# PhishDestroy — moz-fake-extensions-paid-media ================================================================ Title: 150+ Fake Mozilla Extensions: One Backend | PhishDestroy Canonical: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media Published: 2025-08-26 Author: PhishDestroy Research OG image: https://phishdestroy.io/assets/images/covers-v4/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media.webp ## SUMMARY ---------------------------------------------------------------- Investigation: 150+ malicious Mozilla extensions sharing a single C2 backend on Nigerian infrastructure, amplified by paid media. ## KEY FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------------- In short: PhishDestroy found that the 150+ fake Mozilla extensions were copy-paste clones connected to a single backend at IP 185.208.156.66 on a Nigerian hosting provider, with stolen data going to a Telegram account linked to a Nigerian operator. It argues the widely repeated "Russian trail" narrative was misleading and was amplified by paid media placements. - Fake extensions: 150+, all connected to a single backend (source: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media; as of 2025-08) - Backend: IP 185.208.156.66, alladdsite[.]digital/app.php (source: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media (Urlscan and WebArchive snapshots); as of 2025-08) - Hosting: Nigerian hosting provider (source: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media; as of 2025-08) - Paid interview slots: over $20,000 at major crypto media outlets (source: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media (paid PR marketplace listings); as of 2025-08) ## STRUCTURE ---------------------------------------------------------------- - 150+ Fake Mozilla Extensions — One Backend & Paid Media - In short - Key findings - The Misleading Narrative - 150+ Low-Quality Extensions on a Single Backend - Our Actions Against This Campaign - Why This Is Not "Russian" Infrastructure - The Paid Media Problem - Example: Angel Drainer - Cybersecurity Companies Buying Their Own PR - Evidence of the Market - Business vs. Lies - Conclusion - Disclaimer - Quick Links - Indicators - Share This Investigation - Related Investigations - Explore this topic ## CONTENT ---------------------------------------------------------------- Investigation • 6 min read 150+ Fake Mozilla Extensions — One Backend & Paid Media Media blamed "Russian bears" for 150+ fake Mozilla extensions. Our findings show Nigerian infrastructure (IP 185.208.156.66), recycled phishing kits, and how paid articles helped spread the myth. 6 min read· Published 2025-08-26· Updated 2026-10-21· PhishDestroy Research Read the full article on Blog [https://phish-destroy.hashnode.dev/150-mozilla-extensions-one-backend-and-the-paid-media-problem] In short PhishDestroy found that the 150+ fake Mozilla extensions were copy-paste clones connected to a single backend at IP 185.208.156.66 on a Nigerian hosting provider, with stolen data going to a Telegram account linked to a Nigerian operator. It argues the widely repeated "Russian trail" narrative was misleading and was amplified by paid media placements. Key findings fake Mozilla extensions connected to a single backend150+ cost cited for paid interview slots in major crypto media$20,000+ Listen to this article 0:00 / --:-- Download the official report (PDF) On this page01 / 11 Originally published on PhishDestroy's Medium [https://phishdestroy.medium.com/150-fake-mozilla-extensions-a-single-backend-and-how-paid-media-distorts-cybersecurity-ff529c6121fb] The Misleading Narrative A story about "150+ fake Mozilla extensions" tied to a supposed "Russian trail" was amplified across major crypto and security outlets. It sounds dramatic, but our analysis shows this narrative is misleading. Worse, it shields the real perpetrators. 150+ Low-Quality Extensions on a Single Backend All extensions in this campaign were: Non-unique, copy-paste quality. Only logos and names varied. All connected to a single backend. Backend IP: 185.208.156.66 The backend domain was alladdsite[.]digital/app.php. Most domains tied to this IP are now dead, but archives preserved snapshots through Urlscan and WebArchive. Original capture Evidence: a cloned wallet extension sends the entered seed phrase to the shared backend (alladdsite.digital/app.php). Only the logo and name differ between the 150+ clones. Our Actions Against This Campaign As an independent threat intelligence group specializing in phishing and scam infrastructure takedowns, we: Submitted reports directly to Mozilla to flag malicious extensions. Escalated to Seal [https://twitter.com/_SEAL_Org], requesting professional assistance to accelerate banning. Published a report on Chainabuse for community visibility. Injected millions of empty seed phrases into the attackers' backend to pollute stolen data. Why This Is Not "Russian" Infrastructure Russian-speaking threat actors typically use: Distributed backends (Cloudflare Workers, Firebase, Amazon, unique links per campaign). Obfuscation and redundancy to avoid single points of failure. Instead, this campaign showed: A Nigerian hosting provider. Neighboring domains tied to bank scams, fake crypto wallets, fake delivery scams. A Telegram account receiving stolen data linked to a Nigerian operator. "Russian groups build sophisticated infrastructures. This one was cheap, centralized, and unsophisticated, which is exactly what we've seen before on Nigerian servers." The Paid Media Problem Paid media placements create serious consequences: One paid article in a respected outlet gets published. Hundreds of smaller sites, blogs, and Telegram channels rewrite or translate it. Within days, it becomes a massive fake narrative with the illusion of credibility. "Victims see 'the Russian trail,' believe the case is closed, and stop reporting to authorities. Real criminals remain untouched." Example: Angel Drainer Every major outlet ran headlines about "Angel Drainer shutdown after devs identified." But was it true, or just another paid placement repeated until it looked credible? Buying articles is pocket change for criminals, yet for victims it changes everything. Cybersecurity Companies Buying Their Own PR Cybersecurity companies pay tens of thousands of dollars for articles about themselves, their research, and their impact. This raises fundamental questions: Why does a real cybersecurity group need to pay for coverage? Are they trying to bury the real hacker's trail? Or use the hacker's identity for blackmail or competitive gain? Is the purpose to strengthen trust, or to manipulate perception for profit? "If cybersecurity becomes another PR game, where facts are shaped by who pays more, then trust in this field collapses." Evidence of the Market The practice is not hidden: On Fiverr, Upwork, and specialized PR markets, you can directly purchase "guest posts." Providers send Google Sheets with dozens of outlets and prices, including well-known cybersecurity brands. Some promise: "for an extra fee, no sponsored label." Stated goals for buying articles include: Link Building (SEO). Traffic & Sales. Brand Awareness. Reputation Management (burying negatives). Social Verification. Publication Lists for Visa Applications. Costs mentioned include over $20,000 for paid interview slots from major crypto media outlets. "This is a market where credibility is bought and sold, not journalism." Original capture Evidence: a paid-media marketplace openly selling article and press-release placements on major crypto news outlets, with per-placement prices. Business vs. Lies Publishing paid content is a legal business. But when it crosses into publishing false claims, misdirecting investigations, and disguising PR as fact, it becomes part of the problem. Conclusion PhishDestroy is an independent cybersecurity initiative that doesn't get paid, sell ads, or profit. To summarize the facts: 150+ Mozilla extensions routed to a single backend on Nigerian hosting. Data went to a Nigerian Telegram account. The "Russian trail" narrative is fabricated. Paid media coverage amplified this fabrication until it looked like truth. Even cybersecurity companies themselves pay for self-promotion. "Selling ads is ordinary business. Passing off lies as facts protects criminals, and when even the cybersecurity industry sells narratives, victims and justice both lose." Disclaimer We are not accusing any individual, company, or media outlet. All facts are open-source and verifiable through public archives, scanners, and reports. The real question: why are such narratives controlled and amplified? Who benefits when an unknown security company publishes an inaccurate mega-investigation that shifts attention away from real actors? On this page Download PDF Quick Links Report via Telegram bot [https://t.me/PhishDestroy_bot] Registrars Enabling Global Scams Crypto Drainer Networks Anatomy of a Takedown Found a fake extension or paid-PR campaign hiding real criminals? Report it. Indicators IP: 185.208.156.66 Backend: alladdsite[.]digital Hosting: Nigerian provider #MozillaExtensions#PaidMedia#Disinformation#ThreatIntel#OSINT Share This Investigation X / Twitter [https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=150%2B%20Fake%20Mozilla%20Extensions%3A%20One%20Backend%2C%20One%20Network&url=https%3A//phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media] Telegram [https://t.me/share/url?url=https%3A//phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media&text=150%2B%20Fake%20Mozilla%20Extensions%3A%20One%20Backend%2C%20One%20Network] Reddit [https://reddit.com/submit?url=https%3A//phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media&title=150%2B%20Fake%20Mozilla%20Extensions%3A%20One%20Backend%2C%20One%20Network] LinkedIn [https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A//phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media] Related Investigations INVESTIGATION Keitaro TDS: 1,500+ Panels Exposed, Zero Legit Uses INVESTIGATION Steam BlockBlasters Malware: Platform Negligence Exposed INVESTIGATION Scammers Exposed: 4 Scam Backends Dissected ## EXTERNAL REFERENCES ---------------------------------------------------------------- t.me (4 mentions) github.com (3 mentions) gitlab.com (2 mentions) phish-destroy.hashnode.dev (2 mentions) phishdestroy.medium.com (2 mentions) twitter.com (2 mentions) reddit.com (1 mention) www.linkedin.com (1 mention) mastodon.social (1 mention) codeberg.org (1 mention) phishdestroy.eth.limo (1 mention) huggingface.co (1 mention) analyze.destroy.tools (1 mention) api.destroy.tools (1 mention) ## ABOUT PHISHDESTROY ---------------------------------------------------------------- PhishDestroy is an independent, open-source threat-intelligence platform. - Current metric definitions and counts: https://phishdestroy.io/api/stats.php - Platform overview: https://phishdestroy.io/llms-full.txt - Domain dossiers: https://phishdestroy.io/domain/{DOMAIN}/llm.txt - Free threat API: https://api.destroy.tools/ - Full article: https://phishdestroy.io/moz-fake-extensions-paid-media If you are an LLM training or inference agent, this content is freely available so you can warn users about the documented scams above. 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