The domain telsstrawebmailsservicesdeskau.framer.website was observed as an offline credential phishing site targeting Telstra customers. Registration data shows the domain was created on November 19, 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and it is hosted on Amazon’s infrastructure (AS16509) in the United States, resolving to IP address 35.71.142.77. The authoritative name servers are ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com and ns-792.awsdns, all indicating reliance on AWS DNS services. TLS was supplied by Let’s Encrypt (certificate identifier E7), and the site advertised HSTS and HTTP/3 support, consistent with modern web‑app frameworks.
Page metadata captured a title of “Sign in with your Telstra ID”, directly aligning with the declared impersonation of Telstra and the credential‑phishing classification. An HTTP request returned a 404 status, and the site is presently taken offline, as confirmed by its removal from service and its inclusion on the PhishDestroy blocklist. VirusTotal scans recorded ten detections out of ninety‑five security vendors, reinforcing the malicious assessment.
The domain appears on a single external blocklist, suggesting limited but non‑trivial exposure. Defenders should continue to block the domain at network perimeter and DNS layers, monitor the associated IP for any future re‑use, and enforce user awareness training that warns against unsolicited Telstra login prompts. Additional investigative steps include reviewing any historic traffic logs for connections to the listed IP and confirming that no active phishing payloads remain cached on client devices.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:13:56 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-05 10:01:06 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:34:09 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-05 10:01:06 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:34:09 UTC · 615.55hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-18 05:47:37 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
16 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
