Analysis of comcastlogin.framer.website shows a credential‑phishing campaign that impersonates Xfinity. The site’s page title resolves to "Xfinity Sign In," directly matching the targeted brand. Technical fingerprinting indicates the site was built on the Framer Sites platform with a React front‑end, and it enforces HSTS while supporting HTTP/3, suggesting a modern web stack. The domain was registered on 19 November 2021 through CSC Corporate Domains, Inc., and uses four Amazon Route 53 name servers (ns-1243.awsdns-27.org, ns-1818.awsdns-35.co.uk, ns-336.awsdns-42.com, ns-792.awsdns). DNS resolution points to 52.223.52.2, an address owned by Amazon.com, Inc. (AS16509) located in the United States.
The TLS certificate is issued by Let’s Encrypt (E7), which is typical for short‑lived, low‑cost deployments. An HTTP request returns a 404 status, indicating the content is no longer publicly reachable; the current status is recorded as offline. Security‑vendor telemetry on VirusTotal shows 11 of 93 scanners flag the domain, and the URL appears on at least one active blocklist. PhishDestroy has also listed the site as blocked. These indicators collectively confirm the domain’s use for brand impersonation and credential harvesting.
Uncertainty remains around the exact content that was served before the site went offline, as the 404 response prevents direct inspection of the phishing page. Defenders should continue to block the domain at perimeter controls, monitor for any re‑hosting attempts on the same IP range, and add the URL to internal threat‑intel feeds. Given the Amazon hosting and Let’s Encrypt certificate, future iterations could be rapidly redeployed; therefore, automated detection rules that flag the combination of the Xfinity‑related page title and the Framer/React stack are recommended. Continuous observation of the registrar CSC Corporate Domains for new domains using similar naming patterns is also advised.
Saved certificate metadata. Certificate dates without a timezone are shown as stored. Transport encryption does not establish that the site is trustworthy.
Attributionactor class: Hostingmechanism: Placeholder Pagesource: Current Http Probe
Evidence layersAvailability: Root path has no contentContent: Absent At RootDNS: ResolvedRegistration: Unknown
Latest HTTP observation非活动Hosting Placeholderactor class: HostingPlaceholder Page45%2026-10-13 01:15:40 UTC
RDAP registration未知
Observed timelinelast reachable: 2026-08-29 01:01:06 UTCcurrent episode first observed: 2026-10-01 01:39:03 UTCobserved RIP window: 2026-08-29 01:01:06 UTC → 2026-10-01 01:39:03 UTC · 792.63hmidpoint estimate ≈ 2026-09-14 13:20:04 UTC · precision very low · basis bounded
Availability, content, DNS and registration are independent evidence layers. NXDOMAIN, an unreachable origin or missing content alone does not prove registrar action. A registrar or provider is credited only when a direct technical marker identifies that actor. Report causality is shown separately.
技术 · 4 identified
F
Framer Sites
R
React
JavaScript frameworks
JavaScript library for building user interfaces with component-based architecture.
H
HSTS
安全
HTTP Strict Transport Security — forces browsers to use HTTPS connections only.
H
HTTP/3
Miscellaneous
Third major version of HTTP protocol, built on QUIC for faster, more reliable connections.
This timeline displays historical security and status checkpoints observed by the PhishDestroy automated monitoring network. It records domain lifecycle updates, scanner changes, and threat telemetry over time.
16 recorded events. These records describe collected evidence, outgoing notifications and publication; they do not confirm a complete investigation or a takedown.
A stored Cloudflare Radar report is available. The report link alone is not a malicious verdict and does not prove that every network field was captured.
Web Archive
Preserved in 互联网档案馆 — historical evidence archived
We scan suspicious URLs, inspect public results and send evidence through the appropriate abuse-reporting channels. The dated events above show what is recorded for this domain. The directory below explains the wider workflow.
01Public scans & evidence collection10 sources and tool groups+
Inspect the public DNS, TLS, HTTP and technology surface.
02Abuse reports & follow-upRegistrar, hosting and security channels+
Identify the responsible provider. Match registration and hosting records to the relevant abuse contact.
Prepare an evidence package. Include the URL, public scan references, captures and the recorded observations.
Send the report. Keep outgoing report records and recipient information when available.
Recheck and publish updates. Track later scanner verdicts, provider responses and site availability.
Security services used for scanning, reputation checks and reporting are listed below. A service being listed is not evidence that it received, accepted or acted on this particular domain. Recorded submissions appear in the notification history above.
(US)
