On 2026-04-07 11:20:34 UTC PhishDestroy delivered an evidence-backed abuse report (repeated 5 times, most recently 2026-04-07 11:20:34 UTC) to abuse@internet.bs with the evidence stored for the case at that time. More than 4 months later, the phishing infrastructure remains reachable .

Under ICANN RAA §3.18 accredited registrars are contractually obliged to “take reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of abuse.” Silence beyond 24 hours after a documented notification with verifiable evidence is not a timing issue — it is a policy decision to let the operation continue. PhishDestroy\'s position: where a registrar fails to act on clear evidence, the registrar has aligned itself with the operator of the scheme and bears co-responsibility for downstream harm caused to victims from the moment of notification onward.

Victim-assistance obligation. If Internet Domain Service BS Corp doesn't consider the listed detections enough proof — that is interesting in itself, given the volume of independent vendor confirmations. But after 5 separate notifications over 4 months, with the operation still active, the registrar took no measurable action to mitigate the harm caused by their client. The reasonable next step is direct help to any identified victims — contact & payment-trail disclosure, abuse-thread transcripts, registrant data preservation — since the registrar chose, by inaction, to extend the window of damage.