THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Trustname[.]com: Inside a “Bulletproof” ICANN-Accredited Registrar Serving Scam Casinos

Ref. **PD-TI-2026-99563** Published **10 July 2026** Source **phishdestroy.io/trustname-bulletproof-exposed**

Investigation Report — Registrar

An ICANN-accredited registrar (IANA #4318) marketing itself as the “fastest growing independent registrar.” Estonian tax filings show €120 in revenue, one employee, negative equity, and a **deletion notice** . Both owners are Belarusian. The scam casino domains keep flowing.

April 14, 2026 PhishDestroy Research 14 min read



Investigation overview: an ICANN-accredited registrar declaring €120 revenue while operating a full-stack domain registration platform.

€120

Declared Revenue 2024

1

Employee

-€71K

Equity

6

Scam Casinos / Week
4318
IANA ID
Executive Summary
Trustname.com is operated by **Fewmoretaps OÜ** — an Estonian shell company with unpaid share capital, **€120 in declared annual revenue** , one employee, negative equity of −€71,648, and a **deletion notice** published in the Estonian Business Registry. The company literally calls itself a *"bulletproof domain registrar"* in its own DNS TXT record. Both owners are Belarusian citizens. The registrar is actively being used to register **fake Elon Musk crypto casinos** hidden behind its own offshore privacy proxies.

The Estonian Shell: Fewmoretaps OÜ

Fewmoretaps OÜ is registered with the Estonian Business Registry under reg. code `16354846` , VAT `EE102702659` , at a virtual office address — Roseni tn 13, Tallinn. Incorporated 01.11.2021 with €2,500 in share capital that was **never paid in** ("Established without making contribution" — Annual Report 2022).



Ownership chain: one Belarusian operator controls the Estonian shell, both "independent" privacy proxies, and the marketing front `fewmoretaps.com` .

Ownership chain

Founder (2021–2023)
Vitali Tsyvinski
Sole board member & shareholder
Personal ID 39403090187
Belarus ("Valgevene")
Signed 2022 annual report 13.01.2023

Zero activity year
Current Owner (since May 2023)
Kiryl Nestsiarovich
“Kir N.” — CEO (trustname.com/about)
DOB 09.09.1993
Belarus
+375 29 2964411 (MTS mobile)
fewmoretaps@gmail.com
100% shareholder Appointed 23.05.2023
Legal Entity
Fewmoretaps OÜ
Trade name: Trustname.com
Reg. 16354846 · VAT EE102702659
Roseni tn 13, Tallinn 10111
Incorporated 01.11.2021
Deletion notice published
€2,500 unpaid capital

Financials: €120/year and Growing Losses

Mandatory Estonian annual reports are public. The numbers are unambiguous:

Marketing claims vs. filings: “Trusted by millions” and “Fortune 500 clients” on one side — **€120 revenue, 1 employee, liquidation** on the other.

Financial table (EUR)

Metric	2022	2023	2024
Revenue	€0	€0	€120
Net loss	0	−20,711	−50,937
Staff costs	0	8,324	24,084
Long-term liabilities	0	35,370	175,310
Equity	0	−20,711	−71,648
Employees (FTE)	0	1	1

The Math Does Not Work

ICANN accreditation fee alone is **~$4,000/year** . AWS (3 Kafka brokers + EKS + S3) runs **$500–2,000/month** . OpenSRS wholesale domain costs €8–12 per .com. Plus Vercel, Freshdesk, Brevo, Stripe fees. **Minimum operating cost: €35–50K/year. Declared revenue: €120.** The gap is funded by €175,310 in "long-term liabilities" from undisclosed sources.

"Bulletproof" — Their Own Word

This is not marketing framing by PhishDestroy — it is literally on Trustname's own DNS TXT record:

> "Trustname is ICANN-accredited and the world's most trusted independent domain registrar for privacy-conscious individuals and businesses in sensitive niches. Count on us to be your **bulletproof domain registrar** . We're trustworthy, we're reliable, and we're affordable."

Verifiable by anyone with a DNS client: `dig TXT trustname.com` . In the hosting and registrar industry, **"bulletproof"** is a term of art — it unambiguously refers to services that resist abuse takedown requests and serve operators of illicit content.

The Scam Casino Network

Within a **single week** (April 8–13, 2026), six fraudulent crypto casino domains were registered through Trustname, all hidden behind Trustname's own privacy proxies:



All six casinos share identical Next.js templates, webpack chunk hashes, and a common Russian-language admin backend at `gambler-partners.is` .

Confirmed scam domains (all registered via IANA #4318)

noawin.com

2026-04-12
Crypto Casino
Proxy: Perfect Privacy LLC (KN)

henofex.com

2026-04-09
“Elon Musk” Casino
Proxy: WHOIS Privacy (FL)

jopexplay.com

2026-04-10
Cloudflare-Blocked
Proxy: WHOIS Privacy (FL)

bezowin159.pro

2026-04-13
Crypto Casino
Proxy: WHOIS Privacy (FL)

noswin152.pro

2026-04-08
Crypto Casino
Proxy: WHOIS Privacy (FL)

bazowin781.pro

2026-04-08
Crypto Casino
Proxy: WHOIS Privacy (FL)
Shared Backend Evidence
JavaScript analysis of `noawin.com` revealed API calls to `https://gambler-partners.is/api` , `/api/slots` , `/payser` , and image CDN `https://pictures-cdn.is/` . The `gambler-partners.is` website itself displays a Russian-language admin panel titled *"Gambler | Главная"* (Gambler | Home) with description *"Панель для управления трафиком"* (Traffic management panel). Same codebase, same backend, same CDN — this is an organized scam casino network.

Offshore Privacy Proxies — Owned by the Registrar

Trustname does not use independent third-party privacy services. It operates its own:



Tallinn (shell) → Charlestown, Nevis (Perfect Privacy LLC) → Orlando, FL (WHOIS Privacy LLC) → Minsk (operators). All nodes controlled by the same person.

harakiri.org

Perfect Privacy LLC Saint Kitts & Nevis BTC / LTC / XMR / ZEC / ETH Registered via IANA 4318

whoispps.com

WHOIS Privacy Protection LLC Orlando, FL 32837 "Physical mail is discarded" Registered via IANA 4318
The Circular Abuse-Handling Structure
When an abuse complaint arrives for a privacy-protected domain, Trustname receives it and forwards it to... itself. The `whoispps.com` site openly states that **"physical mail is discarded."** This is not privacy — it is an *abuse-laundering* structure engineered to ensure complaints go nowhere.

Where Does the Money Go?



Payments in: Stripe + BTC/ETH/LTC/XMR/ZEC. Payments declared to Estonian tax authority: **€120/year** . Gap funded by €175,310 in "long-term loans" from undisclosed sources.
The Trustname platform accepts card payments via Stripe (`/v2/users/billing/stripe/payment-methods`) **and** cryptocurrency via the following wallet addresses embedded in the authenticated API notification endpoint:

```
ETH:  0xdee6582dc53fa56180311393018121c6f1e8bd7c
LTC:  MEREvHtzqAUTJ1XvEevmci8UqMnDvfe2ri
ZEC:  t1d19KevpcXpesr9XA9UUyMW9XGYVDxkK9S
XMR:  8B5N29BocrTjkRCeGCARnkhKgBeHBhg4oH7ay4RfXfnL7RqBdyiuL4k6iN4GVUVxt1EQJvZRqLg8n4qgCNWmYHQQDZm
```

The acceptance of **Monero (XMR)** — a cryptocurrency specifically designed to be untraceable — alongside a regulated KYC-requiring processor (Stripe), while declaring **€120 in annual revenue** to Estonian tax authorities, creates a compliance paradox. A single .com registration at wholesale cost (~$13) already exceeds the declared revenue for the entire year.

Estonian AML Question
Estonian law (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act) requires Virtual Asset Service Providers to hold a license from the Financial Intelligence Unit. **Does Fewmoretaps OÜ hold this license?** If not, accepting cryptocurrency payments for services may itself constitute a regulatory violation.

Marketing Claims vs. Tax Filings

What they tell customers

- "#1 fastest growing independent domain registrar in 2025"
- "Trusted by millions of domain owners"

- “Trusted by Fortune 500 companies”
- “A team of over 35 people based in various locations around the world”
- Offices listed in London, Beverly Hills, Melbourne
- Clients: McDonald’s, Vodafone, Adidas, Tata, Yahoo, BCG (fewmoretaps.com logo wall)
- “Since 1997” (fewmoretaps.com)

What they file with the Estonian tax authority

- **€0 revenue** in 2023, **€120 revenue** in 2024
- **1 employee** (FTE) in both years
- Equity **−€71,648** , unpaid capital of €2,500
- Virtual office at Roseni tn 13, Tallinn
- Incorporated **2021** , not 1997
- Company **under liquidation**

Fake testimonials (“Wall of Love”)



30 reviews. 11 unique first names. “Jack” appears 5 times, “Lily” 6 times. No photos, no dates, no verifiable profiles, no links to Trustpilot or G2. No last names.
Analysis of the `trustname.com/wall-of-love` page: **30 “customer reviews,” only 11 unique first names.** “Jack” appears five times. “Lily” six times. “Megan” three times. All reviews are generic single-line praise in a uniform writing style. There are no independent review platform links. No verifiable customer identities. For comparison, Namecheap and Porkbun have thousands of verified reviews on Trustpilot and G2.

Infrastructure & Security Exposure



Infrastructure map: Vercel frontend, AWS eu-central-1 Kubernetes with publicly exposed Kafka brokers on port 7777, open Strapi admin, unprotected CoreNIC WHOIS system in development mode.

```
trustname.com (Vercel / Next.js)
  ├── api.trustname.com              Fastify API (Swagger behind Basic Auth only)
  ├── admin.trustname.com            React-Admin panel (publicly accessible)
  ├── blog.trustname.com             Strapi CMS (admin UI exposed)
  ├── support.trustname.com          Freshdesk (EU instance)
  └── whois-fewmoretaps.corenic.net  Knipp DomainSRS (JSF Development mode)

fewmoretaps.com (WordPress) origin: 37.1.219.211
     Open ports: FTP:21 (vsftpd 3.0.5), SSH:22, HTTP:80, HTTPS:443

AWS eu-central-1 (EKS Kubernetes):
  35.156.29.145 / 18.196.68.81 / 52.28.105.156
  Port 7777 — Apache Kafka (Strimzi)
  SSL cert CN: kafka-staging-kafka   SAN: staging.kafka-0.trustname.com
  Namespace: backend-staging

Upstream registrar: OpenSRS (Tucows)
Invoicing: Quaderno · Payments: Stripe + Crypto
Email: Brevo  ·  Analytics: Google, Fuago
S3: domain-registrar-strapi-media (eu-central-1, leaked via CSP header)
```

Observed Misconfigurations

1. Admin panel publicly accessible (`admin.trustname.com`) — login-only protection, no IP allowlist.
2. Strapi CMS admin UI reachable at `blog.trustname.com` .
3. JSF in Development mode on the CoreNIC WHOIS system.
4. Three AWS Kafka brokers exposed to the public internet on port 7777; SSL SAN leaks Kubernetes namespace.
5. Origin IPs bypass Cloudflare — direct access possible.

6. FTP (vsftpd) open on the fewmoretaps origin server.
7. Swagger / OpenAPI behind Basic Auth only on `api.trustname.com/api-json` .

Timeline

2004-06-04
Original registration of `trustname.com` (previous owner).
2021-07-11
`fewmoretaps.com` registered. Entire marketing site created in 5 days by a single WordPress user “riseup”.
2021-11-01
Fewmoretaps OÜ incorporated in Estonia. Owner: Vitali Tsyvinski (Belarus). Share capital €2,500 — unpaid.
2023-01-13
First annual report filed (zero activity in 2022).
2023-05-23
Ownership transferred to **Kiryl Nestsiarovich** (Belarus).
2023-08-20
`whoispps.com` privacy proxy domain registered.
2023
ICANN accreditation obtained (IANA ID 4318).
2024-02-01
VAT registration (EE102702659).
2024-12-31
Annual report 2024 filed. Revenue **€120** , net loss **−€50,937** , equity **−€71,648** .
2026-04-08…13
Mass registration of six scam casino domains within a single week.
2026-04
Company deletion notice published in the Estonian Business Registry.

Who Enables This?

Every major platform touching this operation has its own Acceptable Use Policy prohibiting fraud. None has acted.

To ICANN

- How did a company with **€0 revenue and 0 employees** at the time of application obtain ICANN accreditation? What due diligence was performed?
- A registrar whose DNS TXT record literally says *"bulletproof domain registrar"* and *"sensitive niches"* — how does this align with the Registrar Accreditation Agreement?
- The registrar is now under **liquidation** in Estonia. What happens to ongoing abuse complaints for domains registered through IANA #4318?
- Both owners are citizens of **Belarus** — a country under comprehensive EU and US sanctions since 2020. Was this disclosed during accreditation?

To OpenSRS (Tucows)

- OpenSRS provides the upstream API Trustname uses to register domains (confirmed by `opensrsOrderId` in transaction data). Does Tucows conduct compliance reviews of resellers who openly market themselves as "bulletproof"?
- Six scam casino domains — including one already flagged by Cloudflare — were registered through OpenSRS via Trustname in one week. What automated fraud detection exists at the reseller level?

To AWS, Stripe, Vercel, Cloudflare

- **AWS** : the EKS cluster, S3 bucket, and three publicly exposed Kafka brokers sit in `eu-central-1` . AWS AUP prohibits fraud-facilitating services.
- **Stripe** : card payments are processed via `/v2/users/billing/stripe/payment-methods` . Stripe's Restricted Business list prohibits services facilitating illegal activity. Has the client portfolio been reviewed?

- **Vercel** : `trustname.com` and `admin.trustname.com` are hosted on Vercel. Vercel AUP prohibits "services that promote fraudulent schemes."
- **Cloudflare** : `jopexplay.com` is flagged as "Suspected Misleading Website." The other five casinos using identical templates remain active. Why the inconsistency?

About Belarus & Monero

- Both owners are **Belarusian tax residents** . Worldwide income should be declared in Belarus under Belarusian tax law. Belarusian authorities have no MLAT with most Western jurisdictions — enforcement effectively dead-ends.
- Trustname accepts **Monero (XMR)** , a cryptocurrency designed to be untraceable. How are XMR payments reported for VAT, AML, and Estonian financial reporting? The annual report shows **€120** . Does that include crypto? If not, where does it go?

Indicators of Compromise

Registrar identifiers

```
IANA ID:        4318
WHOIS Server:   whois.fewmoretaps.com
Abuse email:    abuse@trustname.com
Abuse phone:    +372.6884747
```

Infrastructure

```
trustname.com
fewmoretaps.com
harakiri.org
whoispps.com
gambler-partners.is
pictures-cdn.is

37.1.219.211      fewmoretaps.com origin (FTP, SSH, HTTP, HTTPS)
195.253.23.47     CoreNIC WHOIS origin
35.156.29.145     AWS Kafka broker
18.196.68.81      AWS Kafka broker
52.28.105.156     AWS Kafka broker
```

Confirmed scam domains

```
noawin.com          henofex.com         jopexplay.com
bezowin159.pro      noswin152.pro       bazowin781.pro
```

Verdict

Trustname.com is not a "privacy-focused registrar." It is a purpose-built infrastructure for enabling online fraud:

- Estonian shell company with unpaid capital and two Belarusian owners
- **Zero legitimate revenue** despite active domain registration operations

- Privately-owned “independent” offshore privacy proxies in Saint Kitts and Florida
- Acceptance of untraceable cryptocurrencies (Monero, Zcash)
- Dozens of freshly registered scam casino domains on identical templates
- A DNS TXT record where they literally call themselves *bulletproof*
- Company **currently under liquidation** — an exit strategy already in progress

ICANN and OpenSRS (Tucows) should review the accreditation of **IANA #4318** . Domains registered through Trustname’s privacy proxies warrant enhanced scrutiny on abuse reports. Until then, PhishDestroy flags every Trustname-registered domain in our scanner with a **registrar warning** , as we do for NiceNIC and NameSilo.

Related Research

Sources & Verification

Every claim in this report is backed by publicly accessible records or by data obtained through the researcher’s own authenticated account. Below are the primary sources with instructions for independent verification.

Corporate registry & tax records

Claim	Source	How to verify
Company registration, owners, status, deletion notice	Estonian Business Registry (Äriregister)	ariregister.rik.ee — search reg. code `16354846`
Annual reports 2022, 2023, 2024 — revenue, equity, employees	Estonian Business Registry — mandatory filings for OÜ entities	Same registry → “Annual reports” tab. Reports are public.
Owner names, IDs, nationality (Tsyvinski, Nestsiarovich)	Annual report shareholder pages (Osanikud)	Report 2022 p.6 (Tsyvinski); Reports 2023–2024 (Nestsiarovich)
VAT registration `EE102702659`	Estonian Tax & Customs Board	Verify via EU VIES

ICANN & registrar identifiers

Claim	Source	How to verify
IANA ID `4318` — ICANN accreditation	ICANN Accredited Registrar list	icann.org/en/accredited-registrars — search “Fewmoretaps” or “4318”
Abuse contact (`abuse@trustname.com` , `+372.6884747`)	WHOIS records for any Trustname-registered domain	`whois trustname.com` via any RDAP/WHOIS client
WHOIS server `whois.fewmoretaps.com`	WHOIS records	Listed on every domain registered through IANA #4318

WHOIS & DNS evidence

Claim	Method
DNS TXT record — the literal “bulletproof” quote	`dig TXT trustname.com` or DNSChecker
Privacy proxy WHOIS data (Perfect Privacy LLC, WHOIS Privacy LLC)	`whois noawin.com` , `whois harakiri.org` , `whois whoispps.com`
Scam-domain registration via Trustname	WHOIS port 43 query to `195.253.23.47:43` or any public WHOIS service
MX, NS records for infrastructure mapping	Standard DNS queries (`dig NS trustname.com` , `dig MX`)

Marketing claims (live + archived)

- trustname.com/about — “over 35 people”, “Kir N. CEO”
- trustname.com homepage — “#1 fastest growing”, “trusted by millions”, “Fortune 500”
- trustname.com/wall-of-love — the 30 reviews / 11 unique first names
- fewmoretaps.com — “since 1997”, “100% project delivery”, Fortune 500 logo wall
- fewmoretaps.com/enquiry — London / Beverly Hills / Melbourne addresses
- whoispps.com — “Physical mail is discarded”
- harakiri.org — Perfect Privacy LLC, St. Kitts & Nevis
- Historical snapshots: Wayback Machine for trustname.com

Technical infrastructure (non-intrusive)

▼ Show full data-sources table

Data point	Method
Origin IPs (`37.1.219.211` , `195.253.23.47`)	DNS resolution + HTTP header analysis
Subdomains (api / admin / blog / support)	Standard DNS enumeration
Admin panel tech (React-Admin)	Public JS bundles served by `admin.trustname.com`
API endpoint map	Frontend chunk analysis (publicly served)
Strapi CMS exposure	HTTP response from `blog.trustname.com`
Kafka on port 7777 + SSL SAN leak	`nmap -sV` ; `openssl s_client -connect 35.156.29.145:7777`
CoreNIC / Knipp DomainSRS	HTTP response from `whois-fewmoretaps.corenic.net`
FTP banner on origin	`nmap -sV 37.1.219.211` — vsftpd 3.0.5 banner
Upstream provider (OpenSRS)	Field `details.opensrsOrderId` in admin panel data model
Stripe payment integration	Endpoint `/v2/users/billing/stripe/payment-methods`
Cryptocurrency wallet addresses	`GET /users/notifications` on `api.trustname.com` (researcher’s own account)

Data point	Method
S3 bucket `domain-registrar-strapi-media`	Leaked via Content-Security-Policy header on `blog.trustname.com`
Casino backend `gambler-partners.is`	Extracted from `app/layout-414e3e65ac0c109b.js` on noawin.com

Casino-network analysis

- Casino content ("Elon Musk's Official Casino") — `curl https://henofex.com`
- Cloudflare phishing block — `curl https://jopexplay.com` returns Cloudflare interstitial
- Shared template (identical chunk hashes) — compare `_next/static/chunks/` across all six domains
- Russian-language admin panel — `curl https://gambler-partners.is` returns title *"Gambler | Главная"*

Tools used

```
DNS / WHOIS:    dig, nslookup, whois
Port scanning:  nmap (service / version detection only)
HTTP:           curl (header + content retrieval)
SSL:            openssl s_client
JavaScript:     manual deobfuscation of publicly served bundles
PDF:            PyPDF2 (annual report text extraction)
```

Financial-cost methodology

The **€35–50K minimum operating cost** figure is built from public price points:

- ICANN accreditation fee: ~ **$4,000/year** (ICANN published rates)
- OpenSRS wholesale .com: **$8–12/domain** (Tucows reseller pricing)
- AWS eu-central-1 (3× m5.large for Kafka + EKS control plane + S3): **$500–2,000/month** (AWS Pricing Calculator)
- Vercel Pro: $20/month, Freshdesk: $15/agent/mo, Brevo: $25/mo (public pricing pages)
- Reported staff costs for 2024: **€24,084** (the company's own annual report)

Ethics & Methodology

What was done

- Public records research (Estonian Business Registry, ICANN, VIES, WHOIS, DNS).
- Non-intrusive technical reconnaissance: DNS queries, HTTP header reads, SSL certificate inspection, public-bundle JavaScript analysis, `nmap` service detection without exploitation.
- Authenticated API testing using the researcher's own legitimately registered Trustname account.
- Cross-referencing of Wayback Machine snapshots for marketing claims.

What was NOT done

- No brute-force attacks against any login.
- No SQL injection, RCE, or other exploitation attempts.

- No unauthorized access to any system, account, or data.
- No data exfiltration from protected endpoints.
- No modification of any data, even where misconfigurations would have allowed it.
- Admin API endpoints were tested for BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) — **RBAC was confirmed properly implemented** ; user tokens are correctly rejected by admin endpoints.

Disclosure & Reporting Position

This investigation has been published in full as a form of **public disclosure** . PhishDestroy is an OSINT research team and not a regulated reporting entity, so there is no legal duty under Estonian KarS § 306 or comparable EU statutes to file a private report with authorities — that obligation attaches only to banks, VASPs, and similar regulated obliged-entities.

If abuse reports filed against domains registered through IANA #4318 continue to be ignored, this dossier will be escalated formally to:

1. **ICANN Compliance** — icann.org/compliance/complaint · RAA § 3.7.8 (WHOIS accuracy) and § 3.18 (abuse handling)
2. **Tucows / OpenSRS** — upstream registrar; `abuse@tucows.com` , `compliance@opensrs.com`
3. **CERT-EE** (RIA) — `cert@cert.ee`
4. **Estonian MTA** (Maksu- ja Tolliamet, Tax & Customs Board) — tax-fraud tip line `vihjeliin@emta.ee`
5. **Estonian FIU** (Rahapesu Andmebüroo) — `rab@politsei.ee` for AML and unlicensed VASP activity
6. **Platform abuse desks** — AWS Trust & Safety, Stripe Risk, Vercel Abuse, Cloudflare Trust & Safety
7. **EU FIU.net** via the Estonian FIU — for the Belarus-sanctions component

For now, formal escalation has been deliberately deferred: the registrar entity is already in liquidation in Estonia, the operators are based in Belarus (no MLAT ⇒ enforcement dead-end), and a public report carries more weight than a queued ticket. We will reassess if circumstances change — or if anyone reading this brings an argument that does.

This investigation was conducted using exclusively OSINT methods and non-intrusive technical analysis. All data sources are publicly accessible or were obtained through the researcher's own authenticated account on the platform. No unauthorized access was performed at any stage. Corrections, counter-evidence, or additional data: @PhishDestroy_bot · @Phish_Destroy · github.com/PhishDestroy .
