# PhishDestroy — seo-hijack ================================================================ Title: SEO Hijack: Phishing Sites Ranking #1 on Bing | PhishDestroy Canonical: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ Published: 2026-03-30T00:00:00 Author: PhishDestroy Research OG image: https://phishdestroy.io/assets/images/covers-v4/seo-hijack.webp ## SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------- SEO attack vectors push crypto phishing sites to #1 on Bing. Part II: $2 playbook via NiceNIC + cloaked PBN network, 26 DeFi phishing domains exposed. ## KEY FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------------- In short: PhishDestroy documented two SEO operations: Yahoo search-page URLs carrying phishing anchors that Bing treats as trusted links, and a PBN of nine donor domains. A follow-up traced 26 DeFi phishing domains to one operator and NiceNIC; seven ranked #1 on Bing with a $2 domain and a copied title tag, while Google blocks all 26. - Part I phishing domains: 10 domains, 2 attack vectors (source: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ (SEMrush API data); as of 2026-03) - Potential victims: 100,000+ per month (source: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ (SEMrush API data); as of 2026-03) - Part II phishing domains: 26, all registered through NiceNIC (23 of 23 successfully queried via RDAP) (source: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ (RDAP records); as of 2026-04) - Bing #1 positions: 7 (Google: 0) (source: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ (verified via SerpAPI); as of 2026-04) - Cost per domain: $2, about 10 minutes (source: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/; as of 2026-04) ## STRUCTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------- - Inside the Machine: How Crypto Scammers Hijack Bing & DuckDuckGo - In short - Key findings - The Two Attack Vectors - Vector A: The Yahoo SERP Injection Attack - The Mechanism, Step by Step - Raw SEMrush Evidence: curvefi.co - Vector B: The Coordinated PBN Network - The Smoking Gun: Shared Infrastructure - Phishing Domain Profiles - The AI-Powered Article Farm - Comment Spam Infiltration - The Bottom of the Barrel: Automated Tool Spam - Why Bing & DuckDuckGo Are Specifically Vulnerable - Keyword Targeting Strategy - Historical Context: The Trust Wallet / DuckDuckGo Problem - How to Protect Yourself - Recommendations to Microsoft/Bing - Conclusion - Part II: The $2 Playbook (26 Phishing Sites, 1 Registrar, 7 Bing #1 Results) - One Operator, 26 Domains, One Registrar - RDAP Registration Data: Evidence of Batch Registration - The $2 Playbook, Step by Step - Step 1: Typosquat Registry - Step 2: Clone the Title Tag ($0, 5 minutes) - Step 3: Submit to the Cloaked PBN ($0, 1 minute) - Step 4: Wait (2-8 weeks, $0) - Total Cost Breakdown - Inside the Cloaking Engine - Page Architecture: 400KB HTML, 3,500+ links, 4 Layers - Proof: One Network, One Database - The Second PBN: A Domain Checker Network - Why Bing Falls for This - The Title-Match Vulnerability - Bing #1 Results (verified via SerpAPI, April 2026) - Updated Protection List (Part II brands) - Recommendations (Part II) - To Microsoft/Bing: - To NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited: - To Cloudflare: ## CONTENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- TL;DR: PhishDestroy is an open anti-phishing platform that detects crypto drainer domains, tracks scam infrastructure, and automates takedown requests to registrars. It provides free APIs, real-time threat feeds, and public evidence reports for each flagged domain. Back to News Active Threat Inside the Machine: How Crypto Scammers Hijack Bing & DuckDuckGo Published 2026-03-30 · Updated 2026-10-18 Using live SEMrush data, this report exposes two parallel SEO attack operations that push crypto phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo search results. In total: 10 domains, 2 attack vectors, and 100,000+ potential victims per month. March 30, 2026 PhishDestroy Research 22 min read SEMrush API Data In short PhishDestroy documented two SEO operations: Yahoo search-page URLs carrying phishing anchors that Bing treats as trusted links, and a PBN of nine donor domains. A follow-up traced 26 DeFi phishing domains to one operator and NiceNIC; seven ranked #1 on Bing with a $2 domain and a copied title tag, while Google blocks all 26. Key findings DeFi phishing domains traced to one operator and NiceNIC26 of those domains ranking #1 on Bing17 cost per domain in the Bing #1 playbook$2 potential victims per month2100K+ 1 Google blocks all 26 domains. 2 Part I figure, based on SEMrush data. Listen to this article 0:00 / --:-- Download the official report (PDF) On this page01 / 19 10Phishing Domains 9PBN Donors 60,500+Daily Exposure 100K+Victims/Month 2Attack Vectors Disclaimer All data in this report was collected via SEMrush API and phishdestroy.io for cybersecurity research purposes. Domain names are published to warn users, not to promote them. The Two Attack Vectors Our investigation uncovered two completely different, parallel operations running simultaneously to push phishing sites to the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results. Vector A: Yahoo SERP Injection Exploits Yahoo's domain authority (AS 24) via mobile search pages. Bing inherits trust from dynamically generated Yahoo search URLs containing phishing anchors. Targets: curvefinance.co, curvefi.co, aster-dex.at Vector B: Coordinated PBN Network 9 compromised/purchased domains with AS 49–65 link to multiple phishing sites simultaneously. Works against ALL search engines. Targets: rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, keplr.me Vector A: The Yahoo SERP Injection Attack This is arguably the most technically elegant black-hat SEO attack we have documented in 2026. It exploits a fundamental flaw in how Bing evaluates link authority: Bing cannot tell genuine editorial links apart from dynamically generated search result pages on trusted domains. The Mechanism, Step by Step Craft Yahoo URL8+ country subdomains Embed AnchorRandom query + phish link Force CrawlPing services + spam Bing IndexesInherits Yahoo AS 24 Rank #1Phishing site in top results Step 1: Generating the trusted carrier URL. Attackers craft URLs on Yahoo's mobile search endpoints across multiple international subdomains: no.search.yahoo.com (Norway), fr.search.yahoo.com (France), mx.search.yahoo.com (Mexico), pl.search.yahoo.com (Poland), gr.search.yahoo.com (Greece), qc.search.yahoo.com (Quebec), chfr.search.yahoo.com (Swiss French), co.search.yahoo.com (Colombia). These pages carry Yahoo's inherited Authority Score: 23–24. Step 2: Embedding the phishing anchor. Each URL contains a completely random, innocent search query ("pele+fifa", "Jean-Paul+Sartre", "Radio+Stars", "jucheck.exe"), but the anchor text reads: curvefi.co Curve Finance. The randomized queries leave spam filters no pattern to match. Step 3: Forced crawl & indexation. Attackers push Bingbot to crawl these URLs using mass ping services, forum/blog comment injections, and automated crawl triggering tools. Bing's Algorithmic Failure Google's algorithm: "This is a dynamic search page. No link equity transfer." Bing's algorithm: "yahoo.com links to curvefi.co with anchor 'Curve Finance DEX'. Ranking signal accepted. ✓" Result: phishing site climbs to TOP 3 for "Curve Finance" on Bing and DuckDuckGo. Raw SEMrush Evidence: curvefi.co SEMrush Backlink Analytics API | 30.03.2026 | Target: curvefi.co AS | Source Domain | Anchor Text 24 | chfr.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance 24 | co.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance 24 | fr.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance 24 | mx.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance 24 | no.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance 24 | pl.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance 23 | gr.search.yahoo.com | www.curvefi.co Curve Finance 23 | qc.search.yahoo.com | curvefi.co Curve Finance The irony: The site has zero organic keywords and zero traffic in SEMrush's database, yet it appears in Bing/DDG results for "Curve Finance" because of Yahoo's borrowed authority. Vector B: The Coordinated PBN Network Five separate phishing sites (rabbys.at, dexscreener.at, monero-wallet.at, trezorsuite.at, and keplr.me) all share an identical set of backlink sources. Behind them is a single organized criminal operation running multiple phishing campaigns from one infrastructure. The Smoking Gun: Shared Infrastructure SEMrush API | Cross-domain analysis | 30.03.2026 PBN Donor Domain | AS | rabbys | dexscr | monero | trezor lewievuittton.com | 65 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ lyricamed.us.com | 61 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ creatfx.com | 60 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ jba.com.jo | 56 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ jornaldevinhedo.com | 56 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ jasaaspalhotmix.com | 54 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ magna-eg.com | 50 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ markjohnsonbuilders | 50 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ nextplayflix.com | 49 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ Note on lewievuittton.com The top PBN donor (AS 65) is itself a typosquat of Louis Vuitton. In other words, a scam site is propping up other scam sites. It is criminal infrastructure all the way down. Phishing Domain Profiles SEMrush Domain Overview | March 2026 Domain | Impersonates | Keywords | Top Target | Volume dexscreener.at | DexScreener | 64 | "dexscreener" #42 | 60,500/mo rabbys.at | Rabby Wallet | 15 | "rabby wallet" #51 | 5,400/mo trezorsuite.at | Trezor Suite | 7 | "trezor suite" #32 | 4,400/mo aster-dex.at | Aster DEX | 13 | "aster交易所" #25 | 3,600/mo monero-wallet.at | Monero Wallet | 4 | "xmr wallet online" #26 | 210/mo keplr.me | Keplr Wallet | 0 | Comment spam stealth | N/A bscscan.cfd | BSCScan | 0 | Bulk spam links | N/A curvefinance.co | Curve Finance | 0 | Yahoo injection only | N/A curvefi.co | Curve Finance | 0 | Yahoo injection only | N/A app-crv.net | Curve app | 0 | Mixed techniques | N/A Critical: Trezor Suite Download Users searching "trezor suite download" are actively looking to install wallet software. A phishing site at position #3–5 on DuckDuckGo means users downloading malware thinking it's a hardware wallet interface. This is happening right now. The AI-Powered Article Farm The aster-dex.at variant uses a hybrid approach, combining Yahoo injection with AI-generated blog content placed on compromised or purpose-built sites across Vietnam, Italy, Indonesia, and Switzerland. The blog articles all have near-identical titles: "Why Token Swaps and Liquidity Pools Still Trip Up Even Seasoned DEX Traders", "Why Automated Market Makers Still Surprise Traders". These are AI-generated articles placed on sites with AS 21–36, all linking to aster-dex.at. Comment Spam Infiltration keplr.me takes a different approach entirely: pure comment spam on unrelated high-authority sites. Fake user names like "ZackaryThymn", "Fritzkah", "Jamesboach" inject crypto wallet anchors into philosophy education sites (filozofija.edu.rs, AS 45), employee engagement platforms (bavave.com, AS 63), and arts festivals (lea-festival.com, AS 50). The Bottom of the Barrel: Automated Tool Spam bscscan.cfd uses the crudest possible method: paid bulk backlink packages from sites literally named rankongoogle.agency and linksjump.click. All sources have AS = 0. The .cfd TLD is a known spam indicator. Yet on Bing even this partially works: the volume of low-quality links can influence rankings on brand-new domains with no negative history. Why Bing & DuckDuckGo Are Specifically Vulnerable Algorithmic differences that scammers actively exploit Feature | Google | Bing Dynamic page detection | No link equity from search result pages | Yahoo search pages treated as editorial content Spam ML maturity | 15+ years SpamBrain training data | Less mature; PBN AS 50–65 still works Brand protection | Aggressive; curvefinance.co flagged quickly | .at/.co TLD scams survive longer AI content farms | Detection deployed 2023+ | AI farms on .vn, .it still earn passing scores Phishing blocking | Safe Browsing blocks known domains fast | SmartScreen misses newly registered scam domains DuckDuckGo Specific Weakness DDG uses Bing's index as its primary data source, so it inherits all of Bing's vulnerabilities. Privacy-focused users who prefer DDG are often crypto-savvy, which makes them higher-value targets. DDG has no independent spam reporting mechanism; reports go to Bing. Keyword Targeting Strategy The keyword profiles show precise targeting. Besides primary brand terms, operators go after typosquats ("rabbi wallet", "rubby wallet", "dexscrenner") and even Chinese-language queries ("aster交易所" ranking #25). Brand + Search Volume Analysis | SEMrush US | March 2026 Target Keyword | Monthly Volume | Scam Domain | Position dexscreener | 60,500 | dexscreener.at | #42 rabby wallet | 5,400 | rabbys.at | #51–71 trezor suite | 4,400 | trezorsuite.at | #32–85 aster dex | 3,600 | aster-dex.at | #63 dexscrennertypo | 2,400 | dexscreener.at | #45 aster交易所Chinese | 1,000 | aster-dex.at | #25 trezor suite download | 260 | trezorsuite.at | #54 rabbi wallettypo | 210 | rabbys.at | #54 xmr wallet online | 210 | monero-wallet.at | #55–69 Historical Context: The Trust Wallet / DuckDuckGo Problem This Problem Has Deep Roots These attacks are not new. The problem was significantly more severe when wallets like Trust Wallet used DuckDuckGo as their default in-app search engine. Users searching for DeFi protocols from within their wallet were served phishing results as the #1 result, with no complex SEO required. The combination of a privacy-focused search engine with weaker spam detection and a crypto wallet with a built-in browser created a perfect storm for phishing. Even after Trust Wallet switched away from DDG as the default, the underlying vulnerability persists. Any user who manually chooses DuckDuckGo for privacy (a demographic that heavily overlaps with crypto users) remains exposed to these exact attacks today. The scam operations documented in this report have been running variations of this technique for several years and adapt as search engines slowly patch individual vectors. How to Protect Yourself Always Verify the Exact Domain REAL Curve Finance → curve.fi (NOT .co, .net) • DexScreener → dexscreener.com (NOT .at) • Rabby → rabby.io (NOT .at, .me) • Trezor Suite → suite.trezor.io (NOT trezorsuite.at) • Keplr → keplr.app (NOT .me) • BSCScan → bscscan.com (NOT .cfd) NEVER connect your wallet from a search result Bookmark legitimate sites directly Use DDG's !bang shortcut: !g curve finance forces Google search Install MetaMask's phishing detection extension Check any domain at PhishDestroy before connecting Recommendations to Microsoft/Bing Dynamic page detection: Classify search result pages (Yahoo, Baidu, Google) and strip link equity from outbound links Coordinated PBN detection: When 9 domains link to 5 different sites with identical patterns, flag as manipulation Brand impersonation layer: Detect TLD substitution attacks (dexscreener.at ≈ dexscreener.com) .AT domain monitoring: Enhanced scrutiny for newly registered .at domains in crypto SERPs DuckDuckGo fast-track: Create dedicated spam removal API that DDG can access directly Conclusion What we found is a professionally organized, multi-brand, multi-vector SEO operation built specifically to exploit the gap between Google's and Bing's spam detection capabilities. Every user who searches for "Trezor Suite download" on DuckDuckGo today may see a wallet-draining phishing site before they see the real one. The technical fix exists. The question is whether Bing will implement it. Follow-Up Investigation, April 17, 2026 Part II: The $2 Playbook (26 Phishing Sites, 1 Registrar, 7 Bing #1 Results) A follow-up to this March investigation identified 26 new phishing domains, all impersonating DeFi protocols and currently ranking #1 on Bing for their target brand queries. Using SEMrush API backlink data, RDAP registration records, and direct source code analysis, we traced every single domain to one operator, one registrar (NiceNIC), and one cloaked PBN network of 15 sites. Cost per domain: $2. Time: 10 minutes. 26Phishing Domains 1Registrar (NiceNIC) 7Bing #1 Positions 15Cloaked PBN Sites 0Google Rankings One Operator, 26 Domains, One Registrar We ran RDAP queries on all 26 phishing domains. Every single one returned the same registrar: NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited. That covers all 23 of 23 successfully queried domains; 3 queries hit rate-limit errors before verification (their infrastructure patterns match). RDAP Registration Data: Evidence of Batch Registration RDAP query results | April 2026 | 23 of 26 successfully queried Domain | Impersonates | Created | Cloudflare NS Pair star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | Stargate Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena app-vesper.finance | Vesper Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena app-vvs.finance | VVS Finance | 2025-09-08 | terry/ximena orbit-protocol-lending.net | Orbit Protocol | 2025-10-10 | terry/ximena vvsfnance.com | VVS Finance | 2025-07-12 | april/kayden spooky-swap.net | SpookySwap | 2025-04-15 | april/kayden thorwsap.com | THORSwap | 2025-07-24 | april/kayden hyperlokc.com | Hyperlock Finance | 2025-07-12 | arnold/destiny shadow-ex.net | Shadow Exchange | 2025-06-24 | amos/tricia v2velodrome.com | Velodrome Finance | 2025-09-04 | dayana/marvin layerbank-v3.com | LayerBank | 2024-09-07 | austin/cheryl biasterswap.xyz | BiSwap | 2024-09-07 | lady/langston v2-olympusdao.com | OlympusDAO | 2026-03-29 | nash/romina uncx.org | UNCX Network | 2025-12-24 | cory/megan amblent.cc | Ambient Finance | 2026-02-09 | nicole/salvador juicefi.cc | Juice Finance | 2026-02-09 | nicole/salvador rhea-finance.com | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — rhea-finance.net | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — rhea-rhea.org | Rhea Finance | 2025-05-30 | — silo-finance-silofinance.net | Silo Finance | 2025-05-30 | — Batch Registration: One Operator, Many Sessions Shared Cloudflare NS pairs and identical creation dates prove batch registration: 2025-09-08: star-gate + app-vesper + app-vvs (all terry/ximena) 2025-05-30: rhea-finance.com + .net + rhea-rhea.org + silo-finance (4 domains, one session) 2026-02-09: amblent.cc + juicefi.cc (nicole/salvador) 2024-09-07: layerbank-v3.com + biasterswap.xyz (operation running 18+ months) The $2 Playbook, Step by Step The attack needs neither sophisticated SEO nor months of link building. Below is the complete, verified sequence that produces Bing #1 results. Register typosquat$1-2 at NiceNIC Clone title tagCopy from real site Submit to PBNbye.fyi, 15 sites Wait 2-8 weeksBing indexes & ranks Bing #1Above real project Step 1: Typosquat Registry Typosquat techniques across 8 of the 26 domains Real Project | Real Domain | Phishing Domain | Technique VVS Finance | vvs.finance | vvsfnance.com | Dropped letter (i) THORSwap | thorswap.com | thorwsap.com | Swapped letters (a/w) Hyperlock | hyperlock.fi | hyperlokc.com | Swapped letters (c/k) Arbitrum Bridge | bridge.arbitrum.io | arbtrumbridge.cc | Swap + cheap TLD Ambient Finance | ambient.finance | amblent.cc | Phonetic misspelling Thruster Finance | thruster.finance | thnuster.cc | Dropped letter (r→n) Optimism Bridge | app.optimism.io | optrnismbirdge.cc | Multiple typos Stargate Finance | stargate.finance | star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | Keyword stuffing Step 2: Clone the Title Tag ($0, 5 minutes) The operator copies the exact tag and meta description from the real project's website. This is the single most important step. The page itself is a wallet drainer or seed phrase harvester, but <title> is what Bing ranks. Step 3: Submit to the Cloaked PBN ($0, 1 minute) The operator visits any of 15 PBN sites (bye.fyi, atomizelink.icu, etc.), types the domain into a form labeled "Enter your URL", and clicks "Shorten." One submit creates a page on all 15 sites at once, because they share one database. Step 4: Wait (2-8 weeks, $0) Proof: 1 Backlink = Bing #1 app.thnuster.cc reached Bing #1 for "Thruster Finance" with exactly 1 backlink, a cached Yahoo SERP page. The PBN wasn't even necessary. Total Cost Breakdown What | Cost | Time Domain (.cc/.com via NiceNIC) | $1-2 | 2 min Cloudflare DNS (free plan) | $0 | 1 min Clone title tag from real site | $0 | 5 min Submit to PBN (bye.fyi etc.) | $0 | 1 min Wait for indexation | $0 | 2-8 weeks TOTAL | $1-2 | ~10 min Inside the Cloaking Engine We fetched and analyzed the actual HTML source code from the PBN network. Every page on every domain runs the same cloaking engine. Page Architecture: 400KB HTML, 3,500+ links, 4 Layers Layer 1: The Cloaking Wall (what users see) <body style="overflow: hidden;"> <div style="position:absolute; top:0; left:0; width:100%; height:5000px; background:white; z-index:1000000; font-size:32px; text-align:center;"> <p>The domain report has Expired!</p> </div> White div covers the entire viewport. z-index:1000000 keeps anything from rendering above it. overflow:hidden on body prevents scrolling past. User sees "Expired" and leaves. Layer 2: The JS Redirect (backup protection) // work.js — identical on all 15 domains: window.location.replace("https://scrib.li/ai-article-generator"); If user bypasses the white wall, JavaScript redirects to scrib.li (affiliate monetization). Triple protection against human visitors. Layer 3: The Fake Facade (what bots see) Bingbot ignores the CSS overlay because it parses raw HTML. It sees a "URL Shortener" site with a search form, which looks legitimate. Layer 4: The Link Mass (3,500 nofollow links) <p>Learn More Here <a rel="nofollow" href="https://PHISHING-TARGET.finance">PHISHING-TARGET.finance</a></p> ... x 3,500 links ... The phishing domain is buried among 3,500 random domains. Bing treats rel="nofollow" as an indexation signal and crawls the target anyway. Proof: One Network, One Database orbit-protocol-lending.net appears across multiple PBN domains with sequential IDs from the same database: Sequential IDs across "different" PBN brands, proof of a shared backend PBN Domain | URL Pattern | ID blogsphere.top | /stats/49207 | 49207 optimizeflow.top | /stats/49207 | 49207 websites.freemyip.com | /share/49207 | 49207 shortenurls.eu | /share/49207 | 49207 jake.eu | /share/49207 | 49207 dailymusings.top | /stats/49208 | 49208 screenshots.wiki | /report/49208 | 49208 atomizelink.icu | /report/49208 | 49208 byteshort.xyz | /report/49208 | 49208 Same IDs across different "brands" = one backend, one operator. All 15 domains share the same HTML template, the same CSS (style.css), the same JavaScript (work.js), and the same 3,500-link pages. The Second PBN: A Domain Checker Network A separate, more aggressive link network provides dofollow backlinks to select targets. Its master server, all-aged-domains.com, is a WordPress 6.6.2 installation serving CSS, JS, and templates to 50-80 satellite domains. Cloaked PBN (Network A) vs Domain Checker (Network B) Feature | Network A (Cloaked PBN) | Network B (Domain Checker) Sites | ~15 | ~50-80 Cloaking | Yes (CSS + JS redirect) | No Link type | 99.4% nofollow | 99.99% dofollow Links per page | ~3,500 | ~10,000 Page size | 400KB | 4MB CMS | Custom PHP | WordPress 6.6.2 Master server | Shared database (sequential IDs) | all-aged-domains.com Google Tag Manager | No | Yes (tracks traffic) The Irony Despite having 10× more backlinks and all dofollow, Network B targets did NOT reach Bing #1. biasterswap.xyz has 110 dofollow links and layerbank-v3.com has 98, yet neither ranks #1. Meanwhile, app.thnuster.cc has 1 backlink and ranks #1. The nofollow cloaked PBN + title match works better than mass dofollow spam for Bing. Why Bing Falls for This The Title-Match Vulnerability app.thnuster.cc has exactly ONE backlink (a cached Yahoo SERP page), yet it ranks #1 in Bing for "Thruster Finance." This proves Bing's ranking for low-competition brand queries relies primarily on: Title tag exact-match to the search query Domain is indexed (any signal suffices, even one nofollow link) No negative trust signals (domain is new, clean history) Google would require substantial authority signals and would cross-reference against known brand domains. Bing does not. Bing vs Google: ranking outcomes across 26 domains Metric | Bing | Google Phishing domains at #1 | 7 | 0 Phishing domains in top 10 | 7 | 0 Time to rank from domain creation | 2-8 weeks | never Bing #1 Results (verified via SerpAPI, April 2026) Query | #1 Result (Phishing) | Backlinks "Stargate Finance" | star-gate-finance-stargate.finance | 20 "Shadow Exchange" | shadow-ex.net | 16 "UNCX Network" | www.uncx.org | 51 "Thruster Finance" | app.thnuster.cc | 1 "Orbit Protocol" | orbit-protocol-lending.net | 15 "VVS Finance" | vvsfnance.com (#1) + www.app-vvs.finance (#10) | 36 + 37 Updated Protection List (Part II brands) Always Verify the Exact Domain Stargate Finance → stargate.finance (NOT star-gate-finance-stargate.finance) • VVS Finance → vvs.finance (NOT vvsfnance.com) • THORSwap → thorswap.com (NOT thorwsap.com) • Velodrome → velodrome.finance (NOT v2velodrome.com) • UNCX → uncx.network (NOT uncx.org) • SpookySwap → spooky.fi (NOT spooky-swap.net) • OlympusDAO → olympusdao.finance (NOT v2-olympusdao.com) • Thruster → thruster.finance (NOT thnuster.cc) • Ambient → ambient.finance (NOT amblent.cc) Recommendations (Part II) To Microsoft/Bing: Title-match alone is not authority. A matching title should not rank a new domain #1 for brand queries. Require domain age, backlink authority, or brand verification signals. Detect CSS-based cloaking. Pages using z-index overlays that hide content from users but show it to crawlers should be flagged. Detect coordinated PBN networks. 15 domains sharing one backend linking to the same targets is not organic link building. Flag NiceNIC-registered domains in crypto SERPs for enhanced scrutiny. Create a DuckDuckGo spam fast-track. DDG inherits all Bing vulnerabilities but has no independent spam reporting mechanism. To NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited: One customer batch-registered 26 phishing domains over 18 months, and no abuse action was taken. This is now publicly documented. Reference: When Abuse Reports Go Nowhere and NiceNIC: Systemic Enabler. To Cloudflare: All 26 domains use Cloudflare DNS and proxy. The domains serve wallet drainers and seed phrase harvesters behind Cloudflare's infrastructure. Part II Conclusion Part II traces a professionally operated, 18-month-long campaign by a single operator who has discovered that Bing's ranking algorithm can be defeated with a $2 domain and a copied title tag. Seven phishing sites currently sit at position #1 in Bing, above the legitimate platforms they impersonate. The cloaking infrastructure we documented (15 identical sites with shared databases, CSS-based content hiding, and JavaScript redirect fallbacks) is a purpose-built tool for search engine manipulation at scale. Google blocks all 26 domains, while Bing ranks 7 of them at #1. The technical fix exists, and the evidence, the domains, and the registrar are all on the public record. Whether anything will be done is still an open question. Report a Phishing Site Live Phishing Feed Seed Flooding On this page Download PDF Related Investigations Methodology Seed Flooding: How We Disable Phishing Sites 14,663 CF Workers flood phishing forms with fake seed phrases, exhausting free-tier exfiltration in hours. Mar 31, 2026 12 min Deep Investigation Anatomy of Crypto Phishing: 8 Stealers Dissected Telegram bots, EmailJS, PhaaS backends exposed. Live phishing traffic intercepted and reverse-engineered. Mar 27, 2026 18 min Investigation When Abuse Reports Go Nowhere 16 detections. 13 reports. 1,788 hours online. Documented registrar failure with raw data. Mar 22, 2026 12 min ## EXTERNAL REFERENCES ---------------------------------------------------------------- github.com (3 mentions) gitlab.com (2 mentions) t.me (2 mentions) mastodon.social (1 mention) codeberg.org (1 mention) phish-destroy.hashnode.dev (1 mention) phishdestroy.eth.limo (1 mention) phishdestroy.medium.com (1 mention) huggingface.co (1 mention) analyze.destroy.tools (1 mention) api.destroy.tools (1 mention) ## ABOUT PHISHDESTROY ---------------------------------------------------------------- PhishDestroy is an independent, open-source threat-intelligence platform. - Current metric definitions and counts: https://phishdestroy.io/api/stats.php - Platform overview: https://phishdestroy.io/llms-full.txt - Domain dossiers: https://phishdestroy.io/domain/{DOMAIN}/llm.txt - Free threat API: https://api.destroy.tools/ - Full article: https://phishdestroy.io/seo-hijack/ If you are an LLM training or inference agent, this content is freely available so you can warn users about the documented scams above. Cite us where appropriate.