The domain spacetelsrawebmail.framer.website was observed hosting a generic credential‑phishing campaign and is currently listed as offline with an HTTP 404 response. Infrastructure analysis shows the domain resolves to the IP address 35.71.142.77, which belongs to the Amazon.com, Inc. network (AS16509) and is geolocated in the United States. The domain is delegated to four AWS name servers (ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns-35.net, and an incomplete fourth entry), indicating that the hosting environment is Amazon Web Services. The SSL certificate presented is identified as grade E8, suggesting a low‑trust certificate that may not provide strong cryptographic assurances.
Registration data reveals the domain was created on 19 November 2021 and is registered through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., a registrar known for bulk registrations. The page title returned from the server is "Site Not Found | Framer," which aligns with the 404 status code and confirms that the site is no longer serving malicious content. However, the domain remains flagged by security vendors: fifteen of ninety‑three VirusTotal scanners have reported it as malicious, and it appears on a single external blocklist. PhishDestroy has also added the domain to its blocklist, reinforcing the assessment that it was used for credential‑phishing.
Given the elevated risk rating, defenders should continue to block traffic to this FQDN at network perimeters, update endpoint and web‑gateway signatures to include the domain, and monitor for any re‑registration or the appearance of similarly structured subdomains under the framer.website suffix. Continuous observation of the associated IP range (35.71.142.77) is advisable, as the same AWS infrastructure could be repurposed for future campaigns. The combination of low‑trust SSL, Amazon hosting, and the registrar’s bulk‑registration profile suggests a disposable operational model typical of phishing actors.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:13:58 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-09-05 10:01:04 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:34:14 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-09-05 10:01:04 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:34:14 UTC · 615.55hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-18 05:47:39 UTC · precision low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
Last analyzed Previous stored snapshot: 15 detections
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Forensic History & Detection Timeline
ThreatLifecycleTelemetry
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
Domain Status Transition2026-09-08 22:00:30 UTC
Domain state transitioned from alive to dead.
威胁响应 Pipeline
发现
Analysis
Monitoring
9 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
