Analysis of the domain smtptelstrawebmailswiftviewtelstrawebmailswiftwebmail.framer.website shows an active brand‑impersonation infrastructure that was taken offline prior to the report date of July 24, 2026. The domain was registered on November 19, 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc. and is hosted on Amazon Web Services, resolving to the IPv4 address 52.223.52.2, which belongs to AS16509 (Amazon.com, Inc.) and is geolocated in the United States. An SSL certificate issued by Let’s Encrypt (certificate identifier E7) was present, and the site advertised modern web technologies including Framer Sites, React, HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and HTTP/3 support. An HTTP request to the site returned a 404 status code, indicating that the landing page is no longer publicly reachable.
VirusTotal scans recorded 13 detections out of 95 security vendors, and the domain appears on a single public blocklist. PhishDestroy has also listed the domain as blocked. The page title observed during the brief capture phase was "Sign in with your Telstra ID," confirming the impersonation of Telstra and the credential‑phishing intent. Nameservers listed are ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com and ns-792.awsdns, consistent with AWS DNS hosting.
While the site is currently offline, the persistence of the underlying AWS infrastructure and the reuse of the same certificate suggest the possibility of future reactivation. Defenders should add the IP address 52.223.52.2 to network deny lists, monitor DNS queries for the associated subdomains, and update email security gateways to block messages referencing the observed page title or the Telstra brand. Continuous surveillance of the registrar and blocklist entries is recommended to detect any re‑registration attempts or new hosting signatures tied to this campaign.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:13:13 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-08-27 01:01:46 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:31:59 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-08-27 01:01:46 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:31:59 UTC · 840.50hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-13 13:16:52 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
17 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
