Telstra’s official security team and consider notifying local cybersecurity authorities. Monitor financial statements for signs of fraudulent activity, as stolen credentials may be used for secondary attacks.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:00:22 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-02-14 16:37:25 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:01:04 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-02-14 16:37:25 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:01:04 UTC · 5,480.39hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-06-08 20:49:14 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
14 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
