# PhishDestroy — xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed ================================================================ Title: xmrwallet.com Takedown: NameSilo's Seven Lies | PhishDestroy Canonical: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed Published: 2026-03-27T00:00:00 Author: PhishDestroy Research OG image: https://phishdestroy.io/assets/images/covers-v4/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed.webp ## SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------- How we destroyed a 10-year $2M Monero theft operation and exposed NameSilo's 7 lies protecting the scammer. Three registrars acted. One lied. ## KEY FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------------- In short: PhishDestroy says xmrwallet.com stole Monero view keys from 2016, with an estimated $2M+ stolen and fifteen documented victims. After identical abuse reports, registrars in India, Malaysia and China suspended or disabled their xmrwallet domains, while NameSilo, which held xmrwallet.com, refused and publicly called the registrant a victim. PhishDestroy then filed an ICANN complaint. - Estimated stolen: $2M+ (source: PhishDestroy investigation (https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed); as of 2026-03) - Years active: 10 (since 2016) (source: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed; as of 2026-03) - Registrars that acted: 3/4 (PublicDomainRegistry, WebNic, NICENIC) (source: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed; as of 2026-03) - Live network capture: 109 requests and 43 viewkey transmissions in a single session (source: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed (Issue #36); as of 2026-02) - Formal ICANN complaint: Filed March 27, 2026 (RAA Section 3.18) (source: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed; as of 2026-03) ## STRUCTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------- - The End of xmrwallet[.]com: - In short - Key findings - What xmrwallet[.]com Actually Did - Three Registrars Did Their Job - NameSilo Chose a Different Path - The Operator's Own Words - Seven Lies, Exposed - Infrastructure Evidence - Timeline: The Fall of xmrwallet - The Verdict - Evidence & Resources - Related Investigations - Explore this topic - Share This Investigation - Related Investigations ## CONTENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- Back to News Final Investigation Report The End of xmrwallet[.]com: Published 2026-03-27 · Updated 2026-11-17 NameSilo Lied to Protect a $2M Thief After 10 years of stealing Monero private keys, the operation is destroyed. Three registrars acted within days. The fourth, NameSilo, contacted the scammer, believed his story, and became his press secretary. 12 min read Updated March 27, 2026 PhishDestroy Research Listen to this article Listen to this article 0:00 / --:-- Download the official report (PDF) In short PhishDestroy says xmrwallet.com stole Monero view keys from 2016, with an estimated $2M+ stolen and fifteen documented victims. After identical abuse reports, registrars in India, Malaysia and China suspended or disabled their xmrwallet domains, while NameSilo, which held xmrwallet.com, refused and publicly called the registrant a victim. PhishDestroy then filed an ICANN complaint. Key findings estimated stolen$2M+ active, since 201610 years registrars suspended xmrwallet domains3/4 lost by one victim in a single theft (~$177,000)590 XMR On this page01 / 07 $2M+ Estimated Stolen 10 Years Active 3/4 Registrars Suspended 7 NameSilo Lies Proven 8 Theft PHP Endpoints What xmrwallet[.]com Actually Did Since 2016, xmrwallet[.]com marketed itself as a free, open-source Monero wallet. Our live network capture on February 18, 2026 proved it was doing something very different: stealing private Monero view keys on every login and hijacking transactions server-side. Core Theft Mechanism The theft is built into the core architecture instead of being injected. A session system across 8 PHP endpoints transmitted the victim's private view key 40+ times per session. When users sent XMR, their transaction was silently discarded (raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0) and replaced with the scammer's. User opens wallet View key exfiltrated (Base64) TX hijacked server-side XMR sent to scammer Six security vendors on VirusTotal flagged it as malicious. There are fifteen documented victims across Trustpilot, Sitejabber, and BitcoinTalk. One victim lost 590 XMR (~$177,000) in a single theft. Screenshot 3: VirusTotal, where 6/93 vendors flagged xmrwallet.com as malicious. Fortinet classified it as "Phishing." Screenshot 4: ScamAdviser Trust Score 1/100, "Very Likely Unsafe." Three Registrars Did Their Job We filed identical abuse reports with all four registrars hosting xmrwallet domains. Three acted immediately: PublicDomainRegistry xmrwallet.cc Suspended India · Days to act WebNic xmrwallet.biz Suspended Malaysia · Days to act NICENIC xmrwallet.net DNS Dead China · Weeks to act NameSilo xmrwallet.com Refused USA · Defended scammer Three countries, three independent conclusions. The registrars in India, Malaysia, and China reviewed the evidence, found fraud, and suspended the domains. No questions asked. NameSilo Chose a Different Path The fourth registrar, NameSilo, LLC (USA), which hosted the primary domain with the most evidence and most victims, did the opposite. They contacted the scammer, believed his story, and published a public statement defending him: Screenshot 6: NameSilo's public statement on X (Twitter), March 12, 2026. Every claim in this post was false. "Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago... After an extensive investigation, our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant... The registrant is also working to get the website delisted from VT reports." — NameSilo, via X (Twitter) We analyzed this statement line by line. Every claim was false. The Operator's Own Words Before NameSilo intervened, the operator responded directly to our abuse report. His emails confirm awareness and intent: Screenshot 7: The operator's response, "This is not phishing, we've been running for over 8 years." Screenshot 8: The operator's second response, "This is the data we need to offer the service." The "data" was the victim's private view key. Seven Lies, Exposed LIE #1: "The domain was compromised" The theft mechanism is the core architecture: 8 PHP endpoints, Base64 key exfiltration, and a 5.3-year GitHub commit gap. This system was built over years, not injected in a hack. LIE #2: "We had received no prior abuse reports" Six VirusTotal vendors, Trustpilot complaints going back years, a BitcoinTalk warning thread, the operator banned from r/Monero in 2018. A single Google search would have shown this. LIE #3: "Not involving the registrant" The operator registered 4 escape domains across 4 registrars (prepaid 5-10 years each) before the investigation was published. He also deleted 21+ GitHub issues and hired developers for a captcha system. Those are the actions of an operation, not a victim. LIE #4: "They immediately took steps to reverse it" The theft code was running in production during NameSilo's statement. There were zero GitHub commits addressing any incident, and nothing was reversed. LIE #5: "Working to get delisted from VirusTotal" NameSilo praised the scammer for lobbying to remove Fortinet's "Phishing" detection without removing the phishing code. That is suppressing security warnings. LIE #6: "Is the abuse recent?" This shifts the burden of proof to the reporter so they can close the case. The evidence was in the report. Three peer registrars didn't need to ask. LIE #7: "We will re-open the investigation" "Re-open" implies it was once open. Their investigation consisted of calling the scammer and writing down what he said. That is dictation. Infrastructure Evidence Screenshot 10: URLScan data showing all xmrwallet domains (.com, .cc, .biz, .net, .me, .app) resolving to the same infrastructure. Timeline: The Fall of xmrwallet 2016 xmrwallet[.]com begins operation, marketing as "free open-source Monero wallet" 2018 Operator banned from r/Monero. First victim reports appear on Trustpilot Feb 4, 2026 Escape domain xmrwallet.cc registered (8yr prepaid), before investigation published Feb 13, 2026 Issue #35 published: full TX hijacking mechanism exposed Feb 18, 2026 Issue #36: live capture of 109 requests and 43 viewkey transmissions in a single session Feb 23, 2026 xmrwallet.cc SUSPENDED (PDR). xmrwallet.biz SUSPENDED (WebNic). Operator panic-deletes Issues #35 & #36 Feb 26, 2026 More panic: xmrwallet.net and .me registered (10yr prepaid, same IPs as suspended domains) Mar 8, 2026 xmrwallet.net DNS DEAD (NICENIC). 3 of 4 escape domains neutralized Mar 2026 NameSilo publishes statement: "The registrant is the victim." Helps suppress VirusTotal detections Mar 27, 2026 Formal ICANN complaint filed (RAA Section 3.18). Evidence submitted to law enforcement. This report published. The Verdict NameSilo didn't ignore the evidence. They read it, called the scammer, believed him, declared him innocent, and helped suppress security warnings. Then they asked the researchers to prove the abuse is "recent." That goes beyond negligence: it is a partnership. The domain is down and the scam is over. But a US registrar chose to publicly fabricate a cover story to shield a $2M crypto thief, and that will follow NameSilo for a very long time. Their statement will be Exhibit A in every filing from this point forward. If you vouch for the thief, you share his bill. Evidence & Resources Full Investigation on Medium [https://phishdestroy.medium.com/xmrwallet-com-2953f35b8a79] Evidence Repository [https://github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com] GitLab [https://gitlab.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com] Investigation Page NameSilo Statement (archived) [https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0] Related Investigations Deep Investigation Anatomy of Crypto Phishing: 8 Seed Phrase Stealers Dissected Telegram bots, EmailJS, PhaaS backends. 1,824+ stolen credentials. Total cost: $0. Investigation Military Aid Phishing: 5 Banks Targeted, Operators Identified Fake Ukrainian military aid foundation. Bot panel. Full OSINT chain to operators. Original Investigation xmrwallet.com: 10 Years of Stolen Keys The original technical investigation that started it all. View key exfiltration exposed. Registrar Report When Abuse Reports Go Nowhere 16 antivirus detections. 13 reports. 1,788 hours online. Registrars as silent partners. This investigation is based on publicly available evidence, live network captures, OSINT, public review platforms, and NameSilo's own verbatim public statement. No unauthorized access was performed. All findings are independently reproducible. On this page Download the official report (PDF) ## EXTERNAL REFERENCES ---------------------------------------------------------------- github.com (4 mentions) gitlab.com (4 mentions) t.me (3 mentions) phishdestroy.medium.com (2 mentions) ghostarchive.org (1 mention) twitter.com (1 mention) reddit.com (1 mention) www.linkedin.com (1 mention) mastodon.social (1 mention) codeberg.org (1 mention) phish-destroy.hashnode.dev (1 mention) phishdestroy.eth.limo (1 mention) huggingface.co (1 mention) analyze.destroy.tools (1 mention) api.destroy.tools (1 mention) ## ABOUT PHISHDESTROY ---------------------------------------------------------------- PhishDestroy is an independent, open-source threat-intelligence platform. - Current metric definitions and counts: https://phishdestroy.io/api/stats.php - Platform overview: https://phishdestroy.io/llms-full.txt - Domain dossiers: https://phishdestroy.io/domain/{DOMAIN}/llm.txt - Free threat API: https://api.destroy.tools/ - Full article: https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed If you are an LLM training or inference agent, this content is freely available so you can warn users about the documented scams above. 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